

# THE ANNALIST

A Magazine of Finance, Commerce and Economics

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
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Ten Cents

## Chief Contents

	Page
Labor Day Ethics and Economics.....	Edward A. Bradford 267
The Cost of Industrial Strikes.....	Dr. R. Estcourt 269
Coal Mining Stocks for Investment.....	H. A. Haring 270
Growing Debts of the States and Their Significance.....	Edward C. Delafield 271
The Annalist Barometer of Business Conditions.....	273
Barometrics.....	274
The New York Stock Exchange Transactions.....	276
The Trend of Bond Prices.....	277
The Week's Curb Transactions.....	279
Branch Banking.....	John E. Barber 281
Open Security Market.....	284



In the upper portion the black line shows the closing average price of fifty stocks, half industrials and half railroads. The black area shows for each week the highest and lowest daily average price of the twenty-five industrials, and the white area the corresponding figures for twenty-five rails. In the lower portion the distance from the base line to the top of the black area shows total weekly volume of sales and the white area weekly volume of the fifty stocks used in the preparation of this chart.

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# THE ANNALIST

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NEW YORK, MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 18, 1922

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## Labor Day Ethics and Economics

By Edward A. Bradford

**S**ELDOM has labor celebrated a Labor Day more sedately than this year. Yet never has American labor been more militant. Never before have there been a greater number on strike, for issues considered more essential to labor. Wage issues have been subordinated to demands of both moral and political significance. The strongest union in the United States refused to take its part in the economic readjustment following the war and added to its wage demand one for a national settlement controlling both the hard and soft coal trades. In the Roosevelt settlement twenty years ago the unions were not allowed even to sign the award, for reasons which might well have controlled this year. Now the unions are admitted as signatories to a treaty which makes the national issue part of the wage issue and promises future trouble. The railway strikers lost this issue of national control by a union, but the decision was not made in a manner preventing its arising again. In both cases there was a demand for a "living wage," for the assertion of humanity to labor over the needs of the community dominated by labor, and for the consideration of labor as something other than a commodity, to be paid for upon economic considerations. This is the point at which the year's strikes mingled ethics and economics, and the Church entered into the controversy.

Among the most notable Labor Day sermons was one by the Right Rev. Edwin S. Lines, Bishop of Newark, at the opening of the National Convention of the Episcopal Church at Portland. He remarked that the material progress of the world had been greater than the moral. Naturally, there are no novelties in conduct; right remains right and wrong remains wrong, on principles that are universal and eternal. Inventions are made with breathless speed, and labor shares in the material benefits of all of them, although capital develops them. But in morals there is backsliding, which makes a challenge to the Church to be accepted with courage. Said Bishop Lines:

The Church must make its own the cause of the unprivileged people, of those who are in hard places in life, of those upon whom the existing social and industrial order presses heavily, while it must stand against injustice, unfairness on both sides. The Church is suffering today from too close association with those high in authority, and in prosperity, while less considerate for the great majority for whom life is one long unending struggle, often with little hope, often in poverty. It is suffering for its silence when horrible abuses thrived in English mills and mines in the first half of the last century. We have not measured yet the meaning of our Lord's compassion on the great multitude.

The Church cannot countenance violent methods or an unfair day's pay or an unfair day's work, or the breaking of agreements, but it must never

**The Labor Board and a Reasonable Wage**

Needless to say, law does not include a theoretical family budget among the seven standards of a just and reasonable wage, and does same demand had been made on behalf of the in comparable employment. The board found no difficulty in declining a "living wage" to this deserving class of workers, because the not include comparison with the wages paid shopworkers in a more extravagant form.

That discovery does not rest upon the decision of the Labor Board. The same demand was raised in proceedings before the New Zealand Arbitration Court, and the recommendation of the Australian Royal Commission in support was quoted. Nevertheless the Arbitration Court reduced wages because "the total income of the country was insufficient to pay £5 16s. a week to every adult male worker, and because there were not enough children to sustain the argument for a family wage."

lose its interest, nor forget its obligation in the Master's name for the great multitude in the hard places in life. It must be able to give voice to the aspirations and hopes and desires of this multitude for something better in life for themselves and their children. Out from unspoiled homes are to come those who shall maintain the life of the Church and the service of religion. The Master's heart went out to those who had the least in the way of possessions or opportunity in life and so must the heart of the Church. Our Blessed Lord came into the world to get under that heavy burden which rests upon the great majority of men and women, and woe is to the Church if with His spirit and example, it does not try to get under that burden also.

That is both judicious and sympathetic, well expressive of the function of the Church. It shines in comparison with utterances of other clerics, who have undertaken to say with precision and decision how many hours labor should work, and what wages should be paid. Such matters more concern Caesar than the Church of any faith or denomination. But that does not prevent well meant intervention. For instance, the Research Department of the Social Service Commission of the Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America handed down what may be called the following ex cathedra decision in connection with the railway shopmen's wage reduction by the Labor Board:

It is perfectly patent that the wage reductions ordered bring the earnings of large numbers of employees below the level of a minimum living standard. It is also clear, however grave the crisis, that any effort to enforce as mandatory the board's decision will be contrary to the law as expressly interpreted at the time of its passage and will be regarded by the men as a breach of faith.

It is not clear where the "Protestant

denominations in America" get their authority to make decisions in law. The conflict between ethics and economics will be considered in a few lines later, the present point being the injudicious and excessive partisanship of some churchmen in contentious matters concerning which bishops have no especial qualifications or authority. For example, one of Bishop Lines's colleagues reproached Government and capital for their labor policy, saying:

I admit there is anarchy in labor ranks, but under the present system there is bound to be anarchy.

The Anglican Church is far ahead of the Episcopal Church in America in its attitude toward labor. Of the thirty bishops, eight are members of the Labor Party.

Labor has far more intelligent leadership in England than here—partly because the movement is older there. But also the church folk and the intellectuals have not held aloof from the movement. The leaders of thought in England are also leaders of the Labor Party. There is a tremendous political force back of the labor movement, and this force must find expression.

HERE are comparisons between British and American policies on which an opinion is not expressed. But it would seem that the British bishops might have used their influence to moderate the British strikes, which have rivalled the American in their spirit of domination at any cost of distress to others than union labor. Whether British or American labor are fifty years ahead of or behind each other, as their respective leaders have contended, they are alike in readiness to carry their points by ruthless power used in methods unworthy of savages, and betraying no traces of sympathy or even tenderness for any but themselves. That the Church should be sympathetic toward the

lowly and distressed is in accord with its best traditions and divine inspiration. But when the Church meddles with the "living wage question" it is in danger of finding it loaded for the Church as well as for labor.

Take for example the question now before the Labor Board regarding a reasonable wage for the railway maintenance of way men. On behalf of the men it was put in evidence, or more appropriately in argument, that \$1,600 a year was a minimum living wage. The demand was made in behalf of 400,000 workers, in whose favor it must be said that they are proceeding according to law, and are not seeking to impose their will by a strike. But it is clear that, however deserving they may be in all respects, 400,000 cannot expect, and should not have, a wage above others of like desert. There are 17,000,000 workers of that class in the nation, and the concession of this so-called living wage to all of them would demand \$11,300,000,000 above the present scale. For railway trackmen alone the increase would be \$1,300,000,000. The Labor Board promptly declined to recognize the argument, and resolved to proceed according to the Transportation Act, from which they draw their only right to act at all.

Needless to say, law does not include a theoretical family budget among the seven standards of a just and reasonable wage, and does not include comparison with the wages paid in comparable employment. The board found no difficulty in declining a "living wage" to this deserving class of workers, because the same demand had been made on behalf of the shopworkers in a more extravagant form. If their demand had been granted all other workers would have been entitled to the same pay, and the total would have exceeded the total earnings of the nation for this single class of it. In short the living wage as propounded by the workers is both impossible, and unjust privilege in their favor at the cost of others.

THAT discovery does not rest upon the decision of the Labor Board. The demand was raised in proceedings before the New Zealand Arbitration Court, and the recommendation of the Australian Royal Commission in support was quoted. Nevertheless the Arbitration Court reduced wages because "the total income of the country was insufficient to pay £5 16s. a week to every adult male worker, and because there were not enough children to sustain the argument for a family wage." If that "living wage" for a family were adopted "it would involve payment of maintenance for 150,000 non-existent wives and 672,000 non-existent children." The case is similar in this country. The unions ask for a living wage for an average family of five. The Department of Labor has surveyed ninety-two localities and found a difference of \$259.06 between the maximum and minimum family budgets. Moreover, according to the census, there is an average of 6.4 per-

sons in a family, not five. Also the average of dependent children to a family is 1.4, not three, according to the living wage advocates. According to the living wage theory there are 73,055,028 dependents on the living wage, whereas, according to the census, there are 35,000,000. It seemed to the railways, which would have had to pay the bills, that the living wage on the family budget theory would call for the support of a fictitious population of 38,055,028, and that 5 per cent. of the male workers would be burdened with the support of 10.4 of the dependents of the country. The ideal is laudable theoretically. Practically, whatever is paid out of the country's total income, whatever it may be, to any class above its just proportion for the sake of humanitarianism, must come out of other workers at the expense of humanitarianism. Arithmetic will not yield to the most praiseworthy sentiment.

The "living wage" doctrine dates from Pope Leo's encyclical in 1891. Others have espoused it, before and since, but his is the most authoritative declaration in these words from his encyclical:

There is a dictate of nature more imperious and ancient than any bargain between man and man, that the remuneration must be enough to support the wage-earner in reasonable and frugal comfort. If, through necessity or fear of a worse evil, the workman accepts harder conditions, because an employer or contractor will give him no better, he is the victim of fraud and injustice.

President Harding has expressed the same sentiment in these words in connection with current events:

In our effort at establishing justice we must see that the wage-earner is placed in an economically strong position. His lowest wages must be enough for comfort, enough to make his house a home, enough to insure that the struggle for existence shall

not crowd out the things worth living for. There must be provision for education, for recreation, and a margin for saving.

If the President were asked whether or not employers would do wrong to pay a worker enough for his personal support, but not enough to support a family, he could not do as the Pope did—refer the question to a Cardinal. Repeated "proofs" that families cannot live on the prevailing rate of wages is met by the fact that families do live on the wages paid. The reconciliation of the conflict lies in the fact that the family is the economic unit rather than the individual, many children adding their earnings to the father's. It is unjust and impracticable either to raise the bachelor's pay to the married man's, or to reduce the married man's to the bachelor's. Either way the industry would be starved. There may be nothing immoral or unethical in starving an industry, but that would be more injurious to the community to which the maintenance of industry is essential than a compromise wage. The family is swallowed in the community and production is by the community under the industrial regime even more truly than by the individual or family. Whatever the wage, it is more than the man or his family could earn separately. More than is produced cannot be divided, and whatever reduces production reduces the dividend to whatever unit of production. Christian ethics are not to be rejected because inconsistent with economics and practicalities of actual life. More progress will be made if business ethics are raised, rather than that the churches should raise contentions and depreciate their own esteemed influence by taking up indefensible positions.

There is nothing sectarian in Catholic views of social questions. There is no such thing as a Roman Catholic system

of political economy. But the oldest human institution has learned to accommodate itself to realities of life, and its spokesmen have just now taken thought to urge the claims of the forgotten element of the community—the consumers. The National Catholic Welfare Council is no less considerate of the workers than the Protestant denominations, but it is more cautious in its championship, because it sees the subject more nearly as a whole. The Council rejoices in labor's recent victories, but fears that, unless labor, with its practical experience of industrial life, shows the public something worth while, the public, in its anxiety, may pick upon something injurious to the working people. It is not an idle fear.

GOVERNOR MILLER has propounded that workers engaged in the production of necessities have no right to stop working at their own will, or to refuse to work except on their own terms. Labor's refusal of compulsory arbitration is known to all and Governor Miller's idea has been denounced within the last few days by many spokesmen for labor, and even by others. The Call (Socialist) considers the idea practical conscription of labor and some labor authorities charitably suggest that the Governor has lost his mind. Perhaps. Also he may be a mindreader, and may perceive more clearly what is in the community mind than those interested against the community's interest.

The Catholic Council takes ground like the Governor's, and sees signs that strikes are to be outlawed, because the community does not perceive the necessities of the workers. "Usually it is not a wanton desire to crush free contract that prompts the outlawing of strikes. Ordinarily it comes from a keen sense of the harm strikes inflict upon the general public, and the belief that

the consumers must be protected even at the cost of denying to employees in industry the reality of freedom of contract. Most persons favor the unions \*\*\* but a great many persons are hindered from acting upon these convictions by the belief that the working people are not doing all they can for the consumers. During strikes this belief comes clearly to the surface \*\*\* The public needs to be told that if the employees in industry are to help the general public a great deal, they should be made partners in the industry. They should not be kept in the position of one who can be hired and fired at will, and is paid the lowest wages the "labor market" allows. The public needs to be told that employees strike but partners do not and that, to stop strikes, employees should be made partners \*\*\* Because the issue is in the balance it appears imperative for the working people to lay their plans to secure the greater dignity and rewards of partners in industry and, at the same time, help to obtain for the consumer a steady flow of goods at a fair price."

That more or less practical than the doctrines of the Protestant divines that the living-wage should be paid, whether or not it is or can be earned? At least it is safe to answer that there are many working partners in industry, and will be more as soon as the unions qualify for partnership, and give over their dreams of domination by ruthless methods. Consider the thousands of affidavits officially read in court of hundreds of outrages, unworthy of civilized war, committed in the interest of the living-wage advocates. How can capital admit to partnership those whose creed is based on increasing costs and decreasing production and abolishing profits? The ecclesiastics who espouse the cause of labor have much missionary work to do among their protégés.

## The Legislative Week in Washington

*Special Correspondence of The Annalist*  
WASHINGTON, Sept. 16.

THE Senate adopted the Capper-Tincher Grain Futures act, which was framed to overcome the objections made by the United States Supreme Court to the original grain futures legislation.

Secretary of Commerce Hoover declared that the economic losses to the country because of the coal and railroad strike were overestimated and said "If we can secure a resumption of transportation and rapid distribution of coal and agricultural products, we will not have received such an economic wound as cannot be very quickly recovered from."

The State Department announced that the Haitian Government, through John A. McIlhenny, had invited two bankers to submit bids to be opened here on Sept. 25 for the \$16,000,000 bond issue, representing Series A in connection with the \$40,000,000 loan provided for in the protocol between Haiti and the United States, dated Oct. 3, 1919. The bonds will bear 6 per cent. interest and mature in 1952.

The United States Shipping Board sold 226 wooden ships, built during the war, to George D. Perry, of San Francisco, for \$750,000. The average cost of the vessels was \$700,000 each. They will be dismantled.

The Treasury announced its estimates indicated that the income and profits taxes to be collected this month would amount to about \$270,000,000. Against this tax-payment the Treasury has outstanding about \$360,000,000 of Treasury certificates which mature Sept. 15 and are acceptable in payment of taxes. The 4% per cent. Victory notes have also been made acceptable in payment of taxes.

The soldier bonus bill was adopted by the House without a record vote and transmitted to the Senate. It is the belief here that the bill will go to the President and that he will veto it. Polls

still indicate that advocates of the bill will be unable to rally enough votes to pass it over the veto.

Revolt in the House over the tariff bill has forced the conferees to remove the dye embargo and place potash on the free list. New rates for dyes are fixed as a compromise between the high Senate rates and the rates proposed by the House. New rates, it is believed, will permit importation of considerable quantities of dyes.

The State Department announced that reports from Cuba were that the Cuban Congress was holding up the reform program which had been approved by President Zayas and that much concern was felt. The Department holds that "no progress can be made toward the financial rehabilitation of the Island until this program is carried out," and expressed hope that the Cuban Congress would give way and "avoid the serious situation that otherwise would follow."

The Senate adopted the conference report on the China Trade Bill providing for Federal incorporation of American companies to do business in China with domestic tax exemptions and other privileges designed to foster American commerce in the Orient. The bill was transmitted to the President.

Leaders of the Senate and House agreed upon a plan to adjourn the present session of Congress on Sept. 23, after consideration of the tariff and bonus legislation.

The Senate continued its consideration of legislation to extend a loan of \$5,000,000 to Liberia. An amendment to the bill, which would appropriate \$20,000,000 for reclamation work in the West, was offered by Senator Borah and adopted. Other amendments appropriating money for various purposes were suggested with the hope of preventing adoption of the loan bill at the present session.

An appropriation of \$1,000,000 for the purchase of seed grains to be supplied to farmers in the crop-failure areas

of the United States was provided for in a bill introduced by Senator Jones of Washington.

The Senate agreed to House amendments to two measures designed to aid in the prosecution of war fraud cases under which the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia would exercise equal jurisdiction with other Federal courts.

The Rivers and Harbors Development Bill was sent to conference after an agreement that the House would have an opportunity to vote on the Senate amendments providing for the purchase of the Cape Cod and Dismal Swamp Canals.

Revision of corporation and personal income taxes is proposed in bills introduced by Senator King, Democrat, of Utah. He also introduced a bill requiring Government publication of an annual income tax directory containing names and addresses of taxpayers and the amounts paid.

The Senate adopted a resolution by Senator Smith, of South Carolina, authorizing a broad investigation by the Agriculture Committee of the methods employed in the marketing of cotton to determine whether or not there is interference with the law of supply and demand in the cotton market.

The Borah Fact-finding Coal Commission Bill was adopted by the Senate. Efforts to strike out the provision directing the Commission to make a study of the advisability or wisdom of nationalization of the coal industry were unsuccessful.

The abolition of the Rail Labor Board and the setting up in its place of a disinterested tribunal for settlement of railroad labor disputes was proposed in a bill submitted by Representative Hoch, Republican, of Kansas.

By a vote of 139 to 77 the House approved the conference report on the additional Judges Bill and sent the measure to the White House.



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# The Cost of Industrial Strikes

By Dr. R. Estcourt

HERE was published recently a book of 300 pages setting out the cost of strikes and how much cost is distributed between workingmen, employers and the general public. The writer estimated

that, in one year, 500,000,000 working days were lost; in the two and a half years, following the war, losses in wages and profits due to strikes, added to increased prices and reduced production, cost the country \$100,000,000,000, or five times the amount owing to us from public and private debtors in Europe. Into that total he introduces increase in apartment rents, due to shortage of housing, general housekeeping costs and even clothes and overalls. To the same fact are attributed increases in the cost of potatoes and sugar and losses of crops through the difficulty farmers experienced in obtaining spraying material.

If the only end were to reveal inaccuracies in details, nothing would be gained by examination of these figures, but the truth to which they draw attention lies outside such deductions. In the main the facts approach what is set forth, but the real question is not whether these losses actually occurred in the way stated but whether the same results must not necessarily have been attained by some other means. When a group of merchants realizes that, if market conditions do not improve, bankruptcy is near, they frequently combine to raise prices regardless of strikes so that losses may be counterbalanced by corresponding gains. A few seasons ago onions were selling at less than 1 cent per pound. Fifty-five carloads were wantonly, or perhaps discreetly, destroyed by precipitation into a river. The result was to create a shortage and raise the price to 10 cents per pound. Precisely the same result would have come about if the dealers had refused to buy or the banks to finance further movement of crops, and the surplus had rotted in the ground.

The discussion of the matter from an ethical point of view would lead to endless divergence of opinion without any useful result ensuing but, solely considering the economic point of view to the exclusion of all others, we get a step further toward a solution. The English farmers of the Napoleonic period had for a toast "A short crop and a long war." Labor was scarce and an easily harvested crop at a high price was more remunerative than a heavy crop at a lower price. Discussion of the rightness or wrongness of such matters usually leads to some hasty and ill-advised legislation making matters worse. What is needed is a comprehension of ultimate causes. No one blames a merchant for charging five cents higher for his article than what is esteemed to be its value, but if he charged five cents for an item that had not been supplied he would be condemned. Yet in both cases five cents was transferred from the consumer to the merchant in respect of value not given. Economically there is no difference in the two transactions. Thus we come up against the vexed question of value, what is a just price and so on. At the moment we do not advance far but actually we do advance much more permanently than by shouting about right and wrong, according to previously existing prejudices or, not infrequently, with a view to distract attention from something analogous.

In the last analysis we find ourselves confronted with the basic principle of trade. Should we first fix a price and then see how much we can afford to give for that sum, or should we first provide the goods and then consider how much we can compel people to pay for them? Mr. Ford advocates the former principle,

which was enunciated by John Ruskin as a deduction from very ancient teachings. The latter principle is, however, more generally adopted, on the theory that the value of an article is what it will fetch, and this accords more nearly with orthodox economic teaching. There is much to be said for both theories. It is often contended that the former is applicable only to exceptional circumstances and that, if generally adopted, would lead to price-fixing and other alleged evils. Objections to the latter are heard everywhere from any one who does not happen at the moment to have anything to sell. Directly he or she has something to sell, whether it be goods or service, the point of view automatically changes, at any rate for the time being. It is more than probable that, in the future, before we can adequately settle many of the questions that arise out of strikes, we shall have to consider seriously the consistent adoption of one of these principles, but its adoption will have to rest on the ground of ultimate expediency, not prejudice.

An American merchant was in England a few years ago visiting the works of a manufacturer of notions for export to this country. Incidentally he asked the wages paid to the 380 girls employed. They happened to be \$2.25 per week, a figure that made him gasp. He inquired how the girls managed to live on that wage and the reply was "I do not know. All I know is that I have only to put a board outside the works to get all the applicants necessary, offering to work at that figure." The wages are double since the war but, other things being proportionate, the principle is not affected. This particular manufacturer was of a kindly disposition, an exemplary husband and father. The economic aspect was beyond his grasp. Recently in a Western State a Government commission fixed the minimum wage for females at \$15 instead of \$16 as formerly. The actual cost of living was shown by statistics to have gone down to \$14.99 and an unsuccessful appeal was made to have the former rate restored. In both cases the ability to accept the wage was determined by the competition of workers partially supported otherwise, either as wives or children. It is quite a common affair for an employer to advertise for a pensioner or annuitant to fill some position. In fixing the wages the other source of income is taken into account so that the wage paid, while less than what is current, makes, with the other receipts, a larger income than the current wage.

UNDER the English Poor law system what is known as out-relief is paid out of the taxes to the partially indigent. For many years after the Napoleonic wars it was customary for farmers to use their influence to obtain for their men large doles of out-relief and then to obtain their services at a wage that discounted the amount obtained as relief. Quite apart from any other consideration the economic result was to obtain a subsidy out of the taxes for the benefit of the particular farmer. In precisely the same way when married women and unmarried members of a family living at home accept a wage that is less than sufficient to provide the recognized stand-

ard of living for an individual living alone, the person paying that wage is subsidized out of the earnings of the rest of the family. It matters not where the subsidy comes from, the fact of the subsidy is the same.

It would be contended to be an interference with individual liberty and probably unconstitutional to attempt to prevent married women or pensioners from accepting a wage below that required for self-supporting individuals, yet this liberty disorganizes the whole industrial machine. To one already partly supported the standard of living is not very material. The \$15 a week paid to one who has to provide everything may be almost penury; to a member of a family who only has to contribute to the family budget a share of the cost of food \$12 may provide a standard of living that makes life joyous. There is a large department store where nearly all the employes are of the latter class. They are contented. The proprietor is an estimable man. The customers of the store obtain goods at reduced prices resulting in a further spread of contentment, but the competing stores find the position difficult through having to pay the higher wage, to sell a less quantity at a higher price and to hear a relatively larger proportion of general overhead expenses. The remedy is not readily apparent. Legislation when touching the difficulty at one point usually throws out of gear more than it adjusts.

SOME months ago an official Committee on Elimination of Waste in Industry made a report based on research into the affairs of six leading industries. The result is very instructive, particularly worth considering by those who imagine remedies can easily be found. The industries studied were men's clothing, building, printing, boot and shoe manufacturing, metal trades and textile manufacturing. The table below will prove startling to many people. A theoretical 100 points would represent all possible waste. As no plant could be entirely wasteful the number of points assayed in any case must obviously be less than 100.

In every industry studied there are outstanding examples of good management, but the bulk of the industry does not approximate to this standard. In the clothing industry one plant was rated 57 points higher than the worst and 37 points better than the average. In the following table are shown the best cases compared with the average of the plants studied:

	Points Against Best Plant.	Points Against Average.
Men's Clothing	26.73	63.78
Building Industries	30.15	53.00
Printing	30.50	57.61
Boot and Shoe	12.50	40.83
Metal Trades	6.00	28.66
Textiles	28.00	49.20

From what follows it will be seen to be unjust to jump to the conclusion that the management in those plants showing greatest waste was less capable than in other cases. It might be so and it might not. The management is responsible for keeping the works as a whole going and if the sales were not such as to call for the most economical employment of the full force, the management might be

compelled to slow down the output being able to reduce essential expenditure. An engineer whose train was obstructed by some accident having to keep steam up in anticipation of being able to proceed would consume more fuel on the run than an engineer who went straight through, but it would not follow that he was a less capable operator.

The "responsibility" of a given agency does not mean moral responsibility as ordinarily understood, but only that responsibility which arises from the undeniable fact that a given cause of waste can be removed only by that particular agency. In the illustration just given the engineer would be only a part of the management of the train. Quite a number of officials superior to him and far from the scene would be included in the idea of management. The premature introduction of ethical considerations into matters of this nature merely results in confusing the issue which in the first place is purely economic. Everyone imagines that they alone have a correct conception of what is right and what is wrong. Still worse they constantly regard these terms as equivalents for legal and illegal, notwithstanding the reiterated protest against that conception which can be found in the sacred volumes of any of the great religions, to say nothing of our own revered declaration. It is unfortunate that so few trouble about the economic aspect. The error persists that economics is the domain of a few savants whose deliberations matter little to the mass of the people, instead of being the science of man's temporal well-being in the widest sense.

To comprehend is the great need. How many people have given thought to what would result from full time employment, complete elimination of waste and maximum output of every manufacturing and mining plant in this country? The result would be that perishable articles would rot for want of consumers and the goods that could be safely stored would be piled up in warehouses. If such a thing were conceivable as banks issuing currency at all commensurate with the values produced, on the basis of prices subsisting at the commencement of the operation, the position might prove to be beyond the capacity of the most able financiers. Let those who doubt this assertion look back to 1918. In that year we had 4,000,000 men withdrawn from productive employment and yet the country was able to produce sufficient for its own needs, sufficient to support these 4,000,000 as well as an excessive staff of administrative officials unproductively employed. In addition we produced sufficient to supply still larger aggregates of unprofitably employed persons in Europe, the bill of \$10,000,000,000 for this service still remaining unpaid. With the financial aspect of the matter we are not here concerned. That is another story. The easily deducible fact is that if this result can be attained when 4,000,000 workers are withdrawn from production a far greater result would ensue from a condition of full employment that included those 4,000,000 workers. It cannot then be doubted that in normal times we work, and under existing conditions are compelled to work, in such a way as to produce less than half of what is possible.

There was a well-known cycle factory in the East whose capacity some one took the trouble to examine. Its possible output was more than the whole demand for cycles that existed at the peak period. Its works came in for use when the Government required munitions, but now again it is condemned to operate on a quarter schedule, loading on to cost of production overhead charges four times as great as would be chargeable if capacity operation were possible. It would not be a wild guess that the Steel Trust could economically compass the whole output of its product required for this

## An Analysis of Waste in Industries

Management Responsibility.	Labor Responsibility	Outside Contacts.	Total Waste.
Men's Clothing	48.33	10.50	4.95
Building Industries	34.50	11.30	7.40
Printing	36.36	16.25	5.00
Boot and Shoe	30.25	4.85	5.83
Metal Trades	23.23	2.55	2.88
Textile	24.70	4.70	19.80

country and much of the rest of the world.

A large warehouse in California was stocked to capacity with goods that could not be marketed except at a great loss. It was burnt down and the whole of the stock destroyed. The immediate result was to remove the congestion of the market. Goods in other warehouses could be sold without loss and bank loans repaid. As the premises and stock were fully insured the rebuilding gave a stimulus to various departments of structural industry. A strike or lockout would have resulted in a similar shortening of supply but the benefits would have been delayed through the diminished demand due to loss of wages with their purchasing power. Under such circumstances one may wonder why we should be regretting waste and calculating the cost of strikes.

Every seven years a human body is completely reconstructed by food making good the healthy destruction of tissue through labor. Every four years on the average every piece of machinery is renewed completely, all capital replaced. Every year the world produces enough food to sustain the whole human race. In considerably less than a year, without

interfering with any of these other operations, ample clothing and housing for every human being can be produced. If it were possible everywhere to work productive powers to full capacity a large excess would result. The failure to attain such results is mostly due to the super-organization. Neither the world nor any single country is regarded as a unit.

It is not very difficult to trace out particular losses as due to a strike or lockout. The seriousness of these effects is not to be questioned. The error lies in attempting to deal with them piecemeal, or to calculate their incidence apart from the whole industrial machine. The welfare worker, the local banker and the local politician may be left to undertake the useful operations of first aid. The real mischief arises in imagining that, because the patient looks bright after these ministrations, there is no need for a major operation. A meal to a starving man is essential but it is a remedy that will prove effectual only until he becomes hungry again. What is necessary is to discover the means of enabling him to provide for himself and avoid being a burden in the future. It is not merely employment that is needed, but employ-

ment that will result in supplying an effective demand. All labor does not create value. What is necessary is so to employ it that it does have that result.

Under existing conditions a manufacturer has to consider whether it is more profitable to produce a smaller quantity of goods at a higher price than a larger quantity at a lower price. He can be assured in this process only by co-operation with those similarly engaged. When a decision has been reached, the result may be a strike or lockout. It is unfair to attach blame to an individual driven to this attitude by circumstances over which he has no control. In the long run the aggregate amount of employment may actually be greater, under existing conditions, through keeping the concern out of bankruptcy, although of course that does not mend matters for the workers. Relatively to the whole organization such a man is placed like the head of a department who has to keep his machinery idle or to waste material as a result of the general system adopted by those above him. The organization might appear to be defective when producing such a result, yet those above might well be fully aware of what was occurring in that particular department but compelled to permit it to

continue as a necessary concomitant of larger considerations.

There is no intention of extenuating the existence of things capable of remedial treatment. The need is to understand the futility of applying partial remedies under the mistaken belief that these will solve the difficulty. Whatever a State may have been in days that are gone, we have now to realize that, before all else, it is an economic organization. The men that can best direct it are those with the ability to direct a commercial undertaking. This does not imply following the existing methods of direction involving great waste. Comprehensive treatment is required, the entire industrial organization being regarded as a single unit, firstly as regards States, then as regards federations, ultimately as regards the whole world. To this end all information is of use, whether it shows the cost of strikes, waste in production or distribution or any of the apparent defects of our present system. The way out is by no means clear, but it will not be discovered by jumping at conclusions and remedies based on generalizations from such incidents as happen to appeal most dramatically to the imagination.

## Coal Mining Stocks for Investment

By H. A. Haring

IN TWO PARTS

PART II.

### Coal Mine Earnings

#### THE CONSOLIDATION COAL COMPANY

Year	Tons of coal produced	Surplus for year after fixed charges, taxes and dividends.
1917	10,368,898	\$5,389,933
1918	8,845,957	2,598,645
1919	7,911,895	597,424
1920	9,189,281	7,148,565
1921	7,740,678	744,505

Production: 1 1/2% to 2% of country's total. Cash dividend: 6%.

#### THE PITTSBURGH COAL COMPANY

Year	Tons of coal produced	Surplus for year after fixed charges, taxes and dividends.
1917	18,388,739	\$10,071,852
1918	17,157,169	3,398,925
1919	13,852,515	Def. 337,020
1920	12,348,686	6,757,350
1921	8,261,635	Def. 1,197,938

Production: 2% to 2 1/2% of country's total. Cash dividend: 5%.

#### THE CLINCHFIELD COAL CORPORATION

Year	Tons of coal produced	Surplus for year after fixed charges, taxes and dividends.
1917	2,301,718	\$1,919,104
1918	2,134,199	1,296,100
1919	1,960,838	31,888
1920	2,094,077	669,595
1921	1,822,412	272,926

Production: 1 1/2% of country's total. Cash dividend: 3%.

The table bare. Bituminous coal is too bulky to carry over. It is nowhere stored by the mines. To do so is impossible. Coal must be loaded into railroad cars as mined, not only day by day, but literally hour by hour. If railroad cars are wanting at 7 A. M., the mine lies idle for the day. If all available cars are filled by 1 P. M., work for the day stops at that hour. As the coal mine has, therefore, no merchandise on hand at any time, consequently the industry, in its accounting, knows no "inventory." In its workings, this lack of inventory accentuates the severity of the recurrent swings up and down. Inability to put its manufactured product into warehouses prevents the mine from accumulating coal in storage in slack times to be released at times of demand. Hence arises the seasonal activity of the industry. As a rule the impossibility of storing coal at the mines has been bemoaned by operators, but in 1921 it worked to their advantage. Had they been obliged to write off large losses because of adjusting inventories from the high

prices of 1920 to the low of 1921, their losses would have been beyond calculation. As it was, 1921 was the worst year the business has known. Further loss would have spelled complete disaster.

The investor's chief concern is for his dividends. In the larger corporations and syndicates of mines he will find stability of dividends, protection from large, unexpected losses due to hazards of mining, with the probability, almost the certainty, of extra dividends in cash or, more likely, in stock. If investment is made in smaller corporations, he will worry through long periods without seeing a dividend check, his inquiries for information met with doleful tales of gloom, to be alternated by brief periods of wondrous plethora, when dividends will come in quick succession. The total of these distributions will be like stakes from the gambling table—not infrequently mounting to several hundred per cent. To offset this wealth of income, the investor assumes the corresponding risk of losing all. The small mining company is nothing but a hazard.

Too long a lean period may starve it; one cave-in, one explosion, one inrush of water may end all.

Taken in a large view, the bigger the coal company the less of fancy prices it realizes at times, like the present, when coal soars. The large producers dispose of their coal mostly on long-time contract, and they have relatively small tonnages of "free coal" for playing the market. Indeed, they do not seek the crazy market situations which are the life of the small operator. Repeatedly in past years they have refused to accept unduly high prices, even when they were fairly hurled on them by eager purchasers, crying for coal. In the present year, not just a few of them, but scores and scores, are declining to sell for more than "fair" prices, as established by their "gentlemen's agreement" with Mr. Hoover. The large corporations, such as the two already cited, are the great stabilizers of coal price. They leave to the smaller concerns the big "killings", and the result is that the abnormal, spectacular profits have been made by companies with small capital, say from \$20,000 to \$50,000. These were the horrible examples against which Senators hurled their castigating speeches. Had their profits been given in dollars, none would have noticed them, but to state them in percentages made staggering showings. In the same years that brought these "outrageous" profits to these companies, others, with similar small investment, operating a single mine, were utterly wiped out by some mine disaster. The big money in coal mining, as in every business, when calculated in percentages, goes to the small concern, almost the tiny one, where the owner gives it his primary attention. Conversely, this is the very class of mines which are most often blotted from existence by one of common mine disasters, and they are the mines which, when depression appears, are merely boarded up by their owners, temporarily abandoned.

Before investment is made, consideration would naturally be given to a fifth element, which today no one can escape. For it is the outstanding fact of bituminous mining. It is overproduction, overdevelopment. It is scarcely necessary to expand these bare statements, in view of the wide publicity of this feature of the industry and its frequent discussion in the last six months. The basic condition of overproduction has always existed, has always been recognized within the industry. Only recently

Continued on Page 27.

**A**S examples of how earnings vary, the accompanying table gives the production in tons, and the surplus after fixed charges, taxes and dividends, of two of the principal coal-mining companies and of a third company whose production, although smaller, has been more constant.

The Consolidation Coal Company operates 75 mines, producing 1 1/2 to 2 per cent. of the bituminous coal of the country. The Pittsburgh Coal Company, with 66 mines, produces from 2 to 2 1/2 per cent. of the total. Both companies are well established, experienced, and operating many mines so as to average the hazards of the industry. Production is well developed. Their cash dividends range from 5 to 6 per cent., the continuation of which is fairly well assured, in poor years as well as good, with rather good prospects for extras, probably in stock. Such stock dividends have, in fact, been distributed by the first-named—5 per cent. in 1917 and 14 per cent. in 1918, not from current earnings, but from "appreciation" of their coal deposits, as written onto the company's books in a special adjustment of assets.

And yet, within these five years, the first company shows surpluses as far apart as \$7,148,565 and \$597,424, while the second swings from a surplus of \$10,071,852 to a deficit of \$1,197,938.

The similar earnings of the Clinchfield Coal Corporation are also shown, this company being selected because its tonnage remains constant for the five years, at about 2,000,000 tons annually. With this almost unchanged output, the surpluses of the company exhibit wide variations, ranging from a high of \$1,919,104 to a low of \$31,888.

It is to be noted that fat years and lean, in coal, do not correspond to the cycles in general business. In coal, 1919 was bad, while for general business it was good; with coal, 1920 was a royal year for earnings, at the very time that elsewhere everything had gone to the dogs.

The losses of bituminous mining companies, in the years in which loss is sustained, are the result of current operations. No part of the unfavorable showing is due to "inventory adjustment" and similar "hang-over" items of uncertain nature. In one respect, coal mining is like banking: every night finds

SEP

# Growing Debts of the States and Their Significance



ITH the attention of the financial community and the general public turned to the billions of foreign debts, our federal financ-

ing and the grave problems they involve, there has been a tendency in recent years to lose sight of our growing internal debts and of their significance. The favorable character of the bond market for municipal and State securities has, of course, been noted — and also the fact that hardly a week has passed in the last few months without a new State issue being offered. The average citizen naturally takes some interest in the financial affairs of his own State, particularly at election time, when a bond-issue proposition may be submitted for his vote, and when paying his taxes. Beyond this, however, too little attention has been paid to the growing State debts and what they mean, not only to the investor in State securities, but also in regard to very vital developments in State government and finance.

There are now outstanding State securities of the United States to the value of more than a billion dollars. To be more exact, according to a comprehensive study, made by The Bank of America, this total, as of recent date, amounts to \$1,071,506,981.28. This represents only gross bonded indebtedness, and does not consider debts of a temporary nature or sinking fund provisions for paying off these debts. On a natural per capita basis the States are indebted to the extent of about \$10.18. The significance of these figures is interestingly brought out by the fact that the total of State debts is very nearly equal to our total national debt before the war — \$1,028,564,000, or about \$10.60 per capita. Now, of course, the Federal debt is many times multiplied, amounting to about \$23,922,000,000, or approximately \$226 per capita.

The growth of these State debts is an accelerating one, and it is possible to "view with alarm" this increase, if its causes and meaning are ignored. The rapidity with which State debts have been augmented is indicated by the fact that nearly one half, or \$518,997,414.20 of the outstanding debt, has been incurred since this country entered the World War on April 6, 1917. And more than a third, or \$384,899,997.53, of existing securities was issued after Jan. 1, 1920. In fact, all of the existing indebtedness of Arkansas, Illinois, Iowa, Michigan, Ohio, South Dakota, Washington and West Virginia was incurred after the fateful April 6, 1917, as was all Oregon's debt except \$250,000, which was incurred a few days earlier. In the cases of Illinois, Iowa, Ohio and Washington, no outstanding obligation bears a date prior to Jan. 1, 1920.

A question immediately arises: How much of this growth in State indebtedness has been directly due to the World War? An analysis of the purposes for which the State debts were contracted discloses the fact that the war was the immediate cause of \$139,281,722.53 of the outstanding obligations — equal to about 13 per cent. of the entire gross debt. Those figures do not show the total cost of the war to the States, and do not even represent all the bond issues for defraying war-time expenditures, as some of the indebtedness has already been retired. It will be noted that these totals show that, of all the securities issued since this country's entry into the war, less than one third, or 26.8 per cent. was for war purposes. It is true, however, that the war was responsible for the entire debts of a number of States.

The influence of the war, therefore, explains, only in a limited measure, the

By Edward C. Delafield

President of The Bank of America, New York

## The Purposes of State Indebtedness

### TOTAL FOR ALL STATES

Purpose of Debt.	Amount Outstanding.	Per Cent.
Highways	\$367,687,100.00	34.3
Waterways and harbors	213,891,400.00	20.0
Soldiers' bonus	130,022,000.00	12.1
Funding operations	118,557,513.42	11.0
Other improvements	101,550,561.00	9.5
Agricultural aid	45,156,139.39	4.2
Public buildings	20,254,523.28	1.9
Welfare institutions	19,710,750.00	1.9
Miscellaneous	19,331,406.68	1.8
Other military purposes	18,440,810.07	1.7
Education	16,904,282.44	1.6
Total	\$1,071,506,981.28	100.0

growth of State indebtedness, and this would indicate that there have been, in recent years, some more fundamental developments in our State governments. Have these developments been sound? Will they continue? Or are these growing debts an unnecessary burden and is their meaning fraught with danger?

The word "burden" has become so associated with "debt" in popular discussions of municipal operations that local government financing is always visualized in terms of taxes rather than in terms of purposes and results. And where, in some States, there has been a tendency to establish an all-embracing paternalism, there has grown up an equally powerful tendency antagonistic to any State enterprise. How much these conditions are really to be feared as a financial load on the communities, or as the manifestation of sinister tendencies toward paternalism, can be seen only upon close study of the distribution and magnitude of State debts and of the purposes for which they were incurred.

At the outset it will be noted that the debt is very unevenly distributed, and it should not be inferred from a casual glance at the figures that some State with a high debt is more extravagant than another State with a lower debt. Debt is unevenly distributed — but so is population. It is found that four States — New York, Massachusetts, California and Pennsylvania — have outstanding gross debts of more than \$50,000,000 each, and that these four States together account for \$530,174,454.79, or nearly as much as the debt of all the other 44

States together. When the other seven States, which have debts of more than \$25,000,000 each are included, the 11 States are responsible for \$793,315,460.34, or nearly three times as much as the other 37 States together. Four States — Kansas, Kentucky, Nebraska and Wisconsin — report no bonded indebtedness, Kentucky having outstanding warrants amounting to \$5,312,438.77, and Wisconsin owing its trust funds \$2,275,991.77.

NATURALLY, some of the more populated States — the highly developed industrially or agriculturally — have had more governmental activities to finance. But a study of per capita gross debts reveals no very striking correlation between total debt, per capita debt and population. Of the first four States in order of magnitude of total debt, only two are among the first four in order of magnitude of per capita debt — and one of them, Pennsylvania, is twenty-ninth on the list of per capita debts.

It is natural that New York State's density of population, industrial activity and prosperity and the vast public works necessitated by them, should be indicated in the highest debt of any State, \$267,784,000; although, it should be noted, its per capita debt of \$24.79, is fourth. Massachusetts, with a total debt of \$138,049,134.53, is second and its per capita debt of \$35.83 is third. South Dakota has the highest — \$75.02.

Geographically, it is found that the regions of highest per capita debt are along the coasts, the broad belt of the Middle West and South being below the

country's average in per capita debt. New England's debt is \$24.38 per inhabitant, while that of the Pacific States is \$23.15. The Middle Atlantic States' per capita debt is \$15.07 and the Mountain States' is \$12.07. With these figures should be compared the per capita debt of the East-North Central States, \$3.69; that of the West-North Central, \$7.39; the South Atlantic, \$9.20; the East-South Central, \$4.06, and the West-South Central, \$5.26.

These figures, of course, should not be used beyond their significance and no broad generalizations as to debt "burden" or "extravagance" can be based on them. They do, however, in a measure reflect relative governmental activity of the type in which large undertakings are financed through long-term securities. This is brought out in a study of the ratios of net debts to assessed valuation, the net debt, of course, being the gross debt minus sinking funds available for the redemption of the securities. These ratios are naturally very large, but relatively, if not absolutely, they are of interest, throwing light on the other data. Thus, although South Dakota has the highest per capita debt, it is twenty-fourth in order of ratio of net debt to assessed valuation. This would indicate that, considering South Dakota's "real assets" or wealth, it has financed itself very conservatively. And, when the nature of South Dakota's debt is considered, the per capita debt figure loses all sinister significance, as almost all of South Dakota's State debt is in rural credits and the State is not really spending money at all, but only lending it, the security being the very land itself.

No substantiation of fears as to reckless borrowing by the States can be obtained from the ratios of net debts to assessed valuation. This ratio ranges from 4.18 per cent. for Oregon down to 0.005 per cent. for Indiana, and zero in the cases of those States having no bonded indebtedness. In the case of only one State is this ratio higher than 3 per cent. and in only three more higher than 2 per cent. The ratio in fully two-thirds of the States is less than 1 per cent., and in nearly half of the States, lower than a half of 1 per cent.

Just what these State debts mean can be realized only from a close scrutiny of the purposes for which these long-term loans were made. The results of such an analysis cannot, of course, be taken unreservedly and do not present, by any means, a complete picture of State government activities and progress in specific directions. The billions of dollars spent by direct appropriation from current taxes are not represented here, and many specific purposes which are provided for by bond issues in some States are financed from treasury funds in other States because of con-

## Per Capita Gross State Debts

By States and Geographical Divisions.

Per capita average of State debts of all U. S.	\$10.18	EAST NORTH CENTRAL	\$3.69
NEW ENGLAND	\$24.38	36 Ohio	\$3.47
14 Maine	\$14.17	45 Indiana	.121
31 New Hampshire	5.62	40 Illinois	1.70
33 Vermont	4.75	16 Michigan	12.42
3 Massachusetts	35.83	42 Wisconsin	.86
12 Rhode Island	18.25	EAST SOUTH CENTRAL	\$4.06
17 Connecticut	11.80	38 Kentucky	\$2.20
MIDDLE ATLANTIC	\$15.07	27 Tennessee	6.51
4 New York	\$25.79	35 Alabama	3.65
32 New Jersey	5.42	34 Mississippi	3.91
29 Pennsylvania	5.81	WEST SOUTH CENTRAL	\$5.26
SOUTH ATLANTIC	\$9.20	41 Arkansas	\$1.45
7 Delaware	\$21.89	5 Louisiana	23.67
11 Maryland	21.02	37 Oklahoma	2.33
22 Virginia	8.40	42 Texas	.86
13 West Virginia	18.06	MOUNTAIN	\$12.07
19 North Carolina	10.85	24 Montana	\$7.49
30 South Carolina	5.70	15 Idaho	13.87
39 Georgia	1.91	10 Wyoming	21.26
44 Florida	.62	26 Colorado	6.98
WEST NORTH CENTRAL	\$7.39	20 New Mexico	10.70
23 Minnesota	\$8.14	18 Arizona	11.74
46 Iowa	.111	6 Utah	22.33
28 Missouri	6.05	8 Nevada	21.56
25 North Dakota	7.28	PACIFIC	\$23.15
1 South Dakota	75.02	21 Washington	\$9.22
47 Nebraska	0.00	2 Oregon	54.50
47 Kansas	0.00	9 California	21.50

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stitutional restrictions or general financial habits. The record of New York State's outstanding indebtedness shows no securities issued to provide funds for educational purposes, for instance, although New York has spent millions of dollars on such activities. But such an analysis does present clearly the tendencies to improvement in modern State fiscal administration and also the increasing assumption by the State governments of responsibility for the welfare of handicapped citizens and for the construction of unified and extensive systems of permanent public works.

Striking is the large proportion of State obligations incurred for highway construction. More than a third of all the outstanding indebtedness of the States—\$367,687,100 or 34.3 per cent.—has been for the improvement of highways and highway structures. This one fact in itself should go far in reassuring those who may at times feel concern at the rapid increase in governmental debt. Here and there, perhaps, there may be found examples of the faulty application of technical principles in the mapping and building of State highways, but these are rare and unimportant. Certainly in general the idea of integrated and controlled systems of trunk highways in every State represents vital progress and the fact that the States are obligating themselves for this purpose more than for any other is really encouraging. This development is very recent, hardly reaching back more than a decade, and the stimulus of Federal aid legislation has been marked in the last few years. The improvement of our highways is a fundamental necessity and the fact that so far the outstanding per capita debt of the nation for this development is only a little more than \$3.50 to be repaid over long periods, should serve to allay apprehensions of intolerable debt "burdens." New York's \$100,000,000 bond issues for highways, California's \$55,000,000, Pennsylvania's \$50,000,000 and Oregon's \$31,700,000 account, in a considerable measure, for the large totals of the debts of these States.

It is encouraging to note further that the next highest proportion of State debts was incurred for the improvements of waterways and harbors. Altogether \$213,891,400, or 20 per cent. of the total, has provided for the development of

### Ratio of Net State Debt to Assessed Valuation

(Compiled from Authoritative Published Statements)

	Per Cent.		Per Cent.
1 Oregon	4.18	25 Vermont	0.64
2 Louisiana	2.51	26 New Jersey	0.53
3 Delaware	2.18	27 New Hampshire	0.49
4 South Carolina	2.14	28 Pennsylvania	0.47
5 Maine	1.71	29 Arkansas	0.43
6 West Virginia	1.67	30 Colorado	0.42
7 California	1.49	31 Missouri	0.42
8 Utah	1.35	32 Arizona	0.41
9 New York	1.29	33 Georgia	0.41
10 Maryland	1.24	34 Connecticut	0.35
11 Massachusetts	1.16	35 North Dakota	0.34
12 Rhode Island	1.09	36 Oklahoma	0.27
13 Virginia	1.08	37 Illinois	0.26
14 North Carolina	1.07	38 Montana	0.24
15 Washington	1.06	39 Kentucky	0.22
16 New Mexico	1.06	40 Ohio	0.19
17 Wyoming	0.94	41 Florida	0.15
18 Minnesota	0.93	42 Texas	0.12
19 Tennessee	0.92	43 Idaho	0.10
20 Mississippi	0.91	44 Wisconsin	0.05
21 Alabama	0.89	45 Iowa	0.02
22 Michigan	0.86	46 Indiana	0.005
23 Nevada	0.78	47 Kansas	No Debt
24 South Dakota	0.71	48 Nebraska	No Debt

State canal systems and State port facilities. In this group—and in fact in any—the largest single bond issue is that of \$154,800,000 for New York's comprehensive State-owned canal system.

More than a hundred million dollars of the debts—9.5 per cent.—has gone into other public works undertakings. The \$83,775,162 expended on the transit, water supply, sewerage and park systems of Massachusetts accounts for most of this total. Public buildings, such as capitols, have been built with 1.9 per cent. of the total debt. Therefore, at least 65.7 per cent. of the outstanding debt has been used for financing public works of all kinds. In the other classifications there are certainly items which represent other public works, such as asylum and prison buildings under "welfare institutions," school and college buildings under "education," armories under "other military purposes" and miscellaneous improvements not designated in the other classifications.

A closer study of the \$139,281,722.53 debt for which the war was responsible shows that \$130,022,000, or 12.1 per cent. of the total, was incurred in the payment of bonuses for veterans. This includes Michigan's bonus bond issue of \$25,000,000, Minnesota's \$20,905,000,

Ohio's \$20,000,000, Missouri's \$15,000,000, Washington's \$12,500,000, New Jersey's \$12,000,000 and Oregon's \$10,000,000. To this, if it had been declared valid by the courts, would have been added New York's \$45,000,000 issue. The Ohio and Washington debts are entirely for soldiers' bonuses. The remaining amount of the war debts was expended in other welfare measures for soldiers and for such objects as war memorials.

It is interesting to note that, in spite of the much-discussed enterprises in State paternalism in some of the agricultural States, indebtedness for such purposes as may be classed "agricultural aid" amounts to only \$45,156,139.39, or 4.2 per cent. of the total. Most of this, \$37,950,000 is for the rural credit grants of South Dakota, \$2,000,000 for the capital stock of the Bank of North Dakota, and the remainder for agricultural experiment stations, forest preserves and similar activities of a number of States. The growing programs of institutionalizing the unfortunate are responsible for only 1.9 per cent. of the debt or \$19,710,750, this total including bond issues for general and special hospitals, insane asylums, penal institutions and reformatory schools. Educational activities, in-

cluding the building and maintenance of schools and colleges, are responsible for \$16,904,282.44, or 1.6 per cent. of the aggregate and the lowest proportion of any classification.

SOME reflection of improving methods in State finance may be noted in the low proportion of the total debt, only 11 per cent., which may be classified as "funding operations." This refers to refunding or the continuation of a debt after the time originally set for retirement. In earlier periods of State administration this appears to have been a common practice, but it is now disappearing. Another practice which was formerly prevalent is that of funding into bond issues of distant maturity floating debts incurred for minor purposes or even, in some cases, current expenses and operating deficits. These unsound ideas seem now to be entirely rejected. Another favorable tendency is the elimination of the combination bond issue for a number of purposes or for unspecified objects. Now issues for specific purposes are considered at elections on their own and known merits.

Much has been said and written (sometimes perhaps with justice) about the piling up of unnecessary debts; about costly public buildings and against wastefully-built highways; about making future generations pay for the lead pencils used in State offices 20 years before; about the mishandling of sinking funds for the redemption of debts. But this survey by The Bank of America may rightfully serve to put the citizen and the banker at ease. Far from being unnecessary, fully two-thirds and possibly three-quarters of the present indebtedness is for definite and generally essential public improvements which have been, with few exceptions, economically carried out. Bond issues in recent years have followed the principle that no issue should be extended over a period longer than the life of the improvement. Serial issues which, in a way, force the proper provisions for retiring the debt are becoming more and more frequent. Therefore, if the billion-dollar total debt of the States may seem burdensome and hint at danger, a closer acquaintance with the actual facts and figures may well dispel doubts and questionings and reassure banker, investor and taxpayer.

## Coal Mining Stocks for Investment

Continued from Page 270

has it been flung into public attention. For the investor, the significance of overproduction and overdevelopment is the effect on selling prices. Supply of coal, bituminous coal of course, normally exceeds current consumption by a large margin. Competition among the mines to market their coal is so severe, under all normal conditions, that prices go down and down. In previous articles in THE ANNALIST it has been pointed out how the mines for long periods at a time struggle just to exist on a selling price that hovers near the cost line. Then, recurrently, come sudden bulges of price. Profits are then large for a brief time. After that, comes return to the depressed state of overproduction and low price. The normal condition is one of overproduction. From the investor's standpoint, this constitutes the fundamental weakness of the industry.

Soaring prices occur, whenever the fundamental state of overproduction is temporarily choked down. Supply then becomes less than demand, and the inevitable happens. These sharp curtailments of supply result from artificial conditions, of which we have two and only two. The first is a serious and widespread mine strike. The second is railroad paralysis, whether occasioned by strikes, unusual winter weather, or acute car shortages. Any railroad disability prevents movement of coal from mine to market. If the railroad tie-up continues a week or ten days "coal shortages" appear. With a shortage, the demand

appears to rise, and, with it, prices.

In the 22 years of the twentieth century, soaring prices have occurred six times. Three of these sharp advances emerged during the war. Throughout the war period, prices for coal were high and, in common with other businesses, mining was profitable. Bituminous coal prices were high for a total of 23 of the war months. The duration of the high-price levels on the other three of the six upward swings was, in each case, brief. The total length of the three spurts has been 16 months, estimating that for the present year prices will continue above normal until the end of December, which is the extreme likelihood. In the 22 years, therefore, high prices have obtained throughout the industry for 39 months, or 15 per cent. of the time. If evenly distributed through the years, averaged, this would be in each year seven weeks of high prices, offset against 45 weeks of low prices. Low prices, it must be remembered, are so low that loss results from each ton of coal, except from mines favorably situated and ably managed. Nevertheless, and in the face of this discouraging outlook, when the brief periods of high prices do come, the margin of profits is so ample that bituminous coal mining as a whole is highly profitable.

Possibilities of the immediate future form one basis for investment. Coal mining, at the present time, faces several "ifs." For one, we are to have investigations by various fact-finding com-

missions, one provided by the Cleveland "truce," another by Congress, whose purpose is to accumulate information for stabilizing the industry. They hope to invent a panacea for its manifold ailments, specifically to find a cure for overproduction, overmanning, overdevelopment, over-everything. If this cure be found, the industry will be forced to pay penalty for its unpardonable economic sin. This is of course the sin of overproduction. The penalty will mean sifting out all those mines which do not justify survival. To them it will bring the loss of their investment. Our bankers appear to have jumped to the conclusion that this is to happen. They foresee approaching bankruptcy for many mines, and, with caution, the banks are manoeuvering not to be shouldered with that loss.

This contingency is not impossible. When intimately studied, however, such a thing as an abrupt stifling out of the life of mines looks rather remote. Coal mining is not iniquitous, as the legalized liquor business was. It is essential. It is beneficial. More probable, and more in keeping with economic principles, would it be for the industry to fight out the struggle to survive. The mines fit to continue will certainly live. Competition may, conceivably, gradually and slowly thrust the unfit aside, but we have, at the same time, many suggestions of changing conditions that may bring to all, fit and unfit alike, the chance to live and prosper.

Another possible "if" is that if some agreement for arbitration is found which will effectually prevent strikes; and if a similar device is worked out for the railroads, the whole mining industry would be changed. With strikes abolished—an extremely improbable "if"—one artificial possibility of high prices for coal would be stifled. The public would welcome such an event, for its

Continued on Page 283

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# The Annalist Barometer of Business Conditions

A DISTINCT improvement in sentiment has taken place in the last week due to the settlement of the major labor difficulties of the country. A termination of the coal strike, agreement on the return of the railroad shopmen and the ending of difficulties between the employers and employees in the textile district of New England cannot help but make for renewed confidence regarding the outlook. It has been realized all along that such unsettling sentiment as took place arose not because of underlying weakness in the business situation, but as a reflection of the uncertainty regarding the ultimate outcome of the labor difficulties. So far as labor is concerned, it appears now that the menace of any serious disaffection has been removed for a long time to come, and while there undoubtedly will be congestion in the movement of freight, and possibly an enforced curtailment of operations because of the fuel shortage, the trend of events will be toward the working out of the problem to a normal basis, and before many weeks have passed there will undoubtedly be a resumption of prosperous business conditions throughout the country.

The underlying situation in the business world has not been changed by the various strikes. In the final analysis the determination of whether business will be good or bad rests with demand and purchasing power, and in both of these there has been no diminution. That which has occurred has been simply a backing up of demand, and this business has not been lost, but will become assertive in the various markets as time passes. It is probably too much to expect that the resumption of business will lead to capacity operations except in some few lines, but at all events a brisk upturn is forecast, provided, of course, that no conditions arise which menace production or unsettle confidence. On the surface it seems that fears of this kind will have no place in the considerations of business men for the next several months. It is true that the European situation is still in a decidedly unfavorable position, and the news from the Balkan quarter has been somewhat alarming. It is unlikely, however, that any clash in that section will have the same catastrophic effect as did the murder in Serajevo in 1914. The Balkan States are not in a position to finance any prolonged resort to arms, and pressure from England, France and Italy would undoubtedly be of a character which would snuff out any flare of hatred which threatened to disturb the peace of Europe at this time.

Opinion differs as to the economic conditions in Germany, France and Italy. On the face of it, it would seem that Germany is hardly improving her position by the unlimited issuance of paper currency without regard to gold cover. On the other hand, this cannot be taken as a complete index to conditions within Germany. A change may come quickly, just as it did in the case of France after the Franco-Prussian war, and it can come with just as much of a surprise as did the French rehabilitation. As regards France there is evidently a disposition to cut down note circulation. Paper currency at the end of July totaled 36,050,000,000 francs. This was expanded by 400,000,000 francs during August, and later on arose to about 37,000,000,000 francs. In the last week, however, the amount of paper currency was reduced to 36,600,000,000 francs. This showing is particularly noteworthy since France has so much to do in the way of rebuilding, and it is evident that the Government is exercising a firm control over the monetary situation, fully realizing the danger of unlimited printing or note circulation.

However, while the crisis in Europe still persists so far as the monetary condition is concerned and while there are many problems to be solved of a political nature, this country can to a very large extent ignore foreign conditions, even though they do have an effect on our export trade. Europe is far from being the heavy buyer that she was, but trade with Europe can be expected to increase as time goes on. As a matter of fact, our export trade with other sections of the world, while not up to normal, is still in a flourishing condition. This is particularly true of iron and steel. Europe is taking very little in this line, whereas other countries outside of the European classification are relatively heavy buyers.

The improvement in sentiment in this country was perhaps no more strikingly illustrated than by the upturn in the stock market. There was some endeavor to depress prices on the Wall Street theory of selling when the news was out, but as a matter of fact, stocks are far above their prices of the Summer, and certain of them last week moved into new high levels for the year. It was significant, too, that bond floatations commenced to reappear in volume and that new offerings were taken with avidity which bespeak the same power of absorption as prevailed during the Spring. Undoubtedly, from now on there will be more and more financing done, much of it of an interesting character, and probably a great deal of a re-financing nature where stock is sold to retire bonded indebtedness. The character of the stock market appears to make possible financing of this nature. How long this run of financing will continue is problematical, but there seems to be a rather well-defined impression that such floatations of stocks and bonds as are undertaken or contemplated must be put out before Nov. 1. A large Government loan is a probable feature of the early Winter, and it may be that the reluctance to hold out a ray of prospect for corporate financing after Nov. 1 represents a belief that it would then not be feasible since it might interfere with a Government flotation.

The cotton market of recent days has presented an interesting picture. While the price movements have been somewhat irregular and nervous, it appears that there is a heavy latent demand for this staple, both from domestic sources as well as foreign. From such estimates as have come to hand recently, it seems that a low condition figure may be expected, and no matter what this may be, there is still allowance to be made for a deteriorated crop. Weather conditions in the cotton belt have been such that the staple is not at normal, and if this holds true with reference to a large proportion of the cotton, it is possible that an accentuated

shortage may develop with relation to first quality. During last week there was a greater interest displayed in the dry goods trade, and the trend of events seemed to indicate higher prices for goods in the near future. It is true that a great many planters in the South have been selling, and this undoubtedly has created considerable pressure in the various markets, and not infrequently the trend of cotton prices has been at variance with the news. However, there is a well-defined opinion that higher prices for cotton may be expected even though there may be a reaction from present quotations. A short crop and deteriorated quality against a heavy world demand and small carry-over are factors which seem to underlie and make for higher prices.

## The World in Review

THE passage of the Tariff bill has created quite a stir in the British economic press. The London Times Trade Supplement for Sept. 2 notes two points in the bill as of special interest to Great Britain:

The main features of the Fordney tariff were two: The new basis for the computation of ad valorem duties, the "American valuation" and the excessively stringent increases in the rates of duties to be levied on most, if not all, of the principal items figuring in our (British) exports to the United States market.

It is the "American valuation" that is of particular concern to the British exporters. After discussing the meaning of that term and the vicissitudes through which it has passed in the course of the tariff discussions, The Times article continues:

The fetish of "American valuation" is to some extent retained in the bill and may bear heavily upon the prospects for the export trade to the United States of at least one important British industry. Furthermore, it has distinctly disturbing features. It places in the hands of the Administrative powers never before held by the President of the United States, and introduces an element of uncertainty which can scarcely fail to add to the difficulties to be faced by British firms exporting to America.

The British anxiety over the possible bearing of the new American tariff is really one of the phases of the economic difficulties under which Great Britain and the whole British Empire are laboring. It is true that, on the whole, Great Britain manages to hold her own in the field of international trade, in which she had a decided pre-eminence before the war, but the economic difficulties imposed upon her by the war render her position such as to require extraordinary effort and vigilance. In the markets of the Far East, for example, the British Empire encounters new and very serious competition. The following table, given by The London Times, is an illustration of this:

CHINA'S FOREIGN TRADE.  
(In percentages of the total.)

	1913.	1919.	1920.	1921.
British Empire .....	48.05	37.21	41.74	42.33
Great Britain .....	11.44	9.72	13.23	11.78
United States .....	7.40	16.12	15.67	17.29
Japan .....	19.68	33.72	27.62	24.93

The figures in this table do not include the trade with Hongkong and China, which is principally British, and, if added to the above totals, would increase somewhat the British pre-eminence. It is very significant, however, that the table shows distinctly a number of very interesting things. While the relative importance of Great Britain in 1921 is approximately the same as it was in 1913, the relative importance of the British Empire is considerably less. Japan, which during the war came to occupy a position of prime importance in China's foreign trade, is rapidly losing that position, being to a very considerable extent displaced by the United States.

Of the British Imperial problems in the domain of economics that of India is of rather considerable interest and importance. In The London Fortnightly Review for August Sir Michael F. O'Dwyer discusses the question of taxation in India. His contention is that India is one of the most lightly taxed countries in the world. He points out that, while the purchasing power of the rupee today is about half of its prewar value, the increase of taxation has been only from 30 to 40 per cent, as compared with the increase in Great Britain of nearly 400 per cent.

Taxes in India, according to this writer, amount to seven shillings sixpence per head, as compared with an average of from one to three pounds sterling in Egypt, Palestine and Mesopotamia, and the 1921 average in England of twenty-two pounds, or sixty times the per capita rate in India. At the same time, he estimates that English incomes average twelve times the size of Indian incomes.

The income tax, which, in Great Britain, yields nearly three hundred million pounds annually, gives the Indian Government a revenue of only from twelve to fifteen million pounds. This is attributed to the fact that landowners in India do not pay any income tax, which falls practically entirely on the business and professional classes. The total taxation in India for 1920 is estimated at 6 per cent. of the country's annual income, as against 33 per cent. in Great Britain. Commenting on this, the writer in the Fortnightly Review says:

Yet Indian politicians talk loosely of oppressive taxation and refuse to vote the extra duties necessary to balance the budget.

This writer ascribes the difficulty in balancing the budget to the increased cost of administration under the system of Dihyarchy, introduced by the British Government since the war, and to the unwillingness of the Indian Government to return to the old scale of taxation, which had been reduced before the war. He states that the public debt of India today represents two years' income, but notes that three-fifths of it are on account of productive expenditures, such as railways, irrigation, etc.

The Indian political leaders, however, ascribe the budget difficulties to increased military and naval expenditures, and call for drastic reductions. An interesting light on the subject of Indian military expenditures is thrown by a discussion of it in the Cairo Egyptian Gazette for Aug. 7.

The numerical strength of the Indian army, according to the recent report of the Joint

Standing Committee, was six thousand less in 1921-2 than in 1913-4. Yet the cost of its maintenance had doubled. This is attributed mainly to increases in pay, due to the decrease of the purchasing power of the rupee, and to staff inflation, resulting from the abandonment of the Kitchener scheme of centralization. The whole cost of army maintenance in India has increased from five million pounds sterling before the war to eleven million pounds at the present time.

India's trade is mostly with Great Britain, especially on the import side, and this renders the question of possible customs revenues very difficult, though an article in the Calcutta Review for July argues for the need of a protective tariff. India exports mainly jute, raw cotton, grain, hides, skins, tea and seed, while she imports mainly iron, steel, silk, machinery, sugar, rolling stock, hardware and mineral oils. About a quarter of her exports go to Great Britain, but fully two-thirds of her imports come from the British Isles.

A commercial treaty of reciprocity was recently signed between France and Spain. As reported by the Madrid Epoca (July 15), this treaty provides that products originating or manufactured in either of the two countries or those of its colonies where the same tariff is in force as at home, shall be divided into three types, one of which and a certain percentage of the other are to be admitted at the minimum rates. It is expressly stipulated that nothing in the treaty permits either of the signatories to lay claim to special trade facilities afforded by each to its colonies and, in the case of Spain, to Portugal.

Certificates of origin for goods coming under the treaty, even when shipped through a third country, should be supplied by the Ministry of Commerce or local chambers of commerce. Postal packages, provided with such certificates, will be free from examination.

Provisions are also made for a conference within six months to take up the question of smuggling between the two countries and to work out measures to stop it. A similar conference is proposed to take up the matter of commercial frauds. Each of the signatories has the right to issue to its nationals special certificates which would be honored by the other and entitle the holder to freedom of operations in purchasing and exporting.

Along her northeastern frontier France faces the need of similarly establishing close economic relations with her neighbor there, Belgium. A great deal of discussion is occasioned in France by this question, one of the important phases of which is that concerned with the Belgian port of Antwerp. A writer in the Paris Revue d'Economie Politique (June) points out that Antwerp is much more advantageously situated than its nearest French competitor, the port of Dunkirk, as far as steamship line connections are concerned, while the freight rates on the Belgian railroads are considerably lower than they are on the French. Ordinarily, Antwerp draws its trade from the Lorraine basin and the industrial regions of Eastern France. But, since the war, the French Government has succeeded, by tariff impositions, in diverting a good deal of this trade to the French port, which alarmed the Belgian businessmen considerably and led them to ask for preferential treatment in the case of Antwerp. This request was refused and the matter has served as the occasion for a good deal of bitter feeling between the Belgians and the French. Later on, however, certain exemptions, especially in the matter of warehouse taxes, were granted by France, with the result that in 1921 the French shipping through the port of Antwerp showed an increase of about 12 per cent. as compared with 1920.

The question which is of greatest immediate interest in Soviet Russia is the problem of foreign trade. The Soviet Government insists on maintaining a State monopoly of foreign trade, although its position in this regard is more and more criticized within the ranks of the communist leadership itself. However, the organization of trade

technique is not of as great importance, at this particular moment, as the country's capacity for export, which naturally determines its purchasing capacity for import.

In the last few months the Soviet Government has been especially anxious to develop trade relations with Germany. The reason for this is that whatever Russia has to export at the present time is raw materials, especially of the kind that Germany needs. The Soviet trade representative in Germany, in a recent statement published in the Moscow Izvestiya (June 30), said:

It is well known, of course, that, before the war, a large part of our raw materials went to Germany to be there worked up into finished goods. It is natural, therefore, that, at the present time, our raw materials find their best market there. Moreover, we find it possible to get better prices there than in other European markets, in spite of the condition of the German exchange.

The Soviet trade delegation in Berlin finds that it can purchase in Germany very large amounts of the goods Russia needs. More than three thousand deals with German manufacturers have been negotiated, totaling altogether about three billion marks, but these orders depend upon the possibility of export deliveries.

So far the principal item of export from Russia is lumber and its products, which go both to Germany and to England. But with regard to lumber, as a writer in the Moscow Torgovo-Promyshlennaya Gazeta (July 4) points out, Soviet Russia finds itself in a rather difficult situation because of the general conditions of the lumber trade on the European markets. Her principal competitors are Sweden and Finland, which, together, export, at the present time, six times the amount of lumber which Russia has to offer. Moreover, the lumber prices have slumped very considerably recently and the Swedish lumber industry has succeeded in adjusting its operating costs, especially with regard to wages, to the low prices prevailing on the lumber market. Thus, although the Soviet Government hopes to be able to export in the present year four or five times the amount of lumber that had been exported in 1921, nevertheless the net result of these operations is not likely to increase very markedly the purchasing capacity of the Russian monopolized apparatus of foreign trade.

Germany's cost of industrial production is rapidly becoming a problem of grave concern to her manufacturers because, in this manner, they lose the advantages which their low exchange gives them in foreign trade. The Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung (Aug. 12), in analyzing the increase of production costs now coming in the wake of the collapse of the mark, says:

Before the war the large industrial enterprises estimated their wages, salaries and business expenses at about 20 per cent. of their total expenditures. Today, however, these items of expense, figured in terms of gold marks, are estimated at nearly 50 per cent. above the pre-war figures. At the same time, the total output of production measured in weight, has decreased to only about 80 per cent. of what it was before the war. Generally speaking, the per capita production has decreased, but, in many cases, it has been found possible in the last year to obtain a higher output than before the war by means of piece-work.

There are several other factors, according to the Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, making for an increase of production costs. The more important ones among these are the growth of the clerical force, transportation difficulties, delays incidental to the system of export licenses and complications in accounting due to the fluctuation of the currency. All this introduces confusion throughout the whole range of industrial relations. The currency situation eats into the very heart of facilities and profits:

The total expenditures on business costs, Continued on Page 282

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
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**WAR DEPARTMENT**

## Curve of the Food Cost of Living



An index number is a means of showing fluctuations in the average price of a group of commodities. The Annalist Index Number shows the fluctuations in the average wholesale price of twenty-five food commodities selected and arranged to represent a theoretical family's food budget.

## Financial Transactions

## BAROMETRICS

## The State of Credit

	Last Week.	Same Week	Year	Same Period
Sales of stock, shares.....	5,783,484	2,355,002	182,251,730	120,333,015
Sales of bonds, par value.....	\$70,166,050	\$82,771,950	\$3,001,780,752	\$2,148,322,595
High 90.25	High 66.94	High 90.23	High 73.13	
Low 68.17	Low 64.68	Low 66.21	Low 58.35	
High 82.44	High 71.57	High 82.54	High 71.60	
Low 82.13	Low 71.13	Low 75.01	Low 67.56	
Average net yield of ten high-priced bonds.....	4.40%	5.23%	4.58%	5.32%
New security issues.....	\$137,919,400	\$12,000,000	\$1,746,309,900	\$1,237,288,100

	Last Week.	Previous Week.	Year to Date.	Same Week
British Con. 21%	56%@96%	57%@58%	60 @ 89%	48%@48%
British 5%	100%@99%	100%@99%	1024@91%	89%@89%
British 4%	98 @ 97%	97%@97%	98 @ 83%	81%
French rentes (in Paris).....	63.95@61.90	62.10@61.75	62.10@54.20	56.55@55.82
French War Loan (in Paris).....	79.90@77.35	76.80@76.70	80.20@74.20	81.45

## Potentials of Productivity and Measure of Business Activity

## THE METAL BAROMETER

	End of August	End of July
United States Steel orders, tons.....	5,950,100	4,531,026
Daily pig iron production, tons.....	58,586	30,780
Pig iron production, tons.....	*1,816,170	*954,193
High 100.21	High 88.94	High 90.23
Low 88.17	Low 64.68	Low 66.21
High 82.44	High 71.57	High 82.54
Low 82.13	Low 71.13	Low 75.01
Average price of 50 stocks.....	10.94%	10.94%
Average price of 40 bonds.....	4.40%	5.23%
Average net yield of ten high-priced bonds.....	4.40%	5.23%
New security issues.....	\$137,919,400	\$12,000,000
Gain or loss.....	+12,230	+12,044

	Current Price	Range, 1922	Mean Price	Mean Price of Other Years
Copper: Electrolytic, per lb.....	\$0.1400	\$0.1400	\$0.14375	\$0.1275
Cotton: Spot, middling upland, per lb.....	2.150	2.2375	2.1645	2.1425
Brick: Hudson River common, per 1,000.....	19.00	22.00	15.00	18.00
Cement: Portland, bulk, at mill, bbl.....	1.70	1.70	1.70	3.35
Wool: Ohio & Pa. half blood combing, per lb.....	.50	.50	.37	.3250
Pine: Nor. Car. Roofers 6 in., per 1,000 ft.....	33.00	25.50	30.75	27.50
Hides: Packers, No. 1 native, per lb.....	21.00	21.00	16.50	.1275
Petroleum: Pennsylvania crude at well, bbl.....	3.00	3.50	3.00	.55
Pig Iron: Bessemer, at Pittsburgh, per ton.....	36.77	36.77	22.00	27.96
Rubber: Up river, fine, per lb.....	.19	.25	.17	.17375
Silks: Japan, Shinshu, No. 1, per lb.....	7.40	7.85	6.10	.625


## GROSS RAILROAD EARNINGS

	Last Week.	Previous Week.	Range for 1922	Same Week
Hogs, medium to heavy, per cwt.....	\$.80	\$.8525	\$1.025	\$1.025
Steers, good to choice, per cwt.....	10.075	10.20	9.575	8.875
Beef, salt, per 200 lbs.....	14.50	14.50	16.75	13.00
Pork, salt, per 200 lbs.....	2.00	28.50	28.50	25.75
Flour, Spring patents, per bbl.....	7.675	7.875	10.05	7.675
Brick, Middle West, per lb.....	1.005	1.0975	1.125	.08375
Oats, No. 2 and No. 3 white.....	1.3375	1.3025	.1575	.13875
Beef, fresh, per lb.....	1.400	1.3500	.1500	.1250
Mutton, dressed, per lb.....	1.150	1.150	.1600	.0850
Potatoes, white, per bushel.....	.66	.78	.73	.65
Sheep, wethers, per 100 lbs.....	6.00	6.25	9.70	5.125
Sugar, refined granulated, per lb.....	.0650	.06625	.07485	.0600
Codfish, Georges, per lb.....	.0025	.0025	.0025	.1250
Rye flour, special patents, W. St.....	4.75	4.775	4.75	4.725
Rice, extra fancy, per lb.....	1.824	1.825	1.875	1.85
Beans, medium, per bushel.....	5.624	5.024	5.70	5.225
Apples, extra choice, per lb.....	1.875	1.875	.14	.1775
Pears, No. 30, per lb.....	1.2875	1.2875	.12875	.0925
Butter, creamy extra, per lb.....	.3950	.3900	.3425	.3550
Butter, dairy, per lb.....	.3825	.3775	.3850	.4175
Cheese, State, whole milk, per lb.....	.2250	.2225	.2325	.2175
Coffee, Rio No. 7, per lb.....	.10375	.1023	.111875	.08125

## AVERAGE OF WHOLESALE PRICES

	Last Week.	Previous Week.	High.	Low.	1921.	1920.
Hogs, medium to heavy, per cwt.....	\$.80	\$.8525	\$1.025	\$.7625	\$1.025	\$1.025
Steers, good to choice, per cwt.....	10.075	10.20	9.575	8.875	16.70	16.70
Beef, salt, per 200 lbs.....	14.50	14.50	16.75	13.00	19.50	19.50
Pork, salt, per 200 lbs.....	2.00	28.50	28.50	25.75	30.50	30.50
Flour, Spring patents, per bbl.....	7.675	7.875	10.05	7.675	9.80	14.05
Brick, Middle West, per lb.....	1.005	1.0975	1.125	.08375		

## Federal Reserve Gold Holdings and Total Stock of Gold



The space between the base line and the broken line represents the cash reserves required, that between the broken line and the light line the excess reserves, or free gold, and the whole space between the base line and the heavy line represents the total stock of gold. The supply is computed monthly, so that the record can never be brought to the date of publication. The chart records the last figures published.

	Week Ended Saturday, Sept. 16		Bank Clearings		By Telegraph to The Annalist	
	Last Week	1922	Year to Date	1921	Last Week	1922
Central Reserve Cities	1922				1922	1921
New York	\$4,230,637,802	\$3,804,100,175	\$153,869,066,424	\$137,957,850,820	\$39,383,282	\$1,363,792,854
Chicago	500,378,198	523,381,530	19,380,977,633	18,360,849,450	61,535,040	2,061,861,685
Total, 2 C. R. cities	\$4,791,016,000	\$4,327,481,706	\$173,250,044,057	\$156,318,700,279	14,146,600	1,998,498,413
Increase	10.7%		10.9%		20,817,978	515,634,200
Other Federal Reserve Cities					19,370,349	687,401,794
Atlanta	\$48,493,679	\$46,835,076	\$1,413,128,416	\$1,424,651,725	27,385,107	651,596,448
Boston	334,000,000	285,803,695	11,035,000,000	9,902,211,080	35,235,654	713,687,221
Cleveland	113,278,992	102,575,780	3,180,531,207	3,467,268,711	31,939,814	758,849,934
Kansas City, Mo.	148,418,485	183,304,067	4,690,820,265	5,502,317,647	44,768,153	1,369,409,141
Minneapolis	78,076,006	85,621,041	2,215,722,161	2,123,301,354	34,636,856	1,383,713,636
Philadelphia	458,000,000	427,000,000	15,211,000,000	13,750,356,739	36,881,403	1,189,890,575
Richmond	51,191,000	39,832,000	1,516,046,294	1,417,590,000	36,912,922	1,053,310,323
San Francisco	176,800,000	147,700,000	4,991,900,000	4,622,000,000	19,387,116	609,607,610
Total, 8 cities	\$1,408,258,162	\$1,320,671,650	\$44,254,148,343	\$42,300,697,256		
Increase	6.6%		4.6%			
Total, 10 cities	\$6,199,274,162	\$5,648,153,364	\$217,504,192,400	\$198,628,397,535		
Increase	9.7%		9.5%			
Total, 11 cities	\$465,315,347				\$420,636,566	\$14,424,837,520
Increase	11.09%					7.4%
Total, 21 cities	\$6,664,589,509				\$6,068,789,930	\$231,929,029,920
Increase	9.8%					9.3%

## Actual Condition Statements of the Federal Reserve Banks Sept. 13

Dist. 1.	Dist. 2.	Dist. 3.	Dist. 4.	Dist. 5.	Dist. 6.	Dist. 7.	Dist. 8.	Dist. 9.	Dist. 10.	Dist. 11.	Dist. 12.	San Fran. Co.
Boston	New York	Philadelphia	Cleveland	Richmond	Atlanta	Chicago	St. Louis	Minneapolis	Kansas City	Dallas		\$237,409,000
Gold reserve	\$229,780,000	\$1,062,227,000	\$203,466,000	\$244,427,000	\$104,308,000	\$130,809,000	\$570,407,000	\$71,640,000	\$70,186,000	\$47,198,000		
Hedging	9,473,060	21,435,000	28,871,000	19,105,000	9,951,000	1,722,000	14,245,000	4,816,000	1,631,000	1,183,000		9,662,000
Bills on hand	35,845,000	109,386,000	85,842,000	61,505,000	35,801,000	32,152,000	60,986,000	32,825,000	25,706,000	17,789,000		77,183,000
Due members	124,042,000	93,487,000	109,342,000	147,912,000	55,651,000	48,269,000	272,685,000	62,454,000	43,275,000	78,045,000		128,526,000
Notes in circul'n	190,947,000	604,842,000	180,422,000	212,564,000	82,803,000	114,768,000	384,802,000	72,046,000	31,588,000	61,992,000		36,354,000
Itatio reserve	75.2%	83.7%	73.5%	69.5%	79.3%	82.3%	88.2%	63.5%	73.2%	65.3%		62.1%
												67.2%

## Federal Reserve Bank Statement

Consolidated statement of the twelve Federal Reserve Banks compares as follows:

RESOURCES—	Sept. 13, 1922	Sept. 6, 1922	Sept. 14, 1921
Gold and gold certificates	\$281,408,000	\$285,316,000	\$446,642,000
Gold settlement fund—Federal Reserve Board	526,340,000	530,125,000	441,109,000
Total gold held by banks	\$807,748,000	\$815,441,000	\$887,751,000
Gold with Federal Reserve agents	2,219,162,000	2,206,468,000	1,694,301,000
Gold redemption fund	40,324,000	38,914,000	102,449,000
Total gold reserves	\$3,067,234,000	\$3,060,823,000	\$2,684,501,000
Legal tender notes, silver, &c.	130,204,000	125,864,000	150,001,000
Total reserves	\$3,197,438,000	\$3,186,687,000	\$2,834,502,000
Bills discounted: Secured by U. S. Government obligations	123,960,000	130,447,000	503,677,000
All other	263,213,000	274,636,000	924,485,000
Bills bought in open market	204,663,000	188,365,000	40,712,000
Total bills on hand	\$591,836,000	\$593,448,000	\$1,468,874,000
United States bonds and notes	198,835,000	207,514,000	33,729,000
United States certificates of indebtedness: One-year certificates (Pittman act)	55,000,000	56,500,000	187,875,000
All other	243,045,000	244,178,000	19,503,000
Municipal warrants	18,000	21,000	
Total earning assets	\$1,068,734,000	\$1,101,661,000	\$1,710,281,000
Bank premises	43,808,000	43,636,000	28,877,000
Five per cent redemption fund against Federal Reserve Bank notes	4,742,000	4,898,000	8,455,000
Uncollected items	661,605,000	576,078,000	641,279,000
All other resources	18,520,000	18,193,000	16,801,000
Total resources	\$5,014,847,000	\$4,930,953,000	\$5,240,585,000
LIABILITIES—			
Capital paid in	\$106,070,000	\$106,055,000	\$102,982,000
Surplus	215,388,000	215,398,000	213,824,000
Deposits: Government	39,294,000	37,730,000	49,219,000
Member banks—Reserve account	1,811,237,000	1,796,081,000	1,631,035,000
All other	21,572,000	22,986,000	25,574,000
Total deposits	\$1,872,103,000	\$1,856,707,000	\$1,705,831,000
Federal Reserve notes in actual circulation	2,213,615,000	2,211,889,000	2,491,651,000
F. R. Bank notes in circulation—Net liability	50,222,000	52,783,000	103,078,000
Deferred availability items	534,674,000	465,764,000	553,235,000
All other liabilities	22,765,000	22,227,000	60,984,000
Total liabilities	\$5,014,847,000	\$4,930,953,000	\$5,240,585,000
Ratio of total reserves to deposit and Federal Reserve note liabilities combined	78.3%	78.3%	67.5%

## Statement of Member Banks

Data for Federal Reserve Cities and in Federal Reserve Branch Cities

	New York	Chicago		
Sept. 6	Aug. 30	Sept. 6	Aug. 30	
Number of reporting banks	64	50	50	50
Loans sec. by U.S. Govt. obliga'tns	\$75,593,000	\$74,409,000	\$33,109,000	\$34,972,000
Loans sec. by stocks and bonds	1,406,674,000	1,401,886,000	389,857,000	400,369,000
All other loans and discounts	1,949,677,000	1,932,983,000	637,405,000	630,672,000
Total loans and discounts	3,431,944,000	3,409,666,000	1,060,371,000	1,066,013,000
U. S. bonds owned (exclusive of bonds borrowed)	498,751,000	499,674,000	61,134,000	62,952,000
U. S. Victory notes	20,514,000	20,311,000	4,550,000	4,496,000
U. S. Treasury notes	387,789,000	384,965,000	51,549,000	51,813,000
U. S. ctfs. of indebtedness	61,703,000	75,768,000	14,137,000	14,069,000
Other bonds, stocks and secur's	591,338,000	597,435,000	176,570,000	170,726,000
Loans, discounts, investm'ts, &c.	4,992,039,000	4,986,631,000	1,368,311,000	1,375,069,000
Reserve bal. with F. R. Bank	589,367,000	602,532,000	136,223,000	137,836,000
Cash in vault	75,290,000	72,242,000	29,48,000	28,488,000
Net demand deposits	4,305,295,000	4,316,409,000	968,320,000	967,652,000
Time deposits	601,031,000	606,620,000	328,414,000	334,514,000
Government deposits	64,430,000	64,430,000	17,265,000	16,871,000
Bills payable	13,980,000	9,468,000	590,000	935,000
Bills rediscounted	14,015,000	11,614,000	2,367,000	5,290,000
	All Reserve Cities	Reserve Branch Cities	Sept. 6	Aug. 30
Number of reporting banks	269	260	209	

# *New York Stock Exchange Transactions*


**Week Ended September 16**

**Total Sales 5,783,484 Shares**

Stock and Dividend Rate.												Stock and Dividend Rate.																
High.	Low.	Sales.	High.	Low.	Last.	Chge.	High.	Low.	Sales.	High.	Low.	Last.	Chge.	High.	Low.	Sales.	High.	Low.	Last.	Chge.								
81% 48	2,000	ADAMS EXPRESS	80%	70%	70%	- 1%	80%	54	630 C, C & St Louis (4)	80%	78%	80%	+ 2%	61%	25%	22,900	9,800	9,800	9,800	+ 2%	61%	58%	50	- 3%				
23	10%	500 Advance Runcy	22%	21	21	- 1%	72%	120	Do pf (5)	99%	98	99	+ 1%	94%	68%	1,800	800	800	800	Do pf (7)	94%	93%	94%	+ 3%				
60% 45%	7,400 Air Reduction	40%	50%	50	50	+ 2%	60%	43	2,300 Chaset-Peabody	66	62	64	- 2%	87	54	600	Do 2d pf	70%	87	85	86%	87	85	86%	87	- 1%		
18% 9%	18,800 Ajax Rubber	13%	13%	13%	14%	+ 3%	87%	100	Do pf (7)	103	103	103	-	107	72	200	200	200	200	200	101	101	101	+ 1%				
5%	1,700 Alaska Gold Mines	7%	7%	7%	8%	+ 1%	74%	41	23,900 Coca-Cola (4)	72%	69%	69%	-	69	57	300	Do pf (4)	60	68%	68%	-	67	57	300	Do pf (4)	-		
2	5%	11,000 Alaska Juneau	1%	1%	1%	+ 1%	37	24	20,300 Col. Fuel & Iron	30%	32%	35%	+ 2%	40	15%	32,300 Mallinson & Co.	38	33%	35	-	29	15%	32,300 Mallinson & Co.	38	33%	35	-	
91% 35%	22,200 Allied Chem & Dye (4)	80%	74%	84%	84%	-	53%	38	2,400 Col. & Southern (3)	52	49	52	+ 2%	93	62%	100	Do pf (7)	90	90	90	-	93	62%	100	Do pf (7)	-		
115% 101	500 Advance Runcy	11%	11%	11%	11%	+ 1%	63	55	400 Do 1st pf (4)	63	62	63	+ 1%	52	30%	2,500 Manati Sugar	42%	40	41%	-	15%	15%	15%	15%	-			
50%	37%	6,300 Allis-Chalm Mfg (4)	50%	57%	57%	+ 1%	60%	49	100 Do 2d pf (4)	59%	59%	59%	+ 1%	84%	73%	600	Do pf (7)	84%	81%	81%	+ 1%	58	35%	2,400 Manhatttan Elev (7)	56	53%	54	-
103% 80%	900 Do pf (7)	103%	101%	103%	103%	+ 2%	114%	64%	61,600 Columbia Gas & L (11)	11%	11%	104%	+ 12%	74%	55%	400 Do ctfs	55	53%	53%	+ 1%	55	41	4,900 Do ctfs	55	53%	53%	-	
42%	29%	5,200 Am Agrecol Chem	40%	39%	39%	+ 1%	72%	71%	71%	71%	71%	71%	-	21	5	500 Do pf	14%	13%	13%	-	43%	32	1,900 Manhattan Shirt (2)	41%	40%	40%	-	
72%	55%	1000 Do pf	72%	72%	72%	-	70%	56%	7,000 Comp Tab Rec (6)	76%	73%	74%	-	67	35	700 Market St Ry pr (6)	64	63%	63%	-	67	35	700 Market St Ry pr (6)	64	63%	63%	-	
77%	37%	200 Am Ban Note (4)	7%	7%	7%	-	2%	2%	100 Consol. Distributors	7%	7%	7%	-	32	5%	200 Am Ban Note (4)	21	20%	20%	-	32	5%	200 Am Ban Note (4)	21	20%	20%	-	
54	31%	100 Do pf (3)	52%	52%	52%	+ 1%	2%	2%	1000 Consolidated Cigar	38	34	37%	- 1%	46%	32%	13,200 Marland Oil & Ref (4)	41%	39%	40%	-	46%	32%	13,200 Marland Oil & Ref (4)	41%	39%	40%	-	
49	31%	2,000 Am Beet Sugar	47	46%	46%	-	1%	120	113%	400 Consol Gas, Balt (8)	120	118	120	+ 2%	26%	5%	4,940 Martin-Rockwell	15%	15%	19%	-	26%	5%	4,940 Martin-Rockwell	15%	15%	19%	-
49	31%	1,700 Am Bosch Magneto	44%	42%	42%	+ 1%	1%	120	113%	400 Consol Gas, Balt (8)	120	118	120	+ 2%	30%	20%	18,300 Martin-Perry (2)	33%	30%	33%	+ 1%	30%	20%	18,300 Martin-Perry (2)	33%	30%	33%	-
88%	51%	6,300 Am Brake S & Fly (4)	88%	81%	84	+ 2%	145%	85	73,700 Consolidated Gas (8)	145%	140%	141%	- 1%	50%	22%	1,900 Mathieson Alkali	50%	47	48%	-	50%	22%	1,900 Mathieson Alkali	50%	47	48%	-	
112	74%	200 Do pf (7)	112	112	112	+ 2%	1%	154	9	8,300 Consolidated Textile	11%	10%	10%	- 1%	72%	15%	6,500 Maxwell Motors Cl A	60%	57	58%	+ 1%	72%	15%	6,500 Maxwell Motors Cl A	60%	57	58%	-
112	74%	200 Do pf (7)	112	112	112	+ 2%	1%	154	9	8,300 Columbia Graph	3%	3%	3%	-	74%	4%	1,500 Maxell Motors	20%	18%	19%	+ 1%	74%	4%	1,500 Maxell Motors	20%	18%	19%	-
112	74%	200 Do pf (7)	112	112	112	+ 2%	1%	154	9	8,300 Columbia Graph	3%	3%	3%	-	138%	101	5,500 May Dept Stores (8)	13%	13%	13%	-	138%	101	5,500 May Dept Stores (8)	13%	13%	13%	-
110%	93%	14,300 Am Can	100%	100%	100%	+ 3%	1%	120%	91%	17,100 Corn Prod Ref (6)	11%	11%	11%	- 2%	204%	106%	120,810 Mex Petroleum (12)	105%	105%	105%	+ 2%	204%	106%	120,810 Mex Petroleum (12)	105%	105%	105%	-
100%	141	2,200 Am Car & Fly (12)	100%	100%	100%	+ 3%	1%	120	111	100 Do pf (7)	119	119	119	- 1%	99	79%	1,800 Mo. Kan & Texas	13%	13%	13%	-	99	79%	1,800 Mo. Kan & Texas	13%	13%	13%	-
123	115%	500 Do pf (7)	125	125	125	+ 1%	1%	125	122%	122%	122%	- 1%	53%	19%	19,630 Condon Co (2%)	53%	48%	52%	+ 2%	53%	19%	19,630 Condon Co (2%)	53%	48%	52%	-		
14	7	700 Am Chicle	9	8%	8%	- 1%	1%	120	113%	400 Consol Gas, Balt (8)	120	118	120	+ 2%	100%	5%	1,400 Do pf (7)	100%	98	100%	+ 3%	100%	5%	1,400 Do pf (7)	100%	98	100%	-
30%	10%	7,500 Am Cotton Oil	30%	27%	29%	+ 1%	1%	120	113%	400 Consol Gas, Balt (8)	120	118	120	+ 2%	30%	20%	18,200 Crucible Steel	96%	92	93%	+ 2%	30%	20%	18,200 Crucible Steel	96%	92	93%	-
60%	52%	1,900 Do pf	60%	58%	60%	+ 1%	1%	120	113%	400 Consol Gas, Balt (8)	120	118	120	+ 2%	60%	5%	1,200 Do pf (7)	60%	58	60%	+ 1%	60%	5%	1,200 Do pf (7)	60%	58	60%	-
127%	102	26,300 Am Locomotive (6)	127%	122%	123%	+ 2%	1%	127%	110	1,000 Del. Luck & W (18)	127%	120	120	-	11%	10%	1,000 Del. Luck & W (18)	127%	120	120	-	11%	10%	1,000 Del. Luck & W (18)	127%	120	120	-
121%	112	300 Do pf (7)	121%	121%	121%	+ 2%	1%	121%	116	1,210 Del. & Hudson (2)	121%	120	120	-	100%	10%	1,210 Del. & Hudson (2)	121%	120	120	-	100%	10%	1,210 Del. & Hudson (2)	121%	120	120	-
52%	44	2,300 Am Metal (3)	51%	49%	49%	- 1%	1%	120	116	1,000 Do pf (7)	51%	49	49	-	60%	5%	2,300 Del. & Hudson (2)	51%	49	49	-	60%	5%	2,300 Del. & Hudson (2)	51%	49	49	-
113%	107	500 Do pf (7)	113%	112	112	- 1%	1%	113%	108	2,100 Do pf (7)	113%	112	112	-	30%	10%	5,000 Donne Mines (2)	30%	30	38%	- 1%	30%	10%	5,000 Donne Mines (2)	30%	30	38%	-
122%	82	4,400 Am Radiator (4)	122%	117%	117%	+ 1%	1%	122%	117%	117%	117%	- 1%	6	2%	600 Do pf (7)	6	5	5	-	6	2%	600 Do pf (7)	6	5	5	-		
25%	16%	6,300 Am Safety Razor (25c)	25%	26%	26%	+ 1%	1%	120	116	1,200 Am Safety Razor (25c)	25%	26%	26%	-	10%	10%	1,200 Am Safety Razor (25c)	25%	26%	26%	-	10%	10%	1,200 Am Safety Razor (25c)	25%	26%	26%	-
25%	16%	6,300 Am Ship & Commerce	25%	26%	26%	+ 1%	1%	120	116	1,200 Am Ship & Commerce	25%	26%	26%	-	10%	10%	1,200 Am Ship & Commerce	25%	26%	26%	-	10%	10%	1,200 Am Ship & Commerce	25%	26%	26%	-
67%	43%	7,200 Am Stock & Commerce	67%	68%	68%	+ 1%	1%	120	116	1,200 Am Stock & Commerce	67%	68%	68%	-	10%	10%	1,200 Am Stock & Commerce	67%	68%	68%	-	10%	10%	1,200 Am Stock & Commerce	67%	68%	68%	-
47%	35%	8,650 Am Sumatra Tobacco	47%	46%	46%	- 1%	1%	120	116	1,200 Am Sumatra Tobacco	47%	46%	46%	-	10%	10%	1,200 Am Sumatra Tobacco	47%	46%	46%	-	10%	10%	1,200 Am Sumatra Tobacco	47%	46%	46%	-
129%	114%	8,700 Am Tel & Tel (5)	129%	124	124	+ 1%	1%	124	122%	124	124	-	2%	2%	30,000 Do 1st pf	2%	2%	2%	-	2%	2%	30,000 Do 1st pf	2%	2%	2%	-		
129%	114%	8,700 Am Tel & Tel (5)	129%	124	124	+ 1%	1%	124	122%	124	124	-	2%	2%	2,200 Do 2d pf	2%	2%	2%	-	2%	2%	2,200 Do 2d pf	2%	2%	2%	-		
129%	114%	8,700 Am Tel & Tel (5)	129%	124	124	+ 1%	1%	124	122%	124	124	-	2%	2%	10,400 EASTMAN KODAK (5)	107%	105%	105%	+ 2%	107%	105%	105%	105%	+ 2%	107%	105%	105%	+ 2%
129%	114%	8,700 Am Tel & Tel (5)	129%	124	124	+ 1%	1%	124	122%	124	124	-	2%	2%	10,400 EASTMAN KODAK (5)	107%	105%	105%	+ 2%	107%	105%	105%	105%	+ 2%	107%	105%	105%	+ 2%
129%	114%	8,700 Am Tel & Tel (5)	129%	124	124	+ 1%	1%	124	122%	124	124	-	2%	2%	10,400 EASTMAN KODAK (5)	107%	105%	105%	+ 2%	107%	105%	105%	105%	+ 2%	107%	105%	105%	+ 2%
129%	114%	8,700 Am Tel & Tel (5)	129%	124	124	+ 1%	1%	124	122%	124	124	-	2%	2%	10,400 EASTMAN KODAK (5)	107%	105%	105%	+ 2%	107%	105%	105%	105%	+ 2%	107%	105%	105%	+ 2%
129%	114%	8,700 Am Tel & Tel (5)	129%	124	124	+ 1%	1%	124	122%	124	124	-	2%	2%	10,400 EASTMAN KODAK (5)	107%	105%	105%	+ 2%	107%	105%	105%	105%	+ 2%	107%	105%	105%	+ 2%
129%	114%	8,700 Am Tel & Tel (5)	129%	124	124	+ 1%	1%	124	122%	124	124	-	2%	2%	10,400 EASTMAN KODAK (5)	107%	105%	105%	+ 2%	107%	105%	105%	105%	+ 2%	107%	105%	105%	+ 2%
129%	114%	8,700 Am Tel & Tel (5)	129%	124	124	+ 1%	1%	124	122%	124	124	-	2%	2%	10,400 EASTMAN KODAK (5)	107%	105%	105%	+ 2%	107%	105%	105%	105%	+ 2%	107%	105%	105%	+ 2%
129%	114%	8,700 Am Tel & Tel (5)	129%	124	124	+ 1%	1%	124	122%	124	124	-	2%	2%	10,400 EASTMAN KODAK (5)	107%	105%	105%	+ 2%	107%	105%	105%	105%	+ 2%	107%	105%	105%	+ 2%
129%	114%	8,700 Am Tel & Tel (5)	129%	124	124	+ 1%	1%	124	122%	124	124	-	2%	2%	10,400 EASTMAN KODAK (5)	107%	105%	105%	+ 2%	107%	105%	105%	105%	+ 2%	107%	105%	105%	+ 2%
129%	114%	8,700 Am Tel & Tel (5)	129%	124	124	+ 1%	1%	124	122%	124	124	-	2%	2%	10,400 EASTMAN KODAK (5)	107%	105%	105%	+ 2%	107%	105%	105%	105%	+ 2%</td				

Continued on Page 2

## The Trend of Bond Prices—Average of 40 Listed Issues



# Stock Exchange Bond Trading

Week Ended September 16

Total Sales \$76,166,050 Par Value

## UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT WAR LOANS

Range, 1922		Net												
High	Low	Sales	High	Low	Last	Chg'	High	Low	Sales	High	Low	Chg'		
101.38	94.84	2980	Lib 3½%, 1932-47...	101.38	100.80	101.24 + .40	90%	75	10	AJAX RUB ls, cfs, '36...	99%	98½	99	
101.24	94.82	24	Lib 3½%, '32-47 reg.	101.18	100.68	101.14 + .48	100%	81½	11	Am Ag Chem cv 5s, '28...	99%	99	99 - %	
101.68	95.70	4	Lib 1st 4s, 1932-47	100.80	100.70	100.70 + .30	105%	100	100	Am Ag Chem 7½%, '1941...	105%	104%	105	
100.80	95.60	75	Lib 2d 4s, 1927-42	100.28	100.16	100.16 - .04	93	81	11	Am Cotton Oil 5s, '1931...	91½	90%	91½ + ½	
100.54	95.50	2	Lib 2d 4s, '27-42, reg.	99.96	99.78	99.78 ..	96	80%	205	Am S & Ref 5s, '1947...	95%	94%	95% + 1%	
101.78	96.00	514	Lib 1st cv 4½%, '32-47	100.92	100.58	100.58 - .06	104%	97	106	Am Sug R 6s, tnp cfs, '37...	104%	103%	104 - %	
101.40	95.86	35	Lib 1st cv 4½%, reg.	100.60	100.40	100.40 - .26	92%	80%	4	Am Tel & Tel cv 4s, '36...	92%	92	92% + 1	
101.00	94.68	3774½	Lib 2d cv 4½%, '27-42	100.38	100.08	100.14 - .08	100%	91½	272	Am Tel & Tel col 5s, '46...	100%	99%	100% + 1%	
100.80	95.68	74	Lib 2d cv 4½%, '32-47	99.42	99.28	99.28 ..	120	108	144	Am T & T cv 6s, '25...	116	115%	116 + 1	
101.00	96.74	2084	Lib 3d 4½%, 1928...	100.44	100.24	100.30 + .08	114%	114%	2	Am T & T cv 6s, '25, reg...	114%	114%	114% ..	
100.80	94.72	72	Lib 3d 4½%, reg.	100.26	100.12	100.16 + .02	93%	80%	328	Am T & T col 4s, '33...	102%	101%	101% ..	
101.86	95.86	7221	Lib 4th 4½%, '33-38	101.00	100.50	100.56 - .10	87%	70	134	A W W & El 5s, '34...	87%	87%	87% ..	
101.62	95.70	153½	Lib 4th 4½%, '33-38	registered	100.84	100.46	100.44 - .10	88	80	31	Am Writing Paper 6s, '39...	86	86%	86% ..
100.98	100.02	2086	Vict 4½%, 1923...	100.78	100.70	100.72 ..	92%	86%	172	Ann Arbor 4s, '1905...	72	71	72 + 1	
100.00	99.84	906	Vict 4½%, reg.	100.53	100.52	100.56 + .02	95%	85	130	Armour & Co 4½s, '29...	92	92	92% ..	
100.62	100.26	1549	Victory 4½%, 1922	(called)	100.34	100.30	100.32 + .02	86%	78%	55	A, T & S F adj 4s, '35...	85	84%	84% ..
100.50	100.10	91	Victory 4½%, 1922	reg (called)	100.26	100.18	100.20 ..	107%	91%	23	A, T & S F cv 4s, '35...	105	107%	105 + 1%
100.90	95.68	74	Lib 2d cv 4½%, '32-47	42, reg	100.22	99.78	100.04 - .08	90	70%	7	A, T & S F, T, S L 1st	89	89	89 + 1
Total sales .....		\$20,846,050	Net											

## FOREIGN GOVERNMENT

Range, 1922		Net											
High	Low	Sales	High	Low	Last	Chg'	High	Low	Sales	High	Low	Chg'	
102½	90	195	Argent' 7½, temp	102½	101½	102½ + ½	93	85	33	Atl Coast L 1st 4s, '25...	92	91½	91½ ..
87	77	6	Argentine 3½, 1945...	84	83	83 - 1	108%	104%	11	Atl Coast L 1st 4s, '25...	108	107%	108 + %
51	44½	19	Argentine Govt 3½%, 1945...	50	50	50 ..	86%	75%	5	Atl C, L & N 4s, '25...	84	83	83 ..
110	103	72	City of Bergen 5s, 1945...	110	110	110 + 1	50%	23%	15	Atlantic & Dan 4s, '28...	82	82%	82% + 2
116	108	18	City of Berne 8s, 1945...	114	112	114 + 1	104%	98%	180	Atf Ref 5s, '1937...	38%	37%	38% ..
90	76½	125	City of Bordeaux 8s, 1934...	82	80	80 - 2	104%	98%	180	Atf Ref 5s, '1937...	38%	37%	38% ..
112½	101	21	City of Christiania 8s, '45...	104	103½	103½ + ½	93%	88%	51	Baldwin LOCO 5s, '1932...	103%	103%	103% ..
93½	85%	148	City of Copenhagen 5½s, 1944...	94	93%	93% ..	96	88%	51	B & O & Pli 3½s, '25...	95	95%	95% ..
91½	82	141	City of Crac Prague 7½s...	95	92	92 ..	88%	70%	34	Balt & Ohio gold 4s, '48...	87	87%	87% ..
105	99	39	City of Porto Alegre 8s...	104½	101½	101½ + ½	93	85	33	Balt & Ohio cv 4½s, '33...	87	87%	87% ..
100	98	44	City of Rio de Janeiro 8s, 1945...	104	101	101 + 3	100%	94%	106	Balt & Ohio ref 5s, '25...	98	97%	97% ..
100%	98½	104½	City of Rio de Janeiro 8s, 1945...	102	102	102 ..	102%	102%	103	Balt & Ohio ref 5s, '25...	102	101%	101% ..
100%	99	71	City of Sao Paulo 8s, '25...	102	101	102 + 1	108%	102%	11	Barnard & Co 1st 4s, '25...	102	101%	101% ..
100%	98½	104½	City of Rio de Janeiro 8s, 1945...	102	101	101 ..	108%	102%	11	Barnard & Co 1st 4s, '25...	102	101%	101% ..
100%	98	72	City of Solissas 8s, 1936...	102	101	101 ..	108%	102%	11	Barnard & Co 1st 4s, '25...	102	101%	101% ..
100%	98	76½	temp ctfs	80%	79	79 - 1	100%	95%	70	Balt & Ohio cv 4½s, '33...	87	87%	87% ..
76%	67	35	City of Tokio 5s, 1932...	72	71	72 - 1	100%	94%	47	Balt & Ohio cv 4½s, '33...	87	87%	87% ..
116	107	40	City of Zurich 8s, 1945...	115	114	114 + 1	104%	96	47	Beth St p m 5s, '33...	94	93%	94 + 1
100%	94	133	Czechoslovak Rep 8s, '51...	96	94	94 ..	101%	97%	90	Beth St ref 5s, '1942...	97	96%	97% + 1
112½	105%	31	Danish Munici a f 8s, 'A...	101	100½	100½ + ½	100%	95%	61	Boden Copper 6s, '21...	99	99%	99% ..
113	105	13	Danish Munici a f 8s, 'A...	101	100½	100½ + ½	100%	95%	61	Boden Copper 6s, '21...	100	100%	100% ..
98	84	240½	Dept of Seine 7s, '42, temp	91	89	89 ..	100%	97%	51	Bonapart 5s, '25...	102	101%	102% ..
97%	85%	9	Dominican Rep 5s, 1938...	97	97	97 ..	98%	89%	51	Bonapart 5s, '25...	102	101%	102% ..
91	89	81	Dominican Rep 5½s, '42	93%	92	92 ..	104%	100%	61	Bonapart 5s, '25...	102	101%	102% ..
100%	96	137	Dom of Canada 5s, 1926...	100	99	99 ..	100%	95%	61	Bonapart 5s, '25...	102	101%	102% ..
103%	96%	54	Dom of Canada 5s, '29...	102	101	101 ..	101%	96%	61	Bonapart 5s, '25...	102	101%	102% ..
100%	94%	46	Dom of Canada 5s, '31...	100	100	100 ..	100%	95%	61	Boden Copper 6s, '21...	99	99%	99% ..
100%	97%	85	D of C 5s, '52, temp ctfs	100	99	99 ..	105%	102%	61	Boden Copper 6s, '21...	100	100%	100% ..
97	94	436	Dutch E Ind 6s, '47, tr ctfs	97	95	95 ..	100%	95%	61	Boden Copper 6s, '21...	100	100%	100% ..
97	94	334	Dutch E Ind 6s, '62, tr ctfs	96	95	95 ..	100%	95%	61	Boden Copper 6s, '21...	100	100%	100% ..
102½	91%	170	Fr American Industrial 7½s...	98	94	94 - 4	100%	97%	51	Boden Copper 6s, '21...	100	100%	100% ..
108%	94%	508½	French Govt 7s, '45...	100	100½	100½ - 1	100%	95%	51	Boden Copper 6s, '21...	100	100%	100% ..
104%	94%	149	French Govt 7s, '45...	97	97	97 ..	100%	95%	51	Boden Copper 6s, '21...	100	100%	100% ..
91	89	81	French Govt 7s, '45...	92	92	92 ..	100%	95%	51	Boden Copper 6s, '21...	100	100%	100% ..
100%	96%	137	French Govt 7s, '45...	99	97	97 ..	100%	95%	51	Boden Copper 6s, '21...	100	100%	100% ..
100%	96%	54											

### **Stock Exchange. Bond Trading**—Continued

Range, 1922	High Low Sales										Net										Range, 1922
	High	Low	Sales	Ch'ge	High	Low	Sales	Ch'ge	High	Low	Sales	Ch'ge	High	Low	Sales	Ch'ge	High	Low	Sales	Ch'ge	
High	Low	Sales	Ch'ge	High	Low	Sales	Ch'ge	High	Low	Sales	Ch'ge	High	Low	Sales	Ch'ge	High	Low	Sales	Ch'ge	Net	
21	96	123	Interboro-Met 4 $\frac{1}{2}$ s, 1956.	-16	15%	18	+ $\frac{1}{2}$	80	15	N Y, C & St L deb 4 $\frac{1}{2}$ s, '31	+88%	88%	88%	-	81	15	N Y, C & St L deb 4 $\frac{1}{2}$ s, '31	+88%	88%	88%	
18%	7%	57	Int-Met 4 $\frac{1}{2}$ s, cifs of dep.	-10	15%	19	+ $\frac{1}{2}$	94	81	N Y Conn R R 4 $\frac{1}{2}$ s, '63	-93	94	94	-	82	7	N Y Conn R R 4 $\frac{1}{2}$ s, '63	-93	94	94	
16	11%	314	Int-Met 4 $\frac{1}{2}$ s, cifs of dep.	-15	15%	19	+ $\frac{1}{2}$	82	76	N Y Dock 4 $\frac{1}{2}$ s, '63	-81	82	82	-	82	7	N Y Dock 4 $\frac{1}{2}$ s, '63	-81	82	82	
22%	5%	11	Int-Rap Tran 5s, 1968.	-73	72%	72%	-	112%	105%	N Y Edis 1st&ref 4 $\frac{1}{2}$ s, '61	+112%	112	112	-	112%	11	N Y Edis 1st&ref 4 $\frac{1}{2}$ s, '61	+112%	112	112	
74	60%	122	Int-Rap Tran cifs of dep.	-73	72	72%	-	834	76	N Y E, L, H & P 4 $\frac{1}{2}$ s, '49	+85%	84%	85%	+ $\frac{1}{2}$	834	76	N Y E, L, H & P 4 $\frac{1}{2}$ s, '49	+85%	84%	85%	
93%	92	12	I R Tc 7s, 1932, w. 1.	-97	96%	97	-	100%	92%	N Y G, E, L, H & P 5s, '48	+100%	99%	100%	-	92%	834	N Y G, E, L, H & P 5s, '48	+100%	99%	100%	
83%	76	26	I R Tc 7s, 1932, w. 1.	-80%	80%	80%	-	80%	78%	N Y H & Co 5s, '48	+80%	80%	80%	+ $\frac{1}{2}$	80%	78	N Y H & Co 5s, '48	+80%	80%	80%	
82	72%	13	Int-Agr col tr 5s, 1932.	-82	81	81	-	85%	56	N Y H & Co 5s, '48	+80%	80%	80%	+ $\frac{1}{2}$	85%	56	N Y H & Co 5s, '48	+80%	80%	80%	
114%	102	3	Int-Cm's, 26 $\frac{1}{2}$ temp. cifs, '110	-110	110	110	-	55	81	N Y H & Co 5s, '48	+80%	80%	80%	+ $\frac{1}{2}$	55	81	N Y H & Co 5s, '48	+80%	80%	80%	
55%	50	258	Int-G & Tn adj 6s, '51	-52	54%	53	-	55%	37%	N Y H & Co 5s, '48	+80%	80%	80%	+ $\frac{1}{2}$	55%	37	N Y H & Co 5s, '48	+80%	80%	80%	
101%	97	1	Int-G & Tn ext 7s, 1922.	-101	100%	100%	-	57	38%	N Y H & Co 5s, '48	+80%	80%	80%	+ $\frac{1}{2}$	57	38	N Y H & Co 5s, '48	+80%	80%	80%	
69	63	44	Int-G & Tn, Gen 5s, 1958.	-97	96%	97	-	60%	31	N Y H & Co 5s, '48	+80%	80%	80%	+ $\frac{1}{2}$	60%	31	N Y H & Co 5s, '48	+80%	80%	80%	
97%	96	48	Int-G & Tn, Gen 5s, 1958.	-97	96%	97	-	44%	20	N Y H & Co 5s, '48	+80%	80%	80%	+ $\frac{1}{2}$	44%	20	N Y H & Co 5s, '48	+80%	80%	80%	
90%	89	37	Int Paper conv 5s, '47.	-90%	89%	89%	-	44	24	N Y H & Co 5s, '48	+80%	80%	80%	+ $\frac{1}{2}$	44	24	N Y H & Co 5s, '48	+80%	80%	80%	
50%	31%	29	Iowa Central ref 4 $\frac{1}{2}$ s, '51.	-44	44	42%	-	15	5%	N Y H & Co 5s, '48	+80%	80%	80%	+ $\frac{1}{2}$	15	5%	N Y H & Co 5s, '48	+80%	80%	80%	
83%	80	29	Iowa Central 1st 5s, '38.	-81	81	81	-	13%	41	N Y H & Co 5s, '48	+80%	80%	80%	+ $\frac{1}{2}$	13%	41	N Y H & Co 5s, '48	+80%	80%	80%	
98%	90	70	Invincible Oil s f 8s, '31.	-98	96	98	-	73	66	N Y H & Co 5s, '48	+80%	80%	80%	+ $\frac{1}{2}$	73	66	N Y H & Co 5s, '48	+80%	80%	80%	
99%	91	1	KAN & MICH 2d 4s, '27.	-99%	99%	99%	-	100%	84	N Y H & Co 5s, '48	+80%	80%	80%	+ $\frac{1}{2}$	100%	84	N Y H & Co 5s, '48	+80%	80%	80%	
104	101	1	KC & Ft S & M. Co. 4s, '28.	-103%	103%	103%	-	108%	60	N Y H & Co 5s, '48	+80%	80%	80%	+ $\frac{1}{2}$	108%	60	N Y H & Co 5s, '48	+80%	80%	80%	
95	88%	5	K C & M. Bridge 4s, '29.	-83	84%	83	-	108%	62	N Y H & Co 5s, '48	+80%	80%	80%	+ $\frac{1}{2}$	108%	62	N Y H & Co 5s, '48	+80%	80%	80%	
94%	84%	128	Kan City South 5s, '30.	-94%	93%	93%	-	59%	33	N Y H & Co 5s, '48	+80%	80%	80%	+ $\frac{1}{2}$	59%	33	N Y H & Co 5s, '48	+80%	80%	80%	
72	35	35	Kan City South 5s, '30.	-76	74%	74%	-	91%	81	N Y H & Co 5s, '48	+80%	80%	80%	+ $\frac{1}{2}$	91%	81	N Y H & Co 5s, '48	+80%	80%	80%	
95%	78%	5	Kan City Ter 5s, '30.	-89	86%	85%	-	104%	3	N Y H & Co 5s, '48	+80%	80%	80%	+ $\frac{1}{2}$	104%	3	N Y H & Co 5s, '48	+80%	80%	80%	
105%	101	10	Kayser (J) 7s, 1924.	-105	105	105	-	71	50	N Y H & Co 5s, '48	+80%	80%	80%	+ $\frac{1}{2}$	71	50	N Y H & Co 5s, '48	+80%	80%	80%	
100%	107%	12	Kelly-Spring Tire 8s, '31.	-109	108	108	-	95	79	N Y H & Co 5s, '48	+80%	80%	80%	+ $\frac{1}{2}$	95	79	N Y H & Co 5s, '48	+80%	80%	80%	
94%	72	24	Kekulik & Deas 5s, '23.	-94	93%	93%	-	124%	63	N Y H & Co 5s, '48	+80%	80%	80%	+ $\frac{1}{2}$	124%	63	N Y H & Co 5s, '48	+80%	80%	80%	
82	66	3	Kings C El 4 $\frac{1}{2}$ td stpd '49	-79	79%	79%	-	91%	83	N Y H & Co 5s, '48	+80%	80%	80%	+ $\frac{1}{2}$	91%	83	N Y H & Co 5s, '48	+80%	80%	80%	
89%	94%	4	Kinney & Co cvt 7s, '35.	-98	98	98	-	109%	104	N Y H & Co 5s, '48	+80%	80%	80%	+ $\frac{1}{2}$	109%	104	N Y H & Co 5s, '48	+80%	80%	80%	
95%	86	9	LAC GAS ref & ex 5s, '34	-95	93	93%	+ $\frac{1}{2}$	109%	100	N Y H & Co 5s, '48	+80%	80%	80%	+ $\frac{1}{2}$	109%	100	N Y H & Co 5s, '48	+80%	80%	80%	
94%	97%	60	Lack Steel 5s, '23.	-100%	100	100	-	89%	84	N Y H & Co 5s, '48	+80%	80%	80%	+ $\frac{1}{2}$	89%	84	N Y H & Co 5s, '48	+80%	80%	80%	
94	82	60	Lack Steel 5s, '50.	-94	92%	93%	-	90%	84	N Y H & Co 5s, '48	+80%	80%	80%	+ $\frac{1}{2}$	90%	84	N Y H & Co 5s, '48	+80%	80%	80%	
99	85	65	L E & W 1st 5s, '37.	-99	96	99	+ $\frac{1}{2}$	102	49	N Y H & Co 5s, '48	+80%	80%	80%	+ $\frac{1}{2}$	102	49	N Y H & Co 5s, '48	+80%	80%	80%	
96	89%	39	Lake Shore 4s, '1928.	-96%	95%	95%	-	96%	88	N Y H & Co 5s, '48	+80%	80%	80%	+ $\frac{1}{2}$	96%	88	N Y H & Co 5s, '48	+80%	80%	80%	
81	74%	15	Lake Shore 3s, '97.	-81	77	81	-	101%	94	N Y H & Co 5s, '48	+80%	80%	80%	+ $\frac{1}{2}$	101%	94	N Y H & Co 5s, '48	+80%	80%	80%	
94%	84%	15	Lake Shore 4s, '1931.	-94	93%	93%	-	80%	84	N Y H & Co 5s, '48	+80%	80%	80%	+ $\frac{1}{2}$	80%	84	N Y H & Co 5s, '48	+80%	80%	80%	
102	90%	2	Leh. Val Coal 5s, '1933.	-102	102	102	-	80%	84	N Y H & Co 5s, '48	+80%	80%	80%	+ $\frac{1}{2}$	80%	84	N Y H & Co 5s, '48	+80%	80%	80%	
99	77%	35	Leh. Val Coal 5s, '2000.	-100	100	100	-	80%	84	N Y H & Co 5s, '48	+80%	80%	80%	+ $\frac{1}{2}$	80%	84	N Y H & Co 5s, '48	+80%	80%	80%	
105	100%	100	Leh. Val Coal 5s, '2000.	-105	105	105	-	90%	84	N Y H & Co 5s, '48	+80%	80%	80%	+ $\frac{1}{2}$	90%	84	N Y H & Co 5s, '48	+80%	80%	80%	
102%	98%	1	Leh. Val Ter 5s, '1941.	-102	102	102	-	102%	98	N Y H & Co 5s, '48	+80%	80%	80%	+ $\frac{1}{2}$	102%	98	N Y H & Co 5s, '48	+80%	80%	80%	
100	93	5	Lex & East gtd 5s, '65.	-54	54%	54%	-	95	88	N Y H & Co 5s, '48	+80%	80%	80%	+ $\frac{1}{2}$	95	88	N Y H & Co 5s, '48	+80%	80%	80%	
100%	97%	13	Liggett & Myers 5s, '51.	-100	100	100	-	108%	104	N Y H & Co 5s, '48	+80%	80%	80%	+ $\frac{1}{2}$	108%	104	N Y H & Co 5s, '48	+80%	80%	80%	
120	112	12	Liggett & Myers 7s, '44.	-118%	118%	118%	-	99	90	N Y H & Co 5s, '48	+80%	80%	80%	+ $\frac{1}{2}$	99	90	N Y H & Co 5s, '48	+80%	80%	80%	
84%	72	12	Long Island ref 4 $\frac{1}{2}$ s, '40.	-84	83%	83%	-	101	95	N Y H & Co 5s, '48	+80%	80%	80%	+ $\frac{1}{2}$	101	95	N Y H & Co 5s, '48	+80%	80%	80%	
87%	72	58	Long Island deb 5s, '39.	-87	87%	87%	-	94	83	N Y H & Co 5s, '48	+80%	80%	80%	+ $\frac{1}{2}$	94	83	N Y H & Co 5s, '48	+80%	80%	80%	
104%	92%	6	Lorillard 5s, '51.	-99	99	99	-	106	97	N Y H & Co 5s, '48	+80%	80%	80%	+ $\frac{1}{2}$	106	97	N Y H & Co 5s, '48	+80%	80%	80%	
84%	77	7	Lou & Jeff Bridge 4s, '1944.	-84	84%	84%	-	95%	86	N Y H & Co 5s, '48	+80%	80%	80%	+ $\frac{1}{2}$	95%	86	N Y H & Co 5s, '48	+80%	80%	80%	
90%	72%	82	Lous & Newf 5s, '1935.	-74	74%	74%	-	80%	77	N Y H & Co 5s, '48	+80%	80%	80%	+ $\frac{1}{2}$	80%	77	N Y H & Co 5s, '48	+80%	80%	80%	
92	81	53	Market St Ry 5s, '24.	-24	28	28%	-	92%	84	N Y H & Co 5s, '48	+80%	80%	80%	+ $\frac{1}{2}$	92%	84	N Y H & Co 5s, '48	+80%	80%	80%	
97%	90%	37	Market St Ry tr 6s, '1941.	-93	93%	93%	-	102%	94	N Y H & Co 5s, '48	+80%	80%	80%	+ $\frac{1}{2}$	102%	94	N Y H & Co 5s, '48	+80%	80%	80%	
120%	97%	30	M. rland Oil 7s, '1930.	-110	110%	110%	-	103%	94	N Y H & Co 5s, '48	+80%	80%	80%	+ $\frac{1}{2}$	103%	94	N Y H & Co 5s, '48	+80%	80%	80%	
106%	91%	16	M. rland Oil 7s, '1930.	-104	102%	102%	-	103%	94	N Y H & Co 5s, '48	+80%	80%	80%	+ $\frac{1}{2}$	103%	94	N Y H & Co 5s, '48	+80%	80%	80%	
50%	34%	23	M. & St. Co 5s, '34.	-81	81%	81%	-	103%	94	N Y H & Co 5s, '48	+80%	80%	80%	+ $\frac{1}{2}$	103%	94	N Y H & Co 5s, '48	+80%	80%	80%	
50%	32%	5	M. & St. L ref 4 $\frac{1}{2}$ s, '62.	-45	44%	44	-	103%	94	N Y H & Co 5s, '48	+80%	80%	80%	+ $\frac{1}{2}$	103%	94	N Y H & Co 5s, '48	+80%	80%	80%	
107%	100%	27	M. St. P & S S 4s, '31.	-107%	105%	105%	-	92%	89	N Y H & Co 5s, '48	+80%	80%	80%	+ $\frac{1}{2}$	92%	89	N Y H & Co 5s, '48	+80%	80%	80%	
91%	85%	92	M. St. P & S S 4s, '31.	-94	97%	97%	-	59	41	N Y H & Co 5s, '48	+80%	80%	80%	+ $\frac{1}{2}$	59	41	N Y H & Co 5s, '48	+80%	80%	80%	
88%	58%	5	M. K. & T 5s notes.	-88%	88%	88%	-	102%	96	N Y H & Co 5s, '48	+80%	80%	80%	+ $\frac{1}{2}$	102%	96	N Y H & Co 5s, '48	+80%	80%	80%	
84%	73%	70	Mo, K & T 1st 4s, '1930.	-84	84%	84%	-	102%	94	N Y H & Co 5s, '48	+80%	80%	80%	+ $\frac{1}{2}$	102%	94	N Y H & Co 5s, '48	+80%	80%	80%	
77	77	10	Mo, K & T 1st 4s, '1930.	-77	77%	77%	-	101	90	N Y H & Co 5s, '48	+80%	80%	80%	+ $\frac{1}{2}$	101	90	N Y H & Co 5s, '48	+80%	80%	80%	
80%	77	7	Mo, K & T 1st 4s, '1930.	-77	77%	77%	-	91	78%	N Y H & Co 5s, '48	+80%	80%</td									

**New York Stock Exchange Transactions—Continued**

1922		Stock and Dividend Rate.				Net High. Low. Sales.				1922		Stock and Dividend Rate.				Net High. Low. Sales.				1922		Stock and Dividend Rate.				Net High. Low. Sales.				
		High.	Low.	Sales.	Dividend Rate.	High.	Low.	Sales.	Dividend Rate.	High.	Low.	Sales.	Dividend Rate.	High.	Low.	Sales.	Dividend Rate.	High.	Low.	Sales.	Dividend Rate.	High.	Low.	Sales.	Dividend Rate.	High.	Low.	Sales.	Net	
50	36	600	St. Louis-San Fran.	pf.	54 1/2	54	634	—	25%	14	1,600	Third Avenue	—	24%	22%	23%	—	14	6,500	WABASH	—	13%	12%	—	%					
36	20	20%	3,100	St. Louis Southwestern.	34%	32%	334	—	1372	107%	400	Tide Water Oil.	—	136	128	136	—	14	6,500	Do pf.	—	34%	33%	—	%					
53%	32%	4,100	St. Louis Soun.	pf.	51	50	50	—	84 1/2	92%	95,000	Tobacco Products	—	67	58	65%	+ 6%	14	6,500	Vividaude	—	14	12%	13%	+ %					
6%	1%	900	Santa Cecilia Sugar.	—	3	24	28	—	89 1/2	76%	44,300	Do. Class A (7).	—	89%	87	87%	+ 2%	14	6,500	WABASH	—	13%	12%	—	%					
24%	10%	1,200	Savage Arms	—	14%	12%	12%	—	115	88	500	Do pf (7).	—	110	109	109	—	14	6,500	Do pf.	—	34%	33%	—	%					
5%	1%	1,500	Saxon Motor Co.	—	78	61	67	—	70	14	1,800	Tol. St. L. & Western.	—	70	55	55	—	14	6,500	Wells Fargo (5).	—	80	79	79	—	%				
10	2%	2,700	Seaboard Air Line.	—	12%	11%	11%	—	20%	15	14,000	Transcontinental Oil	—	154	14	14%	+ 1%	14	6,500	Western Electric pf (7).	—	110%	107%	106	—	%				
15	2%	1,900	Seaboard Air Line pf.	—	93%	90	90%	—	67 1/2	34	2,600	Twinn City Rap Tr (2).	(2)	62%	60	62	+ 3	14	6,500	Western Maryland	—	105%	105%	105%	—	%				
94%	59%	12,000	Sears, Roebuck & Co.	—	96	90	96	—	78	55	2,900	Union Bag & Paper (6).	—	78	75	76%	+ 2%	14	6,500	Western Pacific	—	104%	104%	104%	—	%				
96%	95%	2,600	Shell Oil pf (6).	—	11%	11	11%	—	25	17 1/2	13,100	Union Oil.	—	20%	18%	20%	+ 2%	14	6,500	Western Pacific	—	64%	64%	+ 1%	%					
23%	10%	600	Simpson Copper	—	40	40	40%	—	154 1/2	20	20,000	Union Pacific (10).	—	154%	151%	153	—	14	6,500	Western Union Tel.	(7)	113%	113	110	—	%				
48%	35%	700	Shuttle Train & Tr. (1,574)	—	33%	32%	34%	—	80	71 1/2	600	Do pf (4).	—	78	70	73	—	14	6,500	Westinghouse A B (4).	—	104	102	102	+ 1	%				
38%	18%	147,800	Sinclair Consol Oil (2).	—	98%	98	98%	—	116	96	7,000	Tunic Tank Car (7).	(7)	116	114	116	+ 6	14	6,500	Westinghouse's E & M (4).	—	63%	63%	63%	—	%				
101	97%	2,000	Slag Con Oil pf (8).	—	10%	10%	10%	—	113	102	1,000	Do pf (7).	(7)	112	108	110	+ 2%	14	6,500	Westinghouse's E & M (4).	—	146	140	140	+ 1	%				
11%	9%	9,700	Skelly Oil	—	51 1/2	49%	51	—	41%	25	1,600	United Alloy Steel (2).	—	32%	37	38%	+ 4%	14	6,500	Westinghouse's E & M (4).	—	70	70	70	—	%				
54%	34%	2,700	Sloss-Sief Steel & Co	—	78%	78%	78%	—	114	104%	23	United Clear St. pf (1).	(1)	110%	110%	110%	—	14	6,500	Westinghouse's E & M (4).	—	80	80	80	—	%				
80	65	100	Do pf.	—	80	80	80	—	80	41	3,600	United Drug	—	82	78	80%	+ 2%	14	6,500	Westinghouse's E & M (4).	—	12%	12%	12%	+ 1	%				
95%	78%	43,500	Southern Pacific	(6).	95%	93%	94%	—	95	95	160	United Dyewood pf (7).	(7)	95	93	95	—	14	6,500	White Eagle Oil (2).	—	32%	32%	32%	+ 1	%				
28%	17%	16,400	Southern Railway	—	27%	26%	26%	—	150%	119%	700	United Fruitt (8).	—	154%	153	153	—	14	6,500	White Motor (4).	—	54%	54%	54%	+ 1	%				
64%	45%	3,100	Do pf.	—	64%	63%	63%	—	20%	14%	50	United Paperboard	—	17%	17%	17%	+ 2%	14	6,500	White Oil.	—	84	84	84	—	%				
24	17	25,000	Spicer Mfg	—	22%	20%	22%	—	19%	7%	800	United Railway Invest.	—	14%	14%	14%	—	14	6,500	Wichita Steel	—	15%	14%	14%	+ 1%	%				
86	84	500	Do pf (6).	—	90	91	90	—	30%	20%	1,400	Do pf.	—	32	30	31%	+ 1%	14	6,500	Wilson & Co.	—	50%	48%	48%	+ 2	%				
141	113	500	Standard Milling (8).	—	141	139%	141	+ 13	87%	20%	50,400	United Retail Stores.	—	87%	84%	84%	+ 1%	14	6,500	Willys-Overland	—	8	7%	7%	+ 1	%				
86	83	300	Do pf.	—	90	90	90	—	87%	43%	5,500	U. S. Cast I. Pipe & F.	—	30%	34%	34%	+ 1%	14	6,500	Wisconsin Central	—	49%	49%	49%	+ 1	%				
121	91%	41,400	Standard Oil of Cal (4).	—	117%	111	114	—	39	16%	300	Do pf (5).	—	73	72	73	+ 1%	14	6,500	Woolworth (W. F. Co) (8).	—	137%	137%	137%	—	%				
196%	169%	10,400	Standard Oil N. J. (5).	—	180%	181%	187	+ 2%	78	50	2,800	U. S. Food Products.	—	74	74	75	+ 1%	14	6,500	Worthington Pump.	—	44%	43%	43%	+ 1	%				
118%	113%	1,800	Do pf (7).	—	117%	115	115	—	10%	25%	19%	6,800	U. S. Hoffmann Mach.	—	20%	20%	22%	+ 2%	14	6,500	Wright Aero (1).	—	94%	90%	89%	+ 1%	%			
53%	45%	1,200	Sterling Products (3).	—	55%	52%	52%	—	67%	37	8,800	U. S. Industrial Alcohol.	—	64%	64%	64%	+ 1%	14	6,500	Wright Aero (1).	—	79	64%	60	+ 1	%				
48%	44%	1,800	Stewart-Warner Sp (3)	—	48%	47%	48%	—	97%	80%	100	Do pf (7).	—	97%	97%	97%	+ 1%	14	6,500	Wright Aero (1).	—	74	70	69	+ 1	%				
50%	35%	1,600	Strong Carburetor (4).	—	57%	56	54	—	82%	55%	9,300	U. S. Realty & Imp. Co.	—	80%	80%	80%	+ 1%	14	6,500	Wright Aero (1).	—	11	6	500	Wright Aero (1).	—	10%	10%	+ 1%	%
139%	79%	98,900	Studebaker Co (111).	—	128%	125	129	—	67%	51%	67,900	U. S. Rubber.	—	58%	52%	53%	+ 3%	14	6,500	Wright Aero (1).	—	3%	3%	3%	+ 1	%				
118%	101%	100	Do pf (7).	—	112%	115	115	—	107	91	10,800	Do pf (8).	—	102%	94	98%	+ 4%	14	6,500	Am Tel & Tel.	—	31%	31%	31%	+ 1	%				
3%	3%	4,400	Submarine Boat	—	7	6%	7	+ 1%	45%	32%	300	U. S. Smelt. Ref. & M.	—	43%	42%	43	—	14	6,500	Crucible Steel.	—	1%	1%	1%	+ 1	%				
10%	4%	1,000	Superior Oil	—	6%	6%	6%	—	50	42%	600	Do pf (3).	—	48%	48%	48%	+ 1%	14	6,500	Con Cigar.	—	5%	5%	4%	+ 1	%				
39%	24%	200	Superior Steel	—	34%	32	33%	—	109%	82	181,300	U. S. Steel (5).	—	100%	104%	104%	+ 4%	14	6,500	North American	—	28%	28%	28%	+ 2	%				
95%	90%	200	Do pf (8).	—	91	90	90	+ 3%	122%	114%	4,600	Do pf (1).	—	122%	121%	122%	+ 1%	14	6,500	Dividend rates as given in the above table are the annual cash payments based on the latest quarterly or half yearly declarations. Unless otherwise noted, extra or special dividends are not included.	—	73%	73%	73%	+ 1	%				
5	2	73,000	Sweets Co of Amer.	—	34	3	3	—	63%	45%	300	U. S. Tobacco (3).	—	63%	63	63	—	14	6,500	Partly extra.	—	90%	89%	89%	+ 1	%				
54	1	2,200	TEMCOR C & F, Cl. A.	—	1%	1%	2	—	71%	60%	10,000	U. S. Tobacco (2).	—	70%	68%	69	+ 1	14	6,500	Partly extra.	—	14%	14%	14%	+ 1	%				
12%	9%	2,900	Tennessee Cop & Chem.	—	10%	10	10	—	22%	9%	22,600	U. S. Utica's Securities.	—	22%	22	23	+ 3%	14	6,500	Partly extra.	—	14%	14%	14%	+ 1	%				
50%	42	54,800	Texas Co (3).	—	40%	47%	47%	+ 1%	38%	25%	1,900	Va-Care Chemical.	—	28%	28%	28%	+ 1%	14	6,500	Partly extra.	—	34%	33%	33%	+ 1	%				
57	38%	36,200	Texas Gulf Sulphur (4).	—	57	50%	56%	+ 1%	25%	21%	200	Do Class B.	—	22	21	22	+ 1%	14	6,500	Partly extra.	—	11%	10%	10%	+ 1	%				
36	24	4,400	Texas & Pacific	—	32%	31	31	—	63%	45%	300	U. S. Tobacco (3).	—	63%	63	63	—	14	6,500	Partly extra.	—	14%	14%	14%	+ 1	%				
32%	23%	20,500	Tux & Pac Coal & O (1).	—	27%	26	25%	+ 1%	71%	60%	10,000	Utah Copper (2).	—	70%	68%	69	+ 1	14	6,500	Partly extra.	—	14%	14%	14%	+ 1	%				
54	1	2,200	VANADIUM CORP.	—	53%	30%	53	—	53%	30%	23,900	VANADIUM CORP.	—	51	51%	51	+ 1%	14	6,500	Partly extra.	—	34%	33%	33%	+ 1	%				
50%	42	54,800	Va-Care Chemical.	—	38%	25%	38	—	50%	42%	1,900	Va-Care Chemical.	—	48%	48%	48%	+ 1%	14	6,500	Partly extra.	—	34%	33%	33%	+ 1	%				
57	38%	36,200	Va-Care Chemical.	—	25%	21%	25	—	50%	42%	200	Do Class B.	—	22	21	22	+ 1%	14	6,500	Partly extra.	—	14%	14%	14%	+ 1	%				

## Transactions on the New York Curb

WEEK ENDING SEPT. 16, 1922.										Range, 1922										Net												
Trading by Days					Foreign					Sales					High Low Last Chge					Sales					High Low Last Chge							
Monday	127,940	161,790	336,788	769,000	Industrials	Oil	Mining	Bonds	Bonds	17	8	100 Atlantic Gulf	9/2	9/2	9/2	1/4	1/4	1/4	1/4	1/4	14	.01	162,000	Spear H Gold M.	14	.01	.00	.00	.00	.00		
Tuesday	161,590	206,112	347,350	769,000						3	1	100 Am Fuel Oil pf.	1/4	1/4	1/4	1/4	1/4	1/4	1/4	1/4	18	.02	11,000	Stewart Mining	14	.01	.00	.00	.00	.00		
Wednesday	122,905	135,563	351,200	1,595,000						13	8	900 Ark Natural Gas	10/4	9/4	10	1/4	1/4	1/4	1/4	1/4	32	.01	1,000	Superior Gas	14	.01	.00	.00	.00	.00		
Thursday	102,905	135,563	351,200	1,595,000						25	8	220,000 Boone Oil	13	12	13	+ .01	+ .01	+ .01	+ .01	+ .01	10	.03	1,000	Superior & Bos	14	.01	.00	.00	.00	.00		
Friday	118,710	180,683	574,000	708,000						27	20	100 British Amer Oil	31/4	31/4	31/4	+ 1/4	+ 1/4	+ 1/4	+ 1/4	+ 1/4	45	.27	3,000	Temiskaming M.	14	.40	.40	.40	.40	.40		
Saturday	57,465	112,485	278,725	429,000						27	20	100 British Can rolled Oil	2/4	2/4	2/4	+ 1/4	+ 1/4	+ 1/4	+ 1/4	+ 1/4	97	.20	40,200	Ventex Kendall	14	.07	.07	.07	.07	.07		
Total	632,145	1,015,840	2,332,344	\$5,410,000	\$1,644,000					242	158	13,000 Carib Syndicate	6/4	6/4	6/4	+ 1/4	+ 1/4	+ 1/4	+ 1/4	+ 1/4	94	.47	45,400	Tonopah Divide	14	.80	.85	.85	.85	.85		
INDUSTRIALS										72	51	2,600 Cities Service	205/2	203	204	+ 2	+ 2	+ 2	+ 2	+ 2	218	.18	14,500	Tonopah Ext.	218	.25	.25	.25	.25	.25		
Range, 1922	Net					High Low Sales					High Low Last Chge					High Low Sales					High Low Last Chge					Net						
High	Low	Sales	High	Low	Last Chge	High	Low	Sales	High	Low	Last Chge	High	Low	Sales	High	Low	Sales	High	Low	Sales	High	Low	Last Chge	High	Low	Last Chge	High	Low	Last Chge			
1%	.50	40,400	Acme	Coal		84	.65	70	10	4	1	1,300 Cosden pf, old	4/4	4/4	4/4	+ 1/4	+ 1/4	1/4	1/4	1/4	1/4	1/4	1/4	1/4	1/4	1/4	1/4	1/4	1/4	1/4	1/4	
1%	.20	21,000	Acme	Packing		44	.36	37	+ .01	10	7/2	100 Cosden Co.	10	10	10	..	..	10	10	10	..	..	1/4	1/4	1/4	1/4	1/4	1/4	1/4	1/4	1/4	1/4
25	15	100	Aluminum Co	com.		20	20	20	..	10	1/2	100 Darby Pete	2/4	2/4	2/4	..	..	2/4	2/4	2/4	..	..	1/4	1/4	1/4	1/4	1/4	1/4	1/4	1/4	1/4	1/4
102	85	400	Allied Pack			4	3%	3%	..	5	1/2	100 Creole Syndicate	2/4	2/4	2/4	..	..	1/4	1/4	1/4	..	..	1/4	1/4	1/4	1/4	1/4	1/4	1/4	1/4	1/4	1/4
12	3%	400	Allied Pack			27	23	23	..	14	1/4	1,500 Equity Pet Corp	14/4	14/4	14/4	+ 1/4	+ 1/4	14/4	14/4	14/4	..	..	1/4	1/4	1/4	1/4	1/4	1/4	1/4	1/4	1/4	1/4
42	23	200	Do prior pf			140	139	140	..	74	1/2	110 Foothills Oil	1/4	1/4	1/4	..	..	1/4	1/4	1/4	..	..	1/4	1/4	1/4	1/4	1/4	1/4	1/4	1/4	1/4	1/4
147	113	20	Am Light & T.			27	23	23	..	19	1/2	100 Foothills Oil	1/4	1/4	1/4	..	..	1/4	1/4	1/4	..	..	1/4	1/4	1/4	1/4	1/4	1/4	1/4	1/4	1/4	1/4
107	94	200	Do pf			27	23	23	..	19	1/2	100 Kirby Pet	5/4	5/4	5/4	+ 1/4	+ 1/4	5/4	5/4	5/4	..	..	1/4	1/4	1/4	1/4	1/4	1/4	1/4	1/4	1/4	1/4
2%	.50	200	Am Drug Strs.	Ci A.		50	.50	.50	..	10	1/2	100 Columbia Pet	.97	.97	.97	+ .03	+ .03	1/4	1/4	1/4	..	..	1/4	1/4	1/4	1/4	1/4	1/4	1/4	1/4	1/4	1/4
14%	.74	2,500	Ampl. Leather			10	9/2	9/2	..	1/2	100 Columbia Pet	.97	.97	.97	+ .03	+ .03	1/4	1/4	1/4	..	..	1/4	1/4	1/4	1/4	1/4	1/4	1/4	1/4	1/4	1/4	
3	1%	600	Atlantic Fruit	w. 1.		2/4	2/4	2/4	..	3/4	1/2	100 Granada Oil	1/4	1/4	1/4	..	..	1/4	1/4	1/4	..	..	1/4	1/4	1/4	1/4	1/4	1/4	1/4	1/4	1/4	1/4
12%	12%	100	Armour Leather	w. 12		12/4	12/4	12/4	..	57/4	52/4	2,300 Gulf Oil Cp of Pa, w.	57/4	52/4	50/4	..	..	1/4	1/4	1/4	..	..	1/4	1/4	1/4	1/4	1/4	1/4	1/4	1/4	1/4	1/4
100%	94%	1,300	Beth Steel	pf, new	w. 1	97	97	97	..	1/4	7/8	7,800 Glen Rock Oil	1/4	1/4	1/4	..	..	1/4	1/4	1/4	..	..	1/4	1/4	1/4	1/4	1/4	1/4	1/4	1/4	1/4	1/4
20%	12%	1,900	Brit-Am	Tob. coupon		19/4	19/4	19/4	..	30	1/4	47,000 Hudson Oil	17	14	15	+ .02	+ .02	1/4	1/4	1/4	..	..	1/4	1/4	1/4	1/4	1/4	1/4	1/4	1/4	1/4	1/4
20	12%	200	Brit-Am	Tob. reg.		19/4	19/4	19/4	..	30	1/4	30,000 Kay County Gas	3	3	3	+ .02	+ .02	1/4	1/4	1/4	..	..	1/4	1/4	1/4	1/4	1/4	1/4	1/4	1/4	1/4	1/4
9%	4%	2,600	Brooklyn City R. R.			9/4	9/4	9/4	..	1/2	1/2	41,000 Keystones Ranger	50	46	42	+ .07	+ .07	1/4	1/4	1/4	..	..	1/4	1/4	1/4	1/4	1/4	1/4	1/4	1/4	1/4	1/4
34	4%	14,600	Buddy Budds	Inc.		5/4	5/4	5/4	..	1/2	1/2	600 Kirby Pet	5/4	5/4	5/4	+ 1/4	+ 1/4	5/4	5/4	5/4	..	..	1/4	1/4	1/4	1/4	1/4	1/4	1/4	1/4	1/4	1/4
3%	1%	2,000	Cent Terces Sugars			2/4	2/4	2/4	..	10	1/2	3,000 Lance Cree Royal	.04	.04	.04	+ .01	+ .01	1/4	1/4	1/4	..	..	1/4	1/4	1/4	1/4	1/4	1/4	1/4	1/4	1/4	1/4
4	2%	4,000	Cent. Lighting & Power			8	7/4	7/4	..	27	1/2	7,000 Livingston Pet	1/4	1/4	1/4	..	..	1/4	1/4	1/4	..	..	1/4	1/4	1/4	1/4	1/4	1/4	1/4	1/4	1/4	1/4
8	6	4,000	Cent. Lighting & Power			8	6%	8	+ 1%	27	1/2	10,000 Livingston Pet	1/4	1/4	1/4	..	..	1/4	1/4	1/4	..	..	1/4	1/4	1/4	1/4	1/4	1/4	1/4	1/4	1/4	1/4
1%	.55	6,500	Car Light & Power			.99	.85	.92	+ .04	27	1/2	10,000 Livingston Pet	1/4	1/4	1/4	..	..	1/4	1/4	1/4	..	..	1/4	1/4	1/4	1/4	1/4	1/4	1/4	1/4	1/4	1/4
50%	44%	1,100	Commercial Solv.	A.		10/4	10/4	10/4	..	10	1/2	10,000 Livingston Pet	1/4	1/4	1/4	..	..	1/4	1/4	1/4	..	..										

## Dividends Declared and Awaiting Payment

## STEAM RAILROADS.

Company.	Rate, riod.	Pay.	Books
Assoc. Gas & El. pf.	.87c	Q Sep. 30	Sep. 15
Auburn Auto	\$.1	Q Oct. 1	*Sep. 20
Do pf.	1%	Q Oct. 1	*Sep. 20
Ault & Wilborg pf.	1%	Q Oct. 1	*Sep. 16
Barnhart Bros. & Spindler 1st & 2d pf.	1%	Q Nov. 1	Oct. 26
Bell Telephone, Canada	2	Q Oct. 14	Sep. 23
Buffalo Gen. Electric	2	Q Sep. 30	Sep. 15
Burroughs Add. Mach.	2	Q Sep. 30	Aug. 21
Brooklyn Union Gas.	2	Q Oct. 2	Sep. 15
Bucyrus pf.	1%	Q Oct. 2	Sep. 30
Burns Bros. pf.	1%	Q Oct. 2	Sep. 22
Do prior pf.	1%	Q Nov. 1	Oct. 20
Calumet & Arizona	.50c	Q Sep. 25	*Sep. 8
Cal. Petroleum pf.	1%	Q Oct. 1	Sep. 20
Canada Bread pf.	1%	Q Oct. 1	Sep. 16
Can. Gen. Electric	1%	Q Oct. 2	Sep. 15
Can. Locomotive	1	Q Oct. 1	Sep. 20
Cartier (W.) Co. pf.	3%	Q Sep. 30	Sep. 9
Central Aguirre Sugar	\$.150	Q Oct. 2	Sep. 21
Cent. Ill. Pub. Ser. pf.	1%	Q Oct. 14	Sep. 30
Cent. States El. pf.	1%	Q Sep. 30	Sep. 9
Cert. T. P. 1st & 2d pf.	1%	Q Oct. 2	Sep. 20
Central Petroleum	\$.250	— Oct. 1	Sep. 25
Chandler Motor	\$.150	Q Oct. 1	Sep. 20
Cheesborough Mfg.	3%	Q Sep. 30	Sep. 9
Do pf.	1%	Q Sep. 30	Sep. 9
Chi. Mill & Lumber pf.	1%	Q Oct. 2	Sep. 23
Cities Service	11%	— Oct. 1	Sep. 15
Do pf. & pf. B.	1%	— Oct. 1	Sep. 15
Cluett-Peabody pf.	1%	Q Oct. 2	Sep. 20
Clev. Worsted Mills	1	Q Sep. 30	*Sep. 15
Colonial Finance Corp.	.25c	Q Oct. 1	Sep. 1
Do pf.	2	Q Oct. 1	Sep. 1
Columbus Petroleum	1	M Oct. 1	Sep. 20
Com. Solv. Class A pf.	\$.1	Q Oct. 1	Sep. 20
Connor (John T.) Co.	.25c	Q Oct. 2	Sep. 20
Corona Type. 1st pf.	2	Q Oct. 2	Sep. 15
Do 2d pf.	1%	Q Oct. 2	Sep. 16
Continental Can pf.	1%	Q Oct. 1	Sep. 20
Consum. Power 6% pf.	1%	Q Oct. 2	Sep. 14
Do 7% pf.	1%	Q Oct. 2	Sep. 14
Crucible Steel pf.	1%	Q Sep. 30	*Sep. 15
Cuban-Am. Sugar pf.	14	Q Sep. 30	Sep. 2
Dalton Add. Mach. pf.	1%	Q Oct. 2	Sep. 20
Dolores Esperanza	2%	Q Oct. 10	Sep. 30
Detroit & Clev. Nav.	\$.1	Q Oct. 2	*Sep. 15
Dom. Canners Ltd. pf.	1%	Q Oct. 2	—
Dominion Oil	2	Q Oct. 1	Sep. 10
Dominion Glass	1%	Q Oct. 2	Sep. 15
Do pf.	1%	Q Oct. 2	Sep. 15
Dom. Iron & Steel pf.	1%	Q Oct. 1	Sep. 15
Dom. Textile	3	Q Oct. 2	Sep. 15
Do pf.	1%	Q Oct. 16	Sep. 30
Dub. Cond. & Radio pf.	\$.2	— Oct. 25	Sep. 10
Duluth Edison Co. pf.	1%	Q Oct. 2	Sep. 20
Du Pont de Nem. stock	1%	Q Oct. 25	Sep. 10
Dunham (J. H.) & Co.	1%	Q Oct. 2	—
Do 1st pf.	1%	Q Oct. 2	—
Do 2d pf.	1%	Q Oct. 2	—
Eastman Kodak	\$.125	Q Oct. 2	Sep. 18
Do pf.	1%	Q Oct. 2	Sep. 21
Edmunds & Jones	.50c	Q Oct. 1	Sep. 20
Do pf.	1%	Q Oct. 1	Sep. 20
Elec. Con. & Mfg.	.60c	— Oct. 2	*Sep. 21
Do pf.	1%	Q Oct. 2	*Sep. 21
Elec. St. Bat. com. & pf.	.75c	Q Oct. 2	Sep. 15
Erie Lighting pf.	.50c	Q Oct. 2	Sep. 15
Emerson Elec. Mfg. pf.	1%	Q Oct. 1	Sep. 20
Empire Safe Deposit	1%	Q Sep. 30	*Sep. 24
Eisenlohr Bros. pf.	1%	Q Sep. 30	Sep. 20
Endicott-Johnson	\$.125	Q Oct. 2	Sep. 21
Do pf.	\$.175	Q Oct. 2	Sep. 21
Fam. Players-Lasky C.	\$.2	Q Oct. 2	*Sep. 15
Fam. Players-Lasky pf. 2	\$.1	*Oct. 16	—
Farr Alpaca	2	Q Sep. 30	Sep. 18
Fisher Body (Ohio) pf.	2	Q Oct. 1	Sep. 21
Fleischmann Co. pf.	1%	Q Oct. 1	Sep. 15
foster (W. C.) Co.	.75c	Q Oct. 1	Sep. 20
Do pf.	2%	Q Oct. 1	Sep. 20
Galena-Signal Oil pf.	2	Q Sep. 30	Aug. 31
General Electric	2	Q Oct. 14	Sep. 7
Do new (par \$10).	.50	— Oct. 14	Sep. 7
Gen. Am. Tank Car pf.	1%	Q Oct. 2	Sep. 15
Gen. Tire & Rubber pf.	1%	Q Oct. 1	Sep. 20
Grassell Chemical	2	Q Sep. 30	Sep. 15
Do pf.	1%	Q Sep. 30	Sep. 15
Gould Mfg.	1%	Q Oct. 1	Sep. 20
Hercules Powder	3	Q Sep. 25	Sep. 15
Higbee Co. pf.	2	Q Oct. 2	Sep. 21
Homentake Mining	.25c	M Sep. 25	Sep. 20
Hood Rubber	\$.1	Q Sep. 30	Sep. 20
Hopewell Steel Ball	2	— Oct. 1	Sep. 20
Hudson Motor Car	.50	Q Oct. 5	Sep. 25
Hupp Motor Car pf.	1%	Q Oct. 1	Sep. 20
Imperial Oil	2%	Q Oct. 1	Sep. 19
Do pf.	2	Q Oct. 1	Sep. 10
Imperial Tob. of Can.	1%	Q Sep. 28	—
Do pf.	3	— Sep. 30	—
Indianapolis Water pf.	1%	Q Sep. 30	Sep. 29
Indianian W. W. Sec.	3%	Q Sep. 30	Sep. 18
International Salt	1%	Q Oct. 2	Sep. 15
Interotyp Corp.	10	Q Nov. 15	Sep. 1
Int. Button Hole B. M.	1	Q Oct. 2	Sep. 15
Int. Cement	.625c	Q Sep. 30	Sep. 15
Do pf.	1%	Q Sep. 30	Sep. 15
Island Creek Coal	\$.2	Q Oct. 2	Sep. 18
Island Creek Coal	\$.2	Ex. Oct. 9	Sep. 18
Do pf.	1%	Q Oct. 2	Sep. 18
Jordan Motor Car pf.	1%	Q Sep. 30	*Sep. 15
Kaufmann Dep. St. pf.	1%	Q Oct. 2	Sep. 20
Kelly Spgfd. Tire pf.	1%	Q Oct. 2	Sep. 15
Kelsey Wheel	\$.150	Q Oct. 2	Sep. 20
Kelley Int. L. & Tr.	2	Q Oct. 1	Sep. 20
Kerr Lake Mines	12%	Q Oct. 16	*Oct. 2
Krege pf.	1%	Q Oct. 1	Sep. 15
Kress pf.	1%	Q Oct. 2	Sep. 20
Laurentide Co.	1%	Q Oct. 15	Sep. 1
Do pf.	1%	Q Oct. 15	Sep. 1
Armour & Co. pf.	1%	Q Oct. 2	Sep. 15
Associated Oil	1%	Q Oct. 25	Sep. 30
Atlanta Refining	5	Q Sep. 16	Aug. 21

## PRE-PAY.

## Books

Company.	Rate, riod.	able.	Close.
Lehigh Val. Coal Sales	\$.2	Q Oct. 2	Sep. 14
Library Bureau	1%	Q Oct. 2	Sep. 20
Do pf.	2	Q Oct. 2	Sep. 20
Lorillard Co.	3	Q Oct. 2	Sep. 16
Do pf.	1%	Q Oct. 2	Sep. 16
Loft, Inc.	.25c	Q Sep. 30	Sep. 23
Loose-W. Biscuit 1st pf.	1%	Q Oct. 1	*Sep. 19
Do 2d pf.	1%	Q Nov. 1	Oct. 1
Long Star Gas.	.375c	Q Sep. 30	Sep. 23
Mackay Co.	1%	Q Oct. 2	*Sep. 6
Do pf.	1	Q Oct. 2	*Sep. 16
Mack Truck 1st & 2d pf.	1%	Q Oct. 1	Sep. 20
Mfrs. Light & Heat	2	Q Oct. 14	Sep. 30
Mallinson (H.R.) & Co.	1%	Q Oct. 2	Sep. 20
Mathieson Alkali pf.	1%	Q Oct. 2	Sep. 20
Mergenthaler Linotype	.25	Q Sep. 30	*Sep. 6
McCrory Stores pf.	1%	Q Oct. 2	Sep. 22
Merrimack Chem.	\$.125	Q Sep. 30	Sep. 18
Merrimack Chem.	\$.1	Ex. Sep. 30	Sep. 16
Mexican Petroleum	3	Q Oct. 10	Sep. 15
Do pf.	2	Q Oct. 2	Sep. 15
Middle States Oil	3	Q Oct. 1	Sep. 10
Miller Rubber pf.	2	Q Sep. 15	Aug. 25
Motor Wheel	2	Q Sep. 20	Sep. 11
Montana Power	4	Q Oct. 1	Sep. 14
Do pf.	1%	Q Oct. 1	Sep. 14
Narragansett Elec. Ltg.	.75	Q Oct. 2	*Sep. 15
Nash Motors pf.	1%	Q Nov. 1	Oct. 20
Nat. Automatic Fire Al.	.25c	Q Oct. 2	Sep. 30
Nat. Breweries	\$.1	Q Oct. 2	*Sep. 15
Do pf.	1%	Q Oct. 2	*Sep. 15
Nat. Breweries	\$.1	Q Oct. 2	Sep. 15
Do pf.	1%	Q Oct. 2	Sep. 15
Nat. Sugar Ref.	1%	Q Oct. 2	Sep. 11
Nat. Licorice pf.	1%	Q Sep. 30	Sep. 22
Nat. Refining pf.	2	Q Oct. 2	Sep. 15
National Surety	3	Q Oct. 2	*Sep. 20
New Eng. Tel. & Tel.	2	Q Sep. 30	Sep. 13
N. E. T. & R. pf.	1%	Q Oct. 2	Sep. 15
N. Y. Telephone	1	Q Oct. 16	Sep. 20
Niagara Falls Power	1%	Q Sep. 15	Sep. 9
Do pf.	1%	Q Oct. 16	Sep. 30
Northwestern Yeast	3	Q Sep. 15	Sep. 12
Pacific-Burt pf.	1%	Q Oct. 2	Sep. 15
Ohio Oil	\$.125	Q Sep. 30	Sep. 24
Ohio Oil	.75c	Ex. Sep. 30	Aug. 24
Orpheum Circuit pf.	2	Q Oct. 2	Sep. 15
Ottawa Car Mfg.	1	Q Oct. 2	Sep. 15
Pac. Tel. & Tel. pf.	1%	Q Oct. 16	Sep. 30
Panama P. & L. pf.	1%	Q Oct. 2	Sep. 20
Panhandle P. & R. pf.	2	Q Oct. 2	Sep. 21
Paige-Detroit Motor	.30c	— Oct. 1	Sep. 20
Packard M. Car pf.	1%	Q Sep. 15	*Aug. 31
Pan-A. P. & T. A. & B.	\$.150	Q Oct. 10	Sep. 15
Park-Utah Mining	.15c	Q Oct. 1	Sep. 20
Penney (J. C.) pf.	1%	Q Sep. 30	Sep. 20
Penn. Power & L. pf.	1%	Q Oct. 2	Sep. 15
Phillips Petroleum	.50c	Q Sep. 30	Sep. 15
"Phelps, Dodge & Co.	\$.1	Q Oct. 3	Sep. 20
Pick (Albert) & Co. pf.	1%	Q Oct. 1	Sep. 22
Pittsburgh Plate Glass	2	Q Oct. 1	Sep. 29
Pond Creek Coal	.375c	Q Oct. 2	Sep. 18
Price Bros.	4	Q Oct. 2	Sep. 23
Prairie Oil & Gas	3	Q Oct. 31	Sep. 30
Prairie Oil & Gas	2	Ex. Oct. 31	Sep. 30
Prairie Pipe Line	3	Q Oct. 31	Sep. 30
Provincial Paper	1%	Q Oct. 2	Sep. 15
Do pf.	1%	Q Oct. 2	Sep. 15
Price Bros.	2	Q Oct. 2	Sep. 23
Quaker Oats	2	Q Oct. 16	Oct. 1
Railway Steel Spring	2	Q Oct. 1	Sep. 10
Do pf.	1%	Q Sep. 20	Sep. 6
Ranger Texas	2	Q Oct. 1	Sep. 10
Reed Button Hole Mac.	3	Q Oct. 2	Sep. 15
Reed Folding Machine	.15c	Q Oct. 2	Sep. 15
Reynolds Tab. A & B.	.75c	Q Oct. 2	Sep. 18
Do pf.	1%	Q Oct. 2	Sep. 18
Royal Baking Powder	2	Q Sep. 20	*Sep. 15
Do pf.	.50c	Nov. 15	*Oct. 14
Sinclair Con. Oil	.50c	Nov. 15	*Oct. 14
Singer Mfg.	\$.125	Q Sep. 30	Sep. 15
St. L. R. M. & Pac.	1	Q Sep. 30	*Sep. 16
Do pf.	1%	Q Sep. 30	*Sep. 16
Standard Oil, Ohio	3	Q Oct. 2	Sep. 20
Standard Oil, Ohio	1	Ex. Oct. 2	Sep. 25
Standard Tex. P. pf. A.	1%	Q Oct. 1	*Sep. 15
Do pf. B.	1%	Q Oct. 1	*Sep. 15
Steel & Tube pf.	1%	Q Oct. 1	Sep. 20
Sterling Oil & Dev.	.10c	— Oct. 5	

# Branch Banking

By John E. Barber

Vice-President First National Bank of Los Angeles

**T**HE integration of business which, since the war, has been conspicuously evident in the mergers and consolidations in the steel, tobacco, oil, automobile and other industries, is also apparent in the banking business where branch banking continues a lively topic of discussion. As to whether or not national banks are entitled to the same freedom in establishing city branches as that accorded State banking institutions in many States, and as to whether or not the experiment now being made in California of country branch banking on rather an extensive scale will result in the greatest good to the greatest number, it would be wiser not to be dogmatic. Nevertheless an examination of the facts concerning branch banking and the extent to which it prevails in this and foreign countries cannot fail to clarify much of the confusion which now surrounds this new phase of our banking development.

The attention of banking circles is now focused upon the determination of national banks in certain cities to establish city branches at strategic points within those cities. For many years national banks have desired to do this, but the interpretation of the National Bank act of 1863 by successive Controllers of the Currency has been the stumbling block. However, the congestion of traffic in the downtown districts of the larger cities and the establishment of branches of banks operating under State charter in the heart of residence districts and outlying industrial and shopping centres have, in some cases, made such inroads in the national banks' business that, latterly, their desire has crystallized into action.

The extent to which State Banks and their branches predominate in some parts of the country may be seen from the following table showing the situation in four typical cities where a total of 22 national banks with 48 branches compete with 72 State banks and 501 branches:

	Nat. Banks.	State Banks.	City Branches.
Detroit	3	0	13
Cleveland	3	0	18
New York	7	44	29
Los Angeles	9	4	12
			90

All told, there are more than 800 branches of State banks in operation throughout the country.

Although national banks have not been allowed to establish or originate branches, there have been two recognized methods by which they could be maintained: (1) A State bank with branches could obtain a national charter and retain its branches; (2) a national bank could purchase or acquire a State institution with branches, nationalize the bank acquired and continue to operate the branches. The latter of these alternatives has been extensively availed of in New York City, where, by purchase, merger and consolidation, a total of 44 branches are now maintained by seven national banks.

Influenced by increasing competitive pressure upon national banks in certain sections of the country, the present Controller of the Currency, Hon. D. R. Crissinger, has, in recent months, permitted certain national banks to open "agencies," but only within the city where the parent bank is located. This privilege is further restricted by the Controller to banks in those 22 States that already permit State banking institutions to operate branches. National banks in many cities have been quick to take advantage of this precedent and are opening branches rapidly, not, however, without opposition, chiefly from State bankers. Whatever the merits of the situation from the standpoint of adequate

service to the public and fair competition between State and national banks, it must be admitted that, in many cities, the privilege of conducting branches confers a considerable advantage upon those institutions possessing it.

However, the source of the present agitation concerning branch banking must be sought deeper than the current discussions relating to it as a "city problem," involving a competitive business struggle between national and State banks, each striving to adjust itself to new conditions imposed by the growth of our cities. It is likely that the basis of much of the opposition is the fear in the minds of many bankers that any encouragement given branch banking within the confines of one city will lead inevitably to the growth of powerful banks operating in several cities or States.

The subject of branch banking in its broader sense and its adaptability to conditions and the temper of the people in the United States has been actively debated at recurrent intervals ever since the founding of this Republic. Alexander Hamilton was the author of a system of branch banking which, later, modified by Scotland, was adopted by Canada. The fundamental ideas of branch banking ran through all of the "central bank" discussions prior to the establishment of our Federal Reserve System which is, itself, founded on a cardinal principle of branch banking. Branch banking is not, therefore, a new subject in the United States, although its application in the last twenty years in this country has been extremely limited. Meanwhile branch banking has made enormous strides in practically every other civilized country in the world.

Branch banking has reached its greatest development in England where, by process of consolidation, accentuated by the war, five great banking institutions now hold more than 80 per cent. of the total bank deposits. Combined, these institutions operate 6,519 branches in England and Wales, as follows:

Lloyds Bank, Ltd., 1,600; London Joint City and Midland Bank, Ltd., 1,550; Barclay's Bank, 1,500; National Provincial and Union Bank of England, 1,000; London County Westminster and Parr's Bank, Ltd., 869.

In Canada the 15 leading banks operate in all more than 4,000 branches across the Continent from the Atlantic to the Pacific. Of these the Royal Bank has more than 700 branches and the Bank of Montreal nearly as many. In France and Germany there are 10 banking systems. In Japan the branch-banking system is in general use and there are a number of strong Japanese banks, each conducting a considerable number of branches. Throughout Central and South Africa the banking situation is handled by strong British banks with head offices in London but operating branches throughout that portion of Africa.

In fact the flat statement can be made that there is no country of any financial strength in the world where some type of branch banking does not exist. A graphic idea of the extent to which this statement is true is revealed by the list of typical banking institutions operating in all parts of the world, together with the number of branches controlled by each, given in the adjoining column.

In this country branch banking has progressed farthest in California where, in addition to numerous "city branches," several large institutions in Los Angeles and San Francisco have set up large banking systems covering many different communities. California alone has more than 300 branch banks or more than

one-third of the total for the United States, and the list is constantly being augmented. It is perhaps natural that California, which has been the leading exponent of the merits of co-operative effort, as typified by the great and successful co-operative marketing organizations, like the California Fruit Growers' Exchange, California Walnut Growers' Association and the Sun-Maid Raisin Growers, should be the first to see the advantages to be derived from an application of the same principle to banking in communities confronted with similar financial problems. There is, however, a deeper economic reason why California, largely an agricultural State, seems peculiarly adapted to support branch banking.

Throughout the State are great producing valleys such as the Imperial, Sacramento and San Joaquin, which, at certain seasons of the year, need large sums of money to move their products. If the resources of the money and investment centers of the State are coupled up through a branch-banking system with the requirements of the agricultural valleys, it is felt that the prosperity not only of the latter, but also of the cities in reality dependent upon the country, would be promoted.

The unique conditions existing in Southern California have caused branch banking to flourish in this district. Not only are there some 150 staple agricultural products produced in this area, but the process of planting and marketing of different crops is practically continuous for the entire twelve months of the year. The result is that the requirements of agriculture, mining and manufacturing provide a continuous demand for all-year-round banking service which furnishes a natural basis for the operation of a banking system. Such a system with a chain of branch banks at many points can correlate seasonal demands and equalize the use of its resources and credit by matching a surplus of funds at one point in its territory with a need at another point. In other words, the proceeds derived from the sale of a crop in any one district in Southern California can be made immediately available to producers in other districts and agricultural activity stimulated rather than retarded.

The largest banking system in California has its head office in San Francisco and maintains 57 branches in 41 cities throughout the entire State from the northern boundary to Mexico, a distance of more than 600 miles. Permission to open three additional branches has recently been granted. A National Bank also located in San Francisco main-

Name of Institution.	No. of Branches.
Anglo Egyptian Bank, Ltd. (Egypt)	20
Banco de Chile	46
Bank of British West Africa, Ltd.	30
Bank of New South Wales	358
Bank of New Zealand	200
Bank of Scotland	182
Commercial Bank of Greece, Ltd.	18
Credit Foncier d'Algérie et de Tunisie (North Africa)	100
Credit Lyonnais	406
Credit Suisse (Switzerland)	11
Dai-Ichi Ginko, Ltd. (Japan)	30
English, Scottish and Australian Bank, Ltd.	300
Imperial Bank of India	72
Lloyds Bank, Ltd.	1,600
Maakuntain Keskus, Pankki — Osakeyhtiö (Finland)	71
Aktiebolaget Mälareprovinsernas Bank (Sweden)	100
Nationalbank für Deutschland (Berlin)	100
Norges Bank, Kristiania	20
Standard Bank of South Africa	375
Ulster Bank, Ltd., Belfast	120
Banca Italiana di Sconto	164

tains branches at Portland, Tacoma and Seattle, nearly 1,000 miles from the head office. Another bank, a State institution, is acquiring in the neighborhood of a dozen branches in the metropolitan area of San Francisco.

Typical of both city and country branch banking are two banking systems centring in Los Angeles. The largest of these, a State institution, operates 50 branch banks, of which 28 are in the City of Los Angeles and 22 in a total of 20 cities outside of Los Angeles. Some of the city branches are merely sublimated tellers' cages, set up to meet customers' difficulties in banking in congested traffic areas.

The establishment and operation of this larger system has introduced several distinctive features into branch banking. In the first place, operation is restricted to a definite economic area, consisting of that part of California from Fresno in the heart of the San Joaquin Valley South to the Mexican border, a district 365 miles long and 200 miles wide, mainly homogeneous in character, products and problems. Instead of an outright purchase of local banks or the installation of new branches, the component units of this system were merged by an exchange of the stock of each bank for the stock of the parent institution, such exchange being made on the basis of actual book value in each case.

By this procedure the former shareholders of each bank acquired a proportionate interest through joint ownership of the same stock, not only in the parent bank but in all branches as well, and a community of interest was created which preserves at each point the advantages and local contacts theretofore enjoyed by the merging banks in each place. This policy is intensified by continuing at each point the existing bank officers and employees, as well as Directors, the latter constituting a Board which passes upon local loans and policies. In this way the local business of the central institution continues in the hands of sympathetic managements intimately acquainted with the needs and customers' credit risks within their respective communities. The local branch on the other hand is able to offer its customers the resources and facilities resulting from the merger which are far greater than are usually available to a unit bank in one of the smaller communities. A further result is to retain in effect local bank earnings for distribution to local shareholders.

In other words, every effort is made in this type of branch operation to preserve the individuality of the former unit banks and their officers, which continue to function locally as before, although along uniform accounting and administrative lines. However, the totals of deposits, assets, investments and loans of the entire system are carried at a central point.

The so-called "equipment services" of the parent bank, as for example, purchase and sale of exchange, bonds and commercial paper, acceptances, credit department, letters of credit, collection of drafts, particularly against shipments of commodities, elaborate research departments supplying accurate information on business and economic subjects, specialists in real estate, live stock, cotton, &c., are not only available to each unit bank but can be extended to their customers, thus giving them the benefit of expensive services which only a large central organization can afford to maintain.

Many other advantages are claimed for branch banking by its advocates. These may be grouped under two heads, those accruing to the public and on the other hand to the banks and their stockholders. The first group may be summarized in the installation of better banking practices in smaller communi-

Continued on Page 287

# The Annalist Barometer of Business Conditions

Continued from Page 273

wages and salaries demand such enormous quantities of fluid cash each month that many of the great concerns in various branches of industry are seriously worried over the future. Share capital has become an insignificant trifly by comparison with the needs for actual cash, and bank credits have to be utilized to an ever-increasing degree. Yet the banks are very reluctant to issue new currency in anything like adequate quantities because of the bearing of such inflation on the currency situation.

One of the methods which the German manufacturers attempt to employ in increasing production is the utilization of legal holidays. They offer special compensation to workmen for work done on holidays, but meet with strenuous opposition of trade unions on this score. Commenting on this situation the *Korrespondenzblatt* (Aug. 12), the official organ of the German trade unions, says:

The legalization of obligatory holidays for workmen was one of the greatest achievements of German trade unionism. Cases, however, have occurred in which employers have offered to remunerate their employees for foregoing the holidays. It is the duty of trade unionists to take their holidays and in this manner lead the way to greater extension of holiday rights in the future.

The cases cited particularly refer to the paper industry, in which an agreement was made between the workmen and the employers, providing for special remuneration in case of holiday work. But this provision had to be canceled because of protests entered by the trade unions.

Switzerland has recently introduced a rather stringent capital tax by an act of her Federal Council. As described in the *Journal de Genève* (July 19), the rates of this tax are as follows: Property, the value of which does not exceed 10,000 francs, is exempt from the tax, while up to 15,000 francs a tax of 1.25 per cent. is imposed. Then the rate increases by 0.25 per cent. for every 5,000 francs up to 80,000, and then for every 10,000 francs up to 300,000. Beyond that the rate of increase is 0.5 per cent. for every additional 100,000 francs up to 1,000,000, and thence 0.5 per cent. for each additional million up to 17,000,000 francs. Thus the capital tax ranges from 1.25 to 18.6 per cent.

## Stocks

THE stock market of last week gave further evidence of the buoyancy which has characterized the course of prices almost since the first of the year. The trend has been upward, and it continued upward to the point last week of carrying many issues to new high levels for the year. For a little time in the early week bear raiders endeavored to make capital out of the situation, but strength in the rail stocks, following the announcement that the strike had been settled, strengthened the position of these issues, so that raids against industrial stocks were halted and the entire market turned upward on Thursday and Friday.

To some extent the upturn in stock market quotations appears to have carried many issues to a point where they are bit top-heavy. Just how much pool activities can be held attributable for the continued strength is a question, but at all events it would seem that the pools have not for the present carried on any extensive distribution, and there is no doubt but that public buying has entered into the market fabric on a fairly large scale since the first of the month.

Probably the most notable feature continues to be the steady accumulation of what might be termed investment stocks. Stocks of the latter class still afford a high yield, even at their present prices. The easing of money is the underlying cause for the buoyancy in this quarter. It has been a buying movement that has encompassed a wide range of issues. The better stocks among the industrials have been under accumulation, and the same has been true of the rails. General Electric, for instance, has been steadily climbing since early in the year, and continues to be in demand, with no setback of consequence in the process of profit-taking. Norfolk & Western is an issue represented among the rails, this 7 per cent. dividend-payer having climbed as high as 124. It will be seen from these instances that the yields are frequently not as high as 6 per cent. in the cases of seasoned issues which have investment qualifications.

There is no doubt, however, that the general public has been buying stocks for the continuation of the rise, and the sharp upturn at the middle of last week represented a confidence that business from now on would be good and that steady improvement in the rate of operations in most lines would be witnessed between now and the end of the year. Even in those issues which may be affected by seasonal conditions there has been sufficient purchasing to absorb such profit-taking as developed. This has been mainly true in the case of the automobile shares. No one thinks for an instant that the business of the automobile companies in the fourth quarter of the year will measure up to that of the months just passed. However, this has not served to depress values to any marked degree. There is apparently a confidence that with the turn to another year there will be a renewal of activities on a wide scale, and that prosperous conditions may be expected for many months to come. Of course, if this does develop as fact, there is hardly a reason for any sharp depression in stocks at the moment, except such minor declines that are of little consequence when taken in relation to the major trend.

The main feature, of course, with relation to the stock market is the money supply, and this is apparently of sufficiently broad proportions to permit of expansion in stock market operations beyond the point which they have already reached. There was some hardening up in the call rate last week, but this was not of character to be disturbing; in fact, it will not be by any means the real index to the money situation. The demands of business have not thus far made any heavy drains on the money market, and if this continues to be true the stock market can have fairly wide latitude for operations. Commercial borrowings are on the increase, however, and they will be watched closely from the stock market point of view. In a broad outlook on the situation, however, it

might be said that no reaction of consequence can be expected in the near future from money conditions alone, but such a reaction may take place from purely technical conditions within the market itself. If the long side becomes overcrowded, and it is probably overcrowded now, then any unfavorable news might bring about a sharp downward revision in prices. Not a few have expected that this would take place before now, but such reactions as have developed have been of somewhat minor consequence.

Apparently the market for the time being is ruled by group buying. Early last week the rails were in strong demand and later in the week public utilities were taken up and some of the industrials. This has been the course of action almost since the advance in prices started. One group after another has felt the influence of heavy purchasing, the only exception being the copper shares, which still continue to act sluggishly. As a matter of fact, there is reason for greater confidence in the copper stocks than has been possible for many months. Demand is improving and surplus stocks are at relatively low ebb. It would not be surprising at any time to see the better conditions in the copper industry reflected in stock market operations.

The railroad shares have naturally reflected the settling of the labor difficulties, and with the economies which have been put into operation and the increased business which may be expected, it is fair to assume that earnings statements will show a decided betterment in the latter months of the year. There is no denying that the railroads will have a volume of business which will really test their capacity to handle. There is a shortage of cars as related to what would be the normal supply if purchases had been made at the regular quota for the past seven years. Likewise, there is also probably a shortage in motive power even though the railroads have been heavy purchasers of locomotives. However, there is no indication of a shortage in either line that may be called acute but from now on it may be expected that coal loadings will show a sharp increase, and that the demand for other freight space will somewhat exceed capacity.

## Bonds

THE last week witnessed a steady market for all classes of bonds, with most attention paid to the higher grade obligations. Speculative interest seemed to have turned from the bond to the stock market for the time being, and while junior obligations held their quotations well they were much less active than for some time past. Municipal, Liberties and high-grade rails were in urgent demand at advancing prices, in spite of an advance of 1/2 per cent. in the rate for time money at the banks.

New issues once again became a noteworthy factor. Aside from the \$200,000,000 issue of 3 1/2 per cent. United States Treasury Certificates the volume for the week was more than double that of any of the three preceding weeks. These offerings were well received in spite of comparatively high prices for the corporate issues and record low yields for the municipals. Among the flotations of interest in the New York market were: \$2,000,000 City of Cleveland (Ohio) school district 4 1/2%, due 1923-42, prices yielding 3.75 to 4.25 per cent., according to maturity; \$1,125,000 City of Little Rock (Ark.) 1-year notes, yielding 4.50 per cent.; \$1,000,000 St. Louis Joint Stock Land Bank 5s, due May 1, 1952, optional 1932, at 103, yielding 4.00 per cent. to the optional maturity; \$912,000 City of Houston (Texas) 5s, due 1924-47, to yield 4.40 per cent.; \$675,000 Atlantic City (N. J.) 5 per cent. road improvement bonds, due 1924-37, at prices yielding from 4.15 to 4.30 per cent.; \$21,000,000 Kansas City Power and Light Company 30-year first mortgage 5s, series "A," at 93, yielding 5.47 per cent.; \$1,193,000 City of Baltimore (Maryland) general improvement 5s, due 1930-34, on a 4.10 per cent. basis; \$199,000 City of Bridgeton (N. J.) 4 1/2 per cent. school bonds, due 1924-58, to yield 4.30 per cent.; \$900,000 City of Sacramento (Cal.) 5 1/2%, due 1923-61, at prices to yield 4.35 per cent.; \$50,000,000 Swift & Co. 10-year 5 per cent. notes, at 97, to yield 5.40 per cent.; \$10,000,000 Eastern Cuba Sugar Corporation first mortgage 15-year 7 1/2%, at 100; \$5,000,000 State of Oregon 4 and 4 1/2 per cent. veteran aid bonds; the 4s mature 1931 and 1961 and are offered at between 4.08 to 4.12 per cent.; the 4 1/2s, maturing over the same period are priced to yield about 4 1/2 per cent.; \$6,000,000 Sugar Estates of Oriente, Inc. first mortgage 20-year sinking fund 7s, 97%, to yield 7.25 per cent.; \$3,580,000 City of Buffalo 4 1/2s, due 1923 to 1962, at prices yielding 3.85 to 3.90 per cent.; \$3,500,000 Nebraska Power Company 100-year 6 per cent. debentures, at 90%, to yield 6.00 per cent.; \$350,000 City of Elmira (N. Y.) 4 1/2 per cent. school construction bonds, due 1942-50, on a 3.95 per cent. basis; \$2,974,000 Southern Railway Company subordinated lien 6 per cent. equipment trust notes, due 1923-32, yielding 4.50 to 5.75 per cent.; \$200,000 Orange County (N. Y.) 4 1/2 per cent. road bonds, due 1932-51, to yield 3.90 per cent.; \$3,000,000 Consolidated Gas, Electric Light and Power Company of Baltimore first refunding 30-year 5 1/2s, series "B," at 99 1/2%; \$1,000,000 San Antonio Joint Stock Land Bank 5s, at 102%, yielding over 4.65 per cent. to optional maturity. In 1932, \$2,635,000 Province of Saskatchewan 20-year 5s, at 90%; \$2,000,000 Greater Winnipeg water district 30-year 5s, 98 1/2%, yielding 5.10 per cent.; \$25,000,000 Sinclair Pipe Line Company 20-year sinking fund 5s, at 95, to yield 5.40 per cent., and several smaller municipal issues.

The demand for municipal bonds is apparently insatiable. New issues were poured into the market in large amounts during the week, but dealers estimated a heavier demand at the close than at the outset. Syndicates are bidding for issues at prices higher than have been in effect for five years and disposing of their bonds in a few hours. In the offering of the City of Buffalo 4 1/2s, above referred to, on a 3.80 to 3.85 per cent. basis it was pointed out that that yield was equivalent to a 5.70 per cent. return on taxable bonds to an investor living in New York State, having an income of \$100,000 or over per year. As taxable bonds of first grade are selling to yield less than 3 per cent. it is easy to see where the

demand for securities of this class comes from.

Liberty bonds advanced in the early sessions, stimulated by the success of the 3 1/2 per cent. issue of United States Treasury Certificates. Toward the end of the week they lost a good part of this gain.

With the shopmen's strike practically settled railroad bonds came into prominence and all classes responded to the increased demand with advancing prices. The gilt edge class commanded more attention than usual, and equipment issues in particular seemed very popular. It was reported that the Southern Railway subordinated 6 per cent. notes were quickly taken and that a new \$6,000,000 Illinois Central Equipment issue bearing a 4 1/2 per cent. coupon was placed privately, at prices yielding between 4.90 and 4.95 per cent. Chicago Great Western 4s were subjected to the shock of a receivership rumor on Tuesday, which drove them down 11 points, to 45 1/2. The rumor was promptly discredited by the President of the road and the bonds recovered to 53 1/2. They closed at 65 1/2, off about 4 points. Chicago & Alton 3s and 3 1/2s each lost about 2 points. New York Central debenture 6s and refunding 5s advanced fractionally. Atlantic Coast Line 4s rose 1/2 to 91 1/2. Great Northern 5 1/2s gained 1/2 to 105. Pennsylvania consolidated 4 1/2s jumped a point, to 101. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy 5s advanced 1/2 to 102. Colorado & Southern 4 1/2s gained 1/2 to 90 1/2. Frisco prior lien "B" 5s climbed 1/2 to 91 1/2. "Over-the-counter" dealings in legal rails were reported in heavy volume.

Public utility issues also enjoyed an active demand. Advances, though small in most instances, were general throughout the most. The best example of the esteem in which strong utility bonds are held was given in the action of the new issue of Consolidated Gas, Electric Light and Power of Baltimore 5s, which were offered at 99 1/2 on Thursday and sold as high as 101 1/2 on Friday. Both issues of Pacific Telephone and Telegraph 5s gained fractions. Public Service of New Jersey 5s advanced 1/2. Rumors to the effect that the Brooklyn Rapid Transit receivership would be terminated in the near future were denied by the bankers interested in that organization, but the advance of 2 1/2% in quotations for the 7s indicates a strong belief in some quarters that a rehabilitation is not far off. The Interborough situation remained uncertain, although the consensus of opinion points toward success for the plan for readjustment. I. R. T. 5s gained 1/2 to 73 1/2. Interborough Metropolitan 4 1/2s rose 1/2 to 15 1/2. Manhattan Railway 4s lost about a point. Third Avenue refunding is jumped 1% to 68 1/2.

Industrials were active and generally strong, though quotations reflected developments in individual cases. United States Rubber 5s gave an excellent exhibition of strength on Thursday when a bear raid drove the preferred stock down 11 points. At that time these bonds only lost 1/2 and they closed the week at 91, up 1/2. Virginia-Carolina Chemical Company 5s advanced 1/2 to 97 1/2. Magna Copper convertible 7s rose 6 points, to 121, on their first appearance on the New York Stock Exchange. American Smelting and Refining 5s rose a point, to 95 1/2. Chile Copper 5s gained 1/2, to 107 1/2. Valvoline Oil 7s continued their advance, gaining a point, to 101.

The unsettled European situation kept prices for foreign obligations irregular and made trading rather dull. Canadian Government and Provincial issues were an exception, all issues registering fair advances and in good demand. South American bonds were dull with few price changes. The Government of Haiti has invited American bankers to bid for an issue of \$16,000,000 bonds running for thirty years and bearing a 6 per cent. coupon. It is understood that several bankers are preparing to submit bids for the issue.

## Money

THE money market, so far as the call rate was concerned, showed a somewhat firmer tone toward the middle of last week, advancing to 5 per cent. on Thursday as compared with an opening rate of 4 per cent. at the outset of the week. There was no change, however, in time money rates, but the commercial paper rate was firmer, dealers reporting 4 1/2 per cent., an advance of 1/2 per cent. There was some little business done at the 4 per cent. rate, but the bulk of the paper moved at the higher figure. Acceptances also stiffened somewhat, advances being recorded in both buyers' and sellers' discounts on all maturities up to six months.

The advance in the call money rate was in part attributable to the heavy Government withdrawals, which amounted to about \$46,000,000. This tended to lessen the floating supply of money in the Street. There is, however, no underlying change in the money situation. There is no shortage of funds for stock market purposes and probably will not be for a long time to come. The crop movement has not made any particularly heavy demands for the reason that the local institutions have been enabled to carry a very large proportion of the burden due to liquidity of their position as compared with that of a year ago. Likewise, there is an abundance of money in the Street, which represents funds which would normally go into business channels if the trade movement was in full swing. Even the low rate which prevails in the Street at times does not serve to draw funds away from the New York centre, which is fairly good evidence that money is fairly good throughout the country.

## Foreign Exchange

THE foreign exchange market showed a recession in all of its leading rates during last week, the outstanding feature being the abrupt decline in sterling to \$4.41, the lowest price that has obtained since July 3, and a loss of 10 1/2 cents from the high point for the year. French, Italian, Belgium and other Continental exchanges were lower, the Italian rate going to a new low for the year at 4.18%, and the French and Belgian rates were only fractionally above their previous low marks. In part this heaviness in the Continental rates was a reflection of the

decline in sterling as well as of conditions particularly relating to the rates themselves.

The decline in sterling was a result of sales to establish dollar credits here in anticipation of grain and cotton bills. This is to be expected at this period of the year, although probably the rate on London will not drop off sharply since there has undoubtedly been provision made earlier in the year for dollar credits wherewith to meet exports of grain and cotton.

Aside from the purely commercial situation, the exchange rates are subject to fluctuation as a result of the political conditions abroad. The war cloud in the Balkans is looked upon with some degree of apprehension and the possibility of a disruption of affairs in that quarter was probably magnified in Europe to a degree which was not quite warranted because of the unsettled conditions which prevail.

Chinese and South American exchanges were somewhat weak, but the Japanese rate moved to a new high for the year at 48 1/2 cents.

## Iron and Steel

THE iron and steel industry is now in a position to resume the normal trend of business, the settlement of the rail and coal strikes having paved the way for this. There is no doubt that the two difficulties caused a serious disruption in this industry as is evidenced by the pig iron and steel ingot production figures for August. The belief is growing, however, that there will be no shortage of fuel which will seriously menace an increase in the volume of operations. It may be that this resumption will not reach for some time the figure of 75 to 80 per cent. which ruled as the rail strike went into effect, but there will be a considerable picking up when the traffic congestion is eliminated and the fuel supplies are on the way to points of serious shortage. Probably there will be no building up of a backlog of coal supplies such as normally obtains during the Summer and Fall, to provide against the Winter demand, but this is not so important if there is the fuel for immediate use, and it appears that this will not be lacking.

Of course, all along there has been an underlying strength in the position of the steel industry in that demand has been far in excess of production. The coal strike and the rail strike have not changed this situation in the least; rather they have made for a latent demand which will probably become assertive in the near future, and this will undoubtedly lead to a heavy increase in unfulfilled tonnage on the books of all of the leading companies. It is this backlog of orders which makes for confidence on the part of steel manufacturers that the balance of the year will be a prosperous one for this industry and that there is no reason to expect any change over the first half of next year. Of course, this confidence arises in the belief that there will be no more obstructive efforts on the part of labor and that the way will be cleared for consumers of steel to take on commitments for immediate and future needs. It must be remembered that the demand for steel comes not from any one particular group of purchasers but is one of wide proportions, extending over the whole country. It is to be expected that the purchasing of steel for automobile purposes will fall off somewhat since, at this season of the year, there is a normal curtailment of activities, but there is every reason to expect that the dropping off in the volume of orders from this quarter will be more than made up by the demand for steel from other channels, notably the railroads.

It is a well-known fact that the railroads have not been buying to the extent of their needs, and it is also very clear that ultimately this business must come into the market. In the case of equipment alone there will be a big demand for steel since the annual purchasing of railroad cars and even locomotives has not kept up to the average of the prewar years. In the period 1915 to 1921 some 800,000 new freight cars were built, whereas in the period 1908 to 1914 the total was close to 1,000,000 cars, and in the period 1901 to 1907 it approximated 1,500,000 cars. Naturally, with the business of the country having increased in great volume during the past seven years, it is to be expected that orders for new equipment must ultimately flood the market if the railroads are to keep themselves in a position to handle traffic on the best possible basis. The position of the railroads has not been

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favorable for making heavy purchases up to the present time, but it is perfectly clear that new business of large proportions is in prospect and the record of earnings is such as to indicate that the roads will rehabilitate themselves and re-establish a firm credit basis, and if the money becomes available the first endeavor will be to renew equipment both as to repairs of old cars and replacements.

One of the interesting questions as related to iron and steel at present is the export situation. This branch of the business has been rather better than is generally understood. To be sure, steel has not been going to the European countries. England has been supplying her own needs to a large extent, Belgium has been producing and likewise Germany, but the cutting off of the European market has not cut down the volume of our export steel business to any small figure. A large business has been done with other countries, some heavy shipments have been made to Mexico and likewise to Australia, and American steel is also going into Africa. These markets have been developed in lieu of European markets, and probably for some time to come American steel will find its way into those countries without any very sharp competition from European sources.

The question of prices is one that is being scanned with close attention by both purchasers and consumers. It seems definitely established that the low prices of not so many months ago will not be seen for a long time to come. The increase in wages by the United States Steel Corporation was a move which precluded any further reduction in steel prices, and as has since been shown, advances have taken place in many products. Last week it was worthy of note that the price on steel rails advanced from \$49 to \$43 a ton, a figure which is well below the stabilization price of just after the war, but which is still substantially above the low prices for the period intervening since then.

Undoubtedly the Steel Corporation will once again act as a balance wheel to the industry just as it has so many times in the past. Its price policy has been one of conservatism both as to reductions and as to increases. It has seldom been a leader but rather has followed the independents to the point that seemed fair but not further. Again in this case it may be that the Steel Corporation's prices will hold in check any wild demonstration in the iron and steel market such as might lead to disastrous results later on. The dangers of a runaway market are too well known to be disregarded lightly.

Alabama iron that sold for \$19 on Aug. 1 is now selling at \$25, and northern iron that was quoted at \$25.50 is now \$35. A composite price on pig iron shows that the present quotation is the highest since the opening week of 1921.

How much the question of fuel is related to the increased prices can be realized from the statement that Connellsville coke recently sold at \$12.50, whereas a year ago the same fuel was to be obtained for \$5 a ton. It is perhaps significant of the changed conditions in the industry that at the \$3 price of a year ago there was no demand for coke, whereas now there is a decided scramble to get supplies. Many iron furnaces have been forced down, but reports last week indicated that a turn had been made, when fifteen furnaces resumed operations. During August the furnaces that went down totaled twenty-eight to thirty, but at the present rate of resumption this loss will not stand long in the way of a rapid resumption of operations. There are many predictions that iron will go to a much higher price, and some go so far as to mention \$50 a ton. This, however, is apparently not justified, but undoubtedly the trend of prices will be upward for some time to come.

There is an interesting relation between price advances and demand. It may be expected that with circumstances so clearly forcing a price increase, consumers will hurry their orders so that they may obtain the best possible quotation. It is generally this way at the outset of price upturns in any line of business. On the other hand, a too rapid advance in price would probably tend to cut down demand in the expectation that a reaction would ensue. Therefore, there has to be a nice adjustment of price to consumption and the steel makers and iron masters are too well versed in the situation to permit of any untoward condition developing.

## Textiles

THE possibility of an early ending of the railroad strike, the wage advances granted in numerous New England textile mills and the setback received by the tariff bill in the House of Representatives all caused a good deal of comment in the cloth trades last week without having any marked effect on the amount of business done. The same three factors, however, may have a directly reverse effect this week. It has long been the belief that something akin to general prosperity is waiting on the end of the railroad strike. The increases in wages will mean a greater spending capacity for thousands of workers in a section of the country in which business has been notoriously poor for some time, although they may well mean higher cloth costs that will ultimately be paid by the public. The settling of the tariff question will also have a strong tendency to steady things, although it will help the upward trend of prices that is now evident in several directions.

Although the expected advances in standard brands of bleached and printed cotton goods again failed to materialize last week, some of the heavier colored cloths—particularly chambrys for the manufacturing trades—went up from a quarter to a half cent a yard. Two leading lines of percales, however, were withdrawn temporarily. The largest producer of denims in the country began booking business for November delivery only, on the basis of 19 cents for 2.20-yard white-back indigo goods. The naming of gingham prices for Spring is still to come, but growing pressure on the part of the jobbers may force the selling agents to declare themselves before the end of the month. Very active trading in gray goods, more especially printcloths, resulted in advances

that brought prices up to a basis of 9 cents for near-by shipments of 38½-inch 64-60s.

The feature of the week in the woolen and worsted goods trade, so far as actual merchandising was concerned, was the first opening of the so-called independent lines of dress goods for next Spring. One of the most important of these lines is scheduled to open some time this week, while another well-known concern, which has been the most active of all on Fall dress goods, will price its new lines near the end of the month. Nothing especially new transpired in the men's wear end of this trade, and formal openings of Spring lines of corporation dress goods have still to be made. Because of the staple all-year character of this merchandise, however, it would not surprise many buyers if formal openings for the coming season were abandoned. This has been done before, and with a great deal less provocation than at the present time.

Excepting for a growing interest on the part of buyers in printed silks, chiefly for Spring delivery, and in the sheer crepe weaves, the week did not bring much change to the silk trade. Labor troubles in Paterson appear to be on the mend, and a general settlement of the strike there is apparently not far distant. A firmer tone to raw silk was apparent, with Sinsinhu No. 1 quoted at \$7.40 a pound, a rise of 15 cents a pound for the week.

Representatives of Irish linen mills now in this country are apparently not getting what they had hoped for in the way of orders. With the passage of the Tariff bill imminent, despite the setback it received last week, the factor of higher duties to come on linens has naturally lost its force as a selling argument. While a fair amount of business is passing from retailer to jobber, from jobber to importer and from importer to manufacturer, there is a curious apathy visible all along the line. The only apparent explanation is a subnormal consumer demand.

Burlaps were unusually active and strong during the first half of the week, speculative buying of both spot and afloat goods being very apparent. There was no question about the bearing the passage of the Tariff bill had on this trade, for when the bill was sent back to the conferees for revision buying fell off abruptly. The advances in prices, however, were largely, if not entirely, sustained. Cables from Calcutta set August shipments of burlaps to North American ports at about \$6,000,000 yards, most of which came to the Eastern ports.

## Shipping

AGGRESSIVE steps are to be taken immediately by the Shipping Board to regain possession of ships purchased by so-called pioneer purchaser steamship lines, which acquired vessels from the Government on the deferred purchase plans. While the details of the seizure program remain to be made known, it is understood that the majority of the nine pioneers, having twenty-eight ships in their possession, failed to come up to the terms laid down by the Shipping Board. Possessory bills are to be filed by the board, Chairman Lasker has announced. The companies were given up until Sept. 15 to pay in cash an amount fixed by the Shipping Board as representing the market value of the tonnage.

## Coal Mining Stocks for Investment

Continued from Page 272

benefit would be immense. Coal, in that contingency, would always be fair priced. But no one seriously believes that strikes, or the threat of strikes, can be prevented, and therefore industrial peace, in coal, is not probable. Such peace would be, however, a deathknell to undue coal profits. This possibility, like that of finding a cure-all for over-production, is an "if" writ in letters large. Possible? Yes. Probable? No.

Applying, now, these principles to the situation in early September, 1922, for the benefit of the prospective investor in coal-mining securities, we find that mining profits this year will be good, ample for all reserves and promising for good distributions. This will be the rule throughout the industry. During the strike the non-unionized mines of the South have attained unprecedented production, at good prices. In the unionized fields the losses of the long idleness will quickly be wiped off the ledgers by the profits of the next few months. Thanks to the concurrent railroad strikes of July and August, a situation of acute demand has developed, with unexpectedly high prices.

Although these prices will tumble quickly, in fact have already done so, yet good prices will hold long enough to net the mines generous earnings for the year. The 1922 showing, therefore, will be good.

In all probability it will be the best year ever known, surpassing 1920's high mark. It is equally safe to predict that, by the end of the year, earnings will begin to drop and the long swing of

The result of this action will be to eliminate several of the present American steamship companies, but it will mark a new period in American shipping. Ever since the present board has been in power these pioneers have been permitted to operate the vessels without paying either interest or principal. Naturally, the private shipowners have protested against the continuance of such a system on the ground that they are placed at a disadvantage by virtue of having to pay higher capital charges. The present policy of the Shipping Board is to sell vessels only for cash.

Another consolidation of general cargo services operated by Government account has been determined upon. The ships allocated to the Susquehanna Steamship Company of New York are to be withdrawn, leaving Moore & McCormack of New York as the sole Shipping Board operator to ports in Scandinavia. It is generally reported that there is to be another elimination on the French Atlantic-Antwerp-Rotterdam berth. The Government has two operators to these ports now. As the allocated vessels are withdrawn, private American lines doubtless will succeed them. It is currently reported that the Barber Steamship Line of New York will re-enter the German trade, and will resume general cargo sailings to River Plate ports. The Luckenbach Line is expected to start up its Rotterdam service within a few months.

The shipping outlook is better. The tendency of the shipping companies to enter into conferences is helpful, in that it makes the maintenance of stable rates, which are generally higher. The passage of the permanent tariff act by Congress is expected to reduce the volume of cargoes offering for transportation to American ports.

The provision in the Tariff bill to create free port zones, inserted by the Senate after being sponsored by Senator Jones of Washington, was knocked out of the bill by the conferees. It was loosely worded and thrown together in haste. This, and the fact that the arch protectionists felt that the free ports would break down the protectionist policy, accounted for its demise. It was strongly supported by the shipping interests, as it was believed this would result in more freight being brought into American ports, especially as raw commodities would be discharged for conversion into manufactured articles to be subsequently shipped to other countries.

The Shipping Board has finally disposed of the great bulk of its wooden fleet. A total of 226 wooden and composite steamers was sold for \$750,000 to Pacific Coast interests, represented at the auction sale in Washington by George D. Perry of San Francisco. It is understood that the ships are to be filled with lumber and taken to China. While one of the conditions in the sale of the vessels was that their engines and machinery were to be dismantled, it appears that the purchasers will get around this. Prior to the recent sale, the same interests bought a fleet of 75 wooden hulls into which no engineers or machinery had been installed. The condition of the hulls is said to be excellent, because they were anchored in fresh water. The Pacific Coast group proposes to take the engines out of the ships just acquired and install them in the hulls.

Announcement has been made of the sale of two ships by the Emergency Fleet Corporation. The Alaska Steamship Company has purchased the 5,000 deadweight ton freighter Medon, while another laker has been sold for the purpose of conversion into a Diesel-driven freighter to the West Lum-

ber Company of San Francisco. The United States Steel Products Company has acquired the former Green Star freighter Lancaster for \$250,000. The ship was bought at a Marshal sale by Thomas J. Burton and later sold to the United States Steel Corporation's subsidiary.

Homer L. Ferguson, President of the Newport News Dry Dock and Shipbuilding Company, who was reported as the moving spirit in the formation of the \$30,000,000 new American steamship line, has stated that his sole interest is in the construction of new ships. Plans have been prepared for two 1,000-foot liners, which are to have a beam of 107 feet. It is reported that the Huntington capital is behind the new venture, because it is recognized that the great Newport News shipbuilding plant will not have battleships to build in the future on account of the disarmament agreement and therefore must have some other phase of activity. A development in this projected company is expected within two weeks by the Shipping Board.

While the indications are that the country will face a shortage of common labor within a few weeks, with the quickening of the industrial activities, it is believed that the steamship lines will reach an agreement with the longshoremen at New York for the continuance of the present scale for the period following Oct. 1. The dock workers have asked for a rise while the shipping companies have proposed a reduction. It is now indicated that a compromise upon the continuance of the present scale will be reached. The officers and crews of the ships agreed to such a plan, when their agreement expired in the Spring.

Even the sponsors of the Ship Subsidy bill now admit that they are apprehensive over the passage of the measure. A movement is on foot to change the name of the Subsidy bill to the Merchant Marine Retaining Fund and to make the basis of the subsidy payments the granting of a retainer for naval auxiliaries.

The outlook for higher freight rates on the Continental services is good, as it is reported the steamship lines will discontinue open rates after Jan. 1.

## Stocks—Transactions—Bonds

### STOCKS, SHARES

	Week Ended Sept. 16, 1922	1921	1920
Monday	1,003,320	731,270	346,602
Tuesday	974,375	646,500	466,940
Wednesday	1,171,447	861,998	558,381
Thursday	1,124,336	598,315	397,391
Friday	1,043,638	519,223	370,434
Saturday	464,168	230,691	420,672
Total, week	3,783,484	3,558,002	3,131,022
Year to date	182,251,730	120,333,015 156,390,941	

### BONDS (PAR VALUE)

Monday	\$10,954,500	\$11,046,750	\$8,122,000
Tuesday	10,035,150	14,934,550	12,213,750
Wednesday	14,259,500	16,507,450	13,228,000
Thursday	15,407,600	15,333,500	8,714,700
Friday	13,636,300	17,116,000	15,040,300
Saturday	5,873,000	7,773,700	6,258,300
Total, week	\$76,166,050	\$82,771,950	\$61,587,500
Year to date	3,091,780,752	2,148,322,596	

In detail the bond dealings compare as follows with the corresponding week last year:

Sept. 16, '22	Sept. 17, '21	Chances
Corporations... \$44,618,500	\$21,990,500	+ \$22,626,000
Liberty..... 20,846,030	52,117,950	- 31,271,900
Foreign..... 10,616,500	8,655,500	+ 961,000
City..... 85,000	28,000	+ 57,000
Total, all... \$76,166,050	\$82,771,950	- \$6,605,000

## Stocks—Averages—Bonds

### TWENTY-FIVE RAILROADS

	High	Low	Last	Chg. from Last	Chg. from Yr. Ago
Sept. 11	70.53	69.89	70.17	+ .11	.54 15
Sept. 12	70.19	69.50	69.78	-.39	.55 01
Sept. 13	69.94	68.94	69.14	-.64	.54 57
Sept. 14	70.51	68.99	69.90	+.86	.54 11
Sept. 15	70.46	69.57	69.85	-.14	.54 19
Sept. 16	70.05	69.51	69.06	-.19	.54 14

### TWENTY-FIVE INDUSTRIALS

Sept. 11	109.94	108.59	109.27	+.38	75.72
Sept. 12	110.10	108.60	109.53	+.26	77.11
Sept. 13	110.00	108.29	108.57	-.36	77.30
Sept. 14	108.95	107.35	108.25	-.32	76.18
Sept. 15	109.20	107.89	108.46	+.21	76.25
Sept. 16	108.44	107.42	107.80	-.06	76.51

### COMBINED AVERAGE—50 STOCKS

Sept. 11	100.23	89.19	89.72	+.25	64.93
Sept. 12	100.10	88.08	89.65	-.07	66.06
Sept. 13	89.97	88.01	88.65	-.80	66.08
Sept. 14	89.73	88.17	89.12	+.27	65.14
Sept. 15	89.83	88.71	89.15	+.01	65.22
Sept. 16	89.24	88.46	89.71	-.42	65.31

### BONDS—FORTY ISSUES

	Net	Change	1921



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42 BROADWAY, — NEW YORK****New England Securities  
Bought—Sold—Quoted  
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Northern Indiana Gas & Elect. 6's, 1952  
General Gas & Elect. 5's, 1932**McCown & Co.**  
Land Title Bldg., Philadelphia, Pa.  
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Lake Shore & Mich. So. 4s, 1931**VILAS & HICKEY**Members of New York Stock Exchange  
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## ADVERTISEMENTS.

## ADVERTISEMENTS.

**Open Security Market—Bonds**

## UNITED STATES AND TERRITORIES

Bid Offered

Consol. 2s, April, 1930.....	103	103%	C. F. Childs & Co., 120 Broadway, N.Y.C....Rector 6731
Conversion 3s, 30 days from date of issue.....	92 1/2	94%	C. F. Childs & Co., 120 Broadway, N.Y.C....Rector 6731
Old 4s, 1925.....	104	104%	C. F. Childs & Co., 120 Broadway, N.Y.C....Rector 6731
Liberty 2d 4 1/2s, 1927-42.....	100,20	100,24	C. F. Childs & Co., 120 Broadway, N.Y.C....Rector 6731
Liberty 1st 3 1/2s, 1932-47.....	101,14	101,20	C. F. Childs & Co., 120 Broadway, N.Y.C....Rector 6731
Liberty 1st 3 1/2s, 1932-47.....	100,60	100,76	C. F. Childs & Co., 120 Broadway, N.Y.C....Rector 6731
Liberty 1st-2d 4 1/2s, 1932-47.....	100	100,70	C. F. Childs & Co., 120 Broadway, N.Y.C....Rector 6731
Liberty 2d 4 1/2s, 1921-42.....	100,20	100,24	C. F. Childs & Co., 120 Broadway, N.Y.C....Rector 6731
Liberty 3d 4 1/2s, 1928.....	100,34	100,46	C. F. Childs & Co., 120 Broadway, N.Y.C....Rector 6731
Liberty 4th 4 1/2s, 1933-38.....	100,60	100,66	C. F. Childs & Co., 120 Broadway, N.Y.C....Rector 6731
Victory 4 1/2s, 1922.....	100,30	100,34	C. F. Childs & Co., 120 Broadway, N.Y.C....Rector 6731
Panama 3s, 1961.....	103	103%	C. F. Childs & Co., 120 Broadway, N.Y.C....Rector 6731
Hawaiian 5 1/2s.....	92	95	C. F. Childs & Co., 120 Broadway, N.Y.C....Rector 6731
Philippine 5 1/2s, 1941.....	107	108%	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C....Rector 813
Puerto Rico 5 1/2s.....	Quoted on rq.	Quoted on rq.	C. F. Childs & Co., 120 Broadway, N.Y.C....Rector 6731

## FOREIGN SECURITIES, INCLUDING NOTES

## GOVERNMENT ISSUES

## AUSTRIA:

Austrian 6s, Treasury..... 2 3% C. B. Richard &amp; Co., 29 B'way, N.Y.C....Whitehall 500

## ARGENTINA:

Argentine Recession 4s.....	63	63%	Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Pl., N.Y.C....Hanover 8300
Argentine 4s, 1895-1900.....	61 1/2	62%	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C....Rector 6330
Argentine 4s, 1896-1900.....	61 1/2	62%	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C....Rector 813
Argentine 4s, 1897.....	63	64	Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Pl., N.Y.C....Hanover 8300
Argentine 4s, 1897.....	61	62	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C....Rector 6330
Argentine 4s, 1897.....	60	60	Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Pl., N.Y.C....Hanover 8300
Argentine 5s, 1895 (large).....	70	70	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C....Rector 6330
Argentine 5s, 1895 (120 pieces).....	70	70	Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Pl., N.Y.C....Hanover 8300
Argentine 5s, 1945 (large).....	80	81	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C....Rector 813
Argentine 5s, 1909 (small).....	78 1/2	79 1/2	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C....Rector 6330
Argentine 5s, 1909 (small).....	78 1/2	79 1/2	Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Pl., N.Y.C....Hanover 8300
Argentine 5s, 1945 (listed).....	83	85	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C....Rector 813
Argentine 5s, 1945 (listed).....	83	85	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C....Rector 6330

## BELGIUM:

Belgian Restoration 5s, 1919.....	64	65%	Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Pl., N.Y.C....Hanover 8300
Belgian Restoration 5s, 1919.....	65	67	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C....Rector 6330
Belgian Restoration 5s, 1919.....	63 1/2	64%	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C....Rector 813
Belgian Restoration 5s, 1919.....	65	67	Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Pl., N.Y.C....Hanover 8300
Belgian Premium 5s, 1920.....	70	71 1/2	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C....Rector 6330
Belgian Premium 5s, 1920.....	70	73	Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Pl., N.Y.C....Hanover 8300
Belgian Premium 5s, 1920.....	70	73	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C....Rector 6330
Belgian Premium 5s, 1920.....	70	73	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C....Rector 813
Belgian Premium 5s, 1920.....	70	73	Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Pl., N.Y.C....Hanover 8300
Belgian Premium 5s, 1920.....	70	73	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C....Rector 6330
Belgian External 6s, 1925.....	99	100	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C....Rector 813
Belgian 7 1/2s, 1945.....	100	106 1/2	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C....Rector 6330
Belgian 8s, 1941.....	104	104%	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C....Rector 813
Belgian 8s, 1941.....	104	103 1/2	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C....Rector 6330

## BOLIVIA:

Bolivian 6s, 1920.....	84 1/2	85	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C....Rector 6330
Bolivian 6s, 1940.....	76	80	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C....Rector 6330

## BRAZIL:

Brazil 4s, 1889.....	43%	44%	Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Pl., N.Y.C....Hanover 8300
Brazil 4s, 1889.....	43%	44%	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C....Rector 6330
Brazil 4s, 1889.....	43%	44%	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C....Rector 813
Brazil 4s, 1890.....	43%	44%	Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Pl., N.Y.C....Hanover 8300
Brazil 4s, 1890.....	42	43	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C....Rector 6330
Brazil 4s, 1910.....	42	43	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C....Rector 813
Brazil 4s, 1911.....	20	25	Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Pl., N.Y.C....Hanover 8300
Brazil 4s, 1911.....	21	25	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C....Rector 813
Brazil Recession 4s.....	42%	43%	Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Pl., N.Y.C....Hanover 8300
Brazil Recession 4s.....	43	43	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C....Rector 813
Brazil Recession 4s.....	42%	43%	Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Pl., N.Y.C....Hanover 8300
Brazil 4 1/2s, 1883.....	47 1/2	47 1/2	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C....Rector 6330
Brazil 4 1/2s, 1883.....	47 1/2	48	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C....Rector 813
Brazil 4 1/2s, 1888.....	47 1/2	48	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C....Rector 6330
Brazil 4 1/2s, 1888.....	47 1/2	48	Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Pl., N.Y.C....Hanover 8300
Brazil 4 1/2s, 1888.....	47 1/2	48	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C....Rector 6330
Brazil 4 1/2s, 1888.....	47 1/2	48	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C....Rector 813
Brazil 4 1/2s, 1895.....	53	53	Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Pl., N.Y.C....Hanover 8300
Brazil 4 1/2s, 1895.....	52 1/2	53	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C....Rector 6330
Brazil 4 1/2s, 1895.....	52 1/2	53	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C....Rector 813
Brazil 4 1/2s, 1903.....	60	62	Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Pl., N.Y.C....Hanover 8300
Brazil 4 1/2s, 1903.....	61	63	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C....Rector 6330
Brazil 4 1/2s, 1908.....	60	65	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C....Rector 813
Brazil 4 1/2s, 1908.....	60	65	Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Pl., N.Y.C....Hanover 8300
Brazil 4 1/2s, 1913.....	24	28	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C....Rector 6330
Brazil 4 1/2s, 1913.....	53	53	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C....Rector 813
Brazil 4 1/2s, 1913.....	52%	53%	Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Pl., N.Y.C....Hanover 8300
Brazil 4 1/2s, 1913.....	53	54	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C....Rector 6330
Brazil 4 1/2s, 1914.....	60	64	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C....Rector 813
Brazil 4 1/2s, 1941.....	103 1/2	103 1/2	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C....Rector 813

## CANADA:

Canada 5s, 1925.....	97 1/2	98 1/2	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C....Rector 813
Canada 5s, 1926.....	100	100%	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C....Rector 813
Canada 5s, 1931 (external).....	100	100%	Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Pl., N.Y.C....Hanover 8

## ADVERTISEMENTS.

## ADVERTISEMENTS.

**Open Security Market—Bonds**

## FOREIGN SECURITIES, INCLUDING NOTES—Continued

## GOVERNMENT ISSUES—Continued

FINLAND:	Bid	Offered	
Finland 5½%	17	20	C. B. Richard & Co., 29 B'way, N.Y.C....Whitehall 500
FRANCE:			
French 4s, 1917.....	48	48%	Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Pl., N.Y.C....Hanover 8300
French 4s, 1917.....	47½	48%	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C....Rector 813
French 4s, 1917.....	48½	49%	Jerome B. Sullivan & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C....Broad 7130
French 4s, 1917.....	48	49%	Dunham & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C....Whitehall 500
French 4s, 1918.....	47½	50%	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C....Rector 6330
French 4s, 1918.....	47½	48%	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C....Rector 813
French Victory 5s, 1931.....	59	60	C. B. Richard & Co., 29 B'way, N.Y.C....Whitehall 500
French Victory 5s.....	59	59½	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C....Rector 6330
French Victory 5s.....	59½	59%	Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Pl., N.Y.C....Hanover 8300
French Victory 5s.....	59½	59%	Jerome B. Sullivan & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C....Broad 7130
French Victory 5s.....	58½	59%	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C....Rector 813
French Premium 5s.....	67½	69%	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C....Rector 6330
French Premium 5s, 1920.....	67	69	Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Pl., N.Y.C....Hanover 8300
French Premium 5s, 1920.....	68	69	C. B. Richard & Co., 29 B'way, N.Y.C....Whitehall 500
French Premium 5s, 1920.....	68	71	Jerome B. Sullivan & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C....Rector 6330
French Premium 5s, 1920.....	79	81	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C....Rector 813
French 6s, 1921.....	69	71	C. B. Richard & Co., 29 B'way, N.Y.C....Whitehall 500
French 6s, 1920.....	70	71	Jerome B. Sullivan & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C....Broad 7130
French 6s, 1920.....	70½	71%	Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Pl., N.Y.C....Hanover 8300
French 6s, 1920.....	68	71	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C....Rector 813
French 6s, 1920.....	69½	71%	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C....Rector 6330
French 7½s, 1941.....	97½	97%	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C....Rector 813
French 8s, 1945.....	101½	101%	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C....Rector 6330
French 8s, 1945.....	100½	101%	C. B. Richard & Co., 29 B'way, N.Y.C....Whitehall 500
GERMANY:			
German Govt. 5s.....	.52	.62	Jerome B. Sullivan & Co., 42 B'way, N.Y.C....Broad 7130
German Govt. 5s.....	%	%	C. B. Richard & Co., 29 B'way, N.Y.C....Whitehall 500
German Govt. 5s.....	%	%	Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Pl., N.Y.C....Hanover 8300
GREECE:			
Greek 5s, 1914.....	73	78	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C....Rector 6330
Greek 5s, 1914.....	58	65	Jerome B. Sullivan & Co., 42 B'way, N.Y.C....Broad 7130
GREAT BRITAIN:			
British Consol. 2½s.....	247	257	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C....Rector 6330
British Funding 4s.....	375	385	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C....Rector 6330
British Funding 4s.....	75%	77%	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C....Rector 813
British Funding 4s.....	75%	77%	Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Pl., N.Y.C....Hanover 8300
British Victory 4s.....	72	79	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C....Rector 813
British Victory 4s.....	77	79	Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Pl., N.Y.C....Hanover 8300
British Victory 4s.....	382	393	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C....Rector 6330
British 5s, 1922.....	340	350	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C....Rector 6330
British 5s, 1922.....	89	91	Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Pl., N.Y.C....Hanover 8300
British 5s, 1922.....	88%	90%	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C....Rector 813
British 5s, 1922.....	88%	90%	Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Pl., N.Y.C....Hanover 8300
British 5s, 1922.....	91%	93%	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C....Rector 813
British 5s, 1927.....	455	465	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C....Rector 6330
British 5s, 1929.....	453	463	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C....Rector 6330
British 5s, 1929.....	91%	93%	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C....Rector 813
British 5s, 1929.....	91%	93%	Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Pl., N.Y.C....Hanover 8300
British 5s, 1929-47.....	87	89	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C....Rector 813
British 5s, 1929-47.....	435	445	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C....Rector 6330
British 5s, 1929-47.....	87½	89%	Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Pl., N.Y.C....Hanover 8300
British Govt. Exchequer 5½s.....	91%	93%	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C....Rector 813
British Govt. Exchequer 5½s.....	455	465	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C....Rector 6330
Great Britain & Ireland 5½s.....	104%	105%	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C....Rector 6330
ITALY:			
Italy 5s, 1920.....	34½	35	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C....Rector 813
Italy 5s, 1920.....	34½	34½	Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Pl., N.Y.C....Hanover 8300
Italy 5s, 1920.....	34½	35	C. B. Richard & Co., 29 B'way, N.Y.C....Whitehall 500
Italy 5s, 1920.....	24½	35	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C....Rector 6330
Italy 5s, 1920.....	34½	34½	Jerome B. Sullivan & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C....Broad 7130
Italy 5s, 1925.....	42½	43%	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C....Rector 6330
Italy 5s, 1925.....	42½	43%	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C....Rector 813
Italy 5s, 1925-26.....	42½	43%	Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Pl., N.Y.C....Hanover 8300
Italy Treasury 5s, 1925.....	42½	43%	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C....Rector 6330
Italy 5s, 1925-26.....	42½	43%	C. B. Richard & Co., 29 B'way, N.Y.C....Whitehall 500
Italy 5s, 1925-26.....	42½	43%	Jerome B. Sullivan & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C....Broad 7130
Italy 5s, 1925-26.....	42½	43%	Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Pl., N.Y.C....Hanover 8300
Italy 5s, 1925-26.....	42½	43%	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C....Rector 813
Japan:			
Japan 4s, 1910 (sterling).....	59	64	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C....Rector 6330
Japan 4s, 1910.....	62	64	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C....Rector 6330
Japan 4s, 1931.....	82½	82%	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C....Rector 6330
Japan 4s, 1931 (small).....	79	79½	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C....Rector 813
Japan 4s, 1931 (small).....	78½	79½	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C....Rector 6330
Japan 1st series 4½s, 1925.....	94½	94%	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C....Rector 813
Japan 1st series 4½s, 1925.....	94½	94%	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C....Rector 6330
Japan 2d series 4½s, 1925.....	94½	94%	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C....Rector 813
Japan 2d series 4½s, 1925.....	94	94%	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C....Rector 6330
Japan 2d series 4½s, 1925 (small).....	92½	93½	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C....Rector 813
Japan 2d series 4½s, 1925 (small).....	92½	93½	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C....Rector 6330
Japan 5s, 1907.....	75	76	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C....Rector 6330
MEXICO:			
Mexican 3s.....	10%	11½	Jerome B. Sullivan & Co., 42 B'way, N.Y.C....Broad 7130
Mexican 3s.....	10%	11½	Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Pl., N.Y.C....Hanover 8300
Mexican 3s.....	10%	11½	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C....Rector 813
Mexican 4s, 1945.....	3½	4½	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C....Rector 6330
Mexican 5s (silver).....	16%	17%	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C....Rector 813
Mexican 5s (silver).....	16%	17%	Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Pl., N.Y.C....Hanover 8300
Mexican 5s, 1945.....	52½	54	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C....Rector 6330
Mexican 5s (silver).....	52½	54	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C....Rector 813
Mexican 5s, 1945.....	51½	53½	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C....Rector 6330
Mexican 5s, 1945.....	51½	53½	C. B. Richard & Co., 29 B'way, N.Y.C....Whitehall 500
Mexican 5s, 1945.....	54½	55½	Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Pl., N.Y.C....Hanover 8300
Mexican 5s, 1945.....	54½	55½	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C....Rector 813
Mexican 5s, 1945.....	54½	55½	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C....Rector 6330
Mexican 5s, 1945.....	54½	55½	Jerome B. Sullivan & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C....Broad 7130
Mexican 5s, 1945.....	54½	55½	Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Pl., N.Y.C....Hanover 8300
Mexican 5s, 1945.....	54½	55½	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C....Rector 813
Mexican 5s, 1945.....	53½	55	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C....Rector 6330
Mexican 5s, 1945.....	53½	55	Jerome B. Sullivan & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C....Broad 7130
Mexican 5s, 1945.....	53½	55	Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Pl., N.Y.C....Hanover 8300
Mexican 5s, 1945.....	53½	55	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C....Rector 813
NORWAY:			
Norway 3½s, 1894.....	57	60	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C....Rector 6330
Norway 3½s, 1894.....	54½	56½	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C....Rector 813
Norway 3½s, 1894.....	54½	56½	Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Pl., N.Y.C....Hanover 8300
Norway 3½s, 1894.....	54½	56½	C. B. Richard & Co., 29 B'way, N.Y.C....Whitehall 500
Norway 3½s, 1894.....	57	60	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C....Rector 6330
Norway 3½s, 1894.....	170	180	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C....Rector 813
Norway 3½s, 1894.....	170	180	C. B. Richard & Co., 29 B'way, N.Y.C....Whitehall 500
*Norway 5s, 1921.....	17½	18½	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C....Rector 6330
*Norway 5s, 1921.....	17½	18½	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C....Rector 813
Norway 5s, 1920.....	17½	18½	Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Pl., N.Y.C....Hanover 8300
Norway 5s, 1920.....	17½	18½	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C....Rector 6330
Norway 5s, 1920.....	17½	18½	C. B. Richard & Co., 29 B'way, N.Y.C....Whitehall 500
Norway 5s, 1920.....	17½	18½	Jerome B. Sullivan & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C....Broad 7130
Norway 5s, 1920-1970.....	17½	18½	Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Pl., N.Y.C....Hanover 8300
Norway 5s, 1920-1970.....	17½	18½	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C....Rector 813
Norway, King. of, 8s, skg., '40.....	100½	101	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C....Rector 6330
Norway, King. of, 8s, skg., '40.....	111½	112½	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C....Rector 813
Norway 8s, 1920.....	112	113	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C....Rector 6330
POLAND:			
Polish Govt. 5s.....	15	20	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C....Rector 813
Polish Govt. 5s.....	15	20	C. B. Richard & Co., 29 B'way, N.Y.C....Whitehall 500
Polish external 6s.....	44	49	P. B. Richard & Co., 29 B'way, N.Y.C....Whitehall 500
Polish Govt. Internat. 5s.....	15	23	Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Pl., N.Y.C....Hanover 8300
Polish Govt. external 6s, 1940.....	45	48	Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Pl., N.Y.C....Hanover 8300
RUSSIA:			
Russian bonds 5½s, 1921.....	13	16	Jerome B. Sullivan & Co., 42 B'way, N.Y.C....Broad 7130
Russian 5½s, 1921.....	13	16	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C....Rector 813
Russian 4% rentes, 1894.....	4	4½	Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Pl., N.Y.C....Hanover 8300
Russian 5½s, 1921.....	1	3	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C....Rector 813
Russian 5½s, 1921 (cert.).....	12	15	Jerome B. Sullivan & Co., 42 B'way, N.Y.C....Broad 7130
Russian 5½s, 1921 (cert.).....	13	16	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C....Rector 6330
Russian 5½s, 1926.....	14	2½	Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Pl., N.Y.C....Hanover 8300

**Open Security Market—Bonds**

## FOREIGN SECURITIES, INCLUDING NOTES—Continued

## MUNICIPAL ISSUES—Continued

GERMANY:	Bid	Offered	
Bremen 4s	1%	Jerome B. Sullivan & Co., 42 B'way, N.Y.C., Broad 7130	
Bremen 4s	1%	Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Pl., N.Y.C., Hanover 8300	
Bremen 4s	1%	Jerome B. Sullivan & Co., 42 B'way, N.Y.C., Broad 7130	
Bremen 4s	1%	Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Pl., N.Y.C., Hanover 8300	
Frankfort 4s	1%	Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Pl., N.Y.C., Hanover 8300	
Frankfort 4s	1%	C. B. Richard & Co., 29 B'way, N.Y.C., Whitehall 500	
Frankfort 4s	1%	Jerome B. Sullivan & Co., 42 B'way, N.Y.C., Broad 7130	
Frankfort 4s	1%	C. B. Richard & Co., 29 B'way, N.Y.C., Whitehall 500	
Frankfort 4s	1%	Jerome B. Sullivan & Co., 42 B'way, N.Y.C., Broad 7130	
Frankfort 4s	1%	Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Pl., N.Y.C., Hanover 8300	
Greater Berlin 4s	1%	Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Pl., N.Y.C., Hanover 8300	
Greater Berlin 4s	1%	Jerome B. Sullivan & Co., 42 B'way, N.Y.C., Broad 7130	
Greater Berlin 4s	1%	Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Pl., N.Y.C., Hanover 8300	
Hamburg 4s	1%	C. B. Richard & Co., 29 B'way, N.Y.C., Whitehall 500	
Hamburg 4s	1%	Jerome B. Sullivan & Co., 42 B'way, N.Y.C., Broad 7130	
Hamburg 4s	1%	Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Pl., N.Y.C., Hanover 8300	
Hamburg 4s	1%	Jerome B. Sullivan & Co., 42 B'way, N.Y.C., Broad 7130	
Hamburg 4s	1%	C. B. Richard & Co., 29 B'way, N.Y.C., Whitehall 500	
Hamburg 4s	1%	Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Pl., N.Y.C., Hanover 8300	
Hamburg 4s	1%	Jerome B. Sullivan & Co., 42 B'way, N.Y.C., Broad 7130	
Hamburg 4s	1%	Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Pl., N.Y.C., Hanover 8300	
Leipzig 4s	1%	Jerome B. Sullivan & Co., 42 B'way, N.Y.C., Broad 7130	
Leipzig 4s	1%	Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Pl., N.Y.C., Hanover 8300	
Leipzig 4s	1%	Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Pl., N.Y.C., Hanover 8300	
Leipzig 4s	1%	C. B. Richard & Co., 29 B'way, N.Y.C., Whitehall 500	
Leipzig 5s	1%	Jerome B. Sullivan & Co., 42 B'way, N.Y.C., Broad 7130	
Leipzig 5s	1%	Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Pl., N.Y.C., Hanover 8300	
Leipzig 5s	1%	Jerome B. Sullivan & Co., 42 B'way, N.Y.C., Broad 7130	
Mannheim 4s	1%	Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Pl., N.Y.C., Hanover 8300	
Mannheim 4s	1%	Jerome B. Sullivan & Co., 42 B'way, N.Y.C., Broad 7130	
Munich 4s	1%	Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Pl., N.Y.C., Hanover 8300	
Munich 4s	1%	C. B. Richard & Co., 29 B'way, N.Y.C., Whitehall 500	
Munich 4s	1%	Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Pl., N.Y.C., Hanover 8300	
Munich 5s	1%	Jerome B. Sullivan & Co., 42 B'way, N.Y.C., Broad 7130	
Munich 5s	1%	C. B. Richard & Co., 29 B'way, N.Y.C., Whitehall 500	
Munich 5s	1%	Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Pl., N.Y.C., Hanover 8300	
Neckar 5s	1%	C. B. Richard & Co., 29 B'way, N.Y.C., Whitehall 500	
Nuernberg 4s	1%	Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Pl., N.Y.C., Hanover 8300	
Nuernberg 4s	1%	Jerome B. Sullivan & Co., 42 B'way, N.Y.C., Broad 7130	
Nuernberg 4s	1%	C. B. Richard & Co., 29 B'way, N.Y.C., Whitehall 500	
Stuttgart 4s	1%	Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Pl., N.Y.C., Hanover 8300	
Stuttgart 4s	1%	Jerome B. Sullivan & Co., 42 B'way, N.Y.C., Broad 7130	
Stuttgart 4s	1%	Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Pl., N.Y.C., Hanover 8300	
HUNGARY:			
Budapest 4s	1%	C. B. Richard & Co., 29 B'way, N.Y.C., Whitehall 500	
Budapest 6s	1%	C. B. Richard & Co., 29 B'way, N.Y.C., Whitehall 500	
JAPAN:			
Tokio, City of, 5s, 1952	72	73	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
NORWAY:			
Bergen, City of, 8s, 1945	109	110	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
Christiania, City of, 8s, 1945	109	110	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
SANTO DOMINGO REPUBLIC:			
Dominican Republic 5s, 1952	96%	97%	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
SWITZERLAND:			
Herne, City of, 8s, mun. ext., '20-45	113%	115	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
Zurich, City of, 8s, 1945	114%	115	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
CANADA:			
Alberta 4s, 1924	98%	99%	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
Alberta 5s, 1925	98%	99%	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
Alberta 5s, 1926	98%	99%	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
Alberta 5s, 1927	100%	101%	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
Alberta 5s, 1928	100%	101%	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
Alberta 5s, 1929	102	103%	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
Alberta 5s, 1939	103%	104%	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
Alberta 5s, 1947	103%	104%	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
Alberta 5s, 1952	103%	104%	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
Alberta 5s, 1953	101	102	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
Alberta 5s, 1959	102%	103%	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
Alberta 5s, 1960, M. & N.	102%	103%	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
Alberta 6s, 1941	106%	107%	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
British Columbia 4s, 1926	96%	98	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
British Columbia 4s, 1927	96%	98	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
British Columbia 4s, 1928	101%	102%	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
British Columbia 5s, 1939	102	103%	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
British Columbia 5s, 1941	103%	104%	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
Colony of Newfoundland 5s, 1939	100%	101%	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
Colony of Newfoundland 5s, 1940	100%	101%	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
Colony of Newfoundland 6s, 1928	102%	103%	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
Colony of Newfoundland 6s, 1929	106%	107%	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
Manitoba 5s, 1939	102%	103%	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
Manitoba 6s, 1925	101	102	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
Manitoba 6s, 1926	102	103	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
Manitoba 6s, 1927	102	103	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
Manitoba 6s, 1928	102	103	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
Manitoba 6s, 1931, M. & N.	102	103	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
Manitoba 6s, 1946	107%	108%	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
New Brunswick 5s, 1929	100%	102	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
New Brunswick 5s, 1931	101	103	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
Nova Scotia 6s, 1925	101	102	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
Nova Scotia 6s, 1928	102%	103%	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
Nova Scotia 6s, 1930	102%	104	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
Nova Scotia 6s, 1936	103%	106%	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
Ontario 4s, 1926	95%	96%	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
Ontario 5s, 1923	98%	W. O.	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
Ontario 5s, 1932	99%	100	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
Ontario 5s, 1935	100%	W. O.	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
Ontario 5s, 1937	101	104	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
Ontario 6s, 1923	100	W. O.	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
Ontario 6s, 1928	102%	103%	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
Ontario 6s, 1943	107%	108%	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
Quebec 5s, 1928	98%	W. O.	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
Quebec 5s, 1929	98%	W. O.	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
Saskatchewan 4s, 1923	98%	W. O.	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
Saskatchewan 5s, 1925	98%	W. O.	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
Saskatchewan 5s, 1939	97%	W. O.	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
Saskatchewan 5s, 1946	102%	104%	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
Saskatchewan 6s, 1925	100%	102	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
FRANCE:			
Midi Ry. of France 6s, 1960	68	69%	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
Ry. of France 6s, 1960	67%	68%	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
Midi Ry. of France 6s, 1960	68	69	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
Paris-Orl. Ry. of France 6s, '56	68	69	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
Paris-Orl. Ry. of France 6s	67%	68	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
Paris-Orl. Ry. of France 6s	67%	69%	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
GERMANY:			
A. G. 4s	2%	3	C. B. Richard & Co., 29 B'way, N.Y.C., Whitehall 500
A. G. 6s	2%	2%	Jerome B. Sullivan & Co., 42 B'way, N.Y.C., Broad 7130
Badische Anilin & Soda 4s	2%	3	Jerome B. Sullivan & Co., 42 B'way, N.Y.C., Broad 7130
Hamburg-American Line 4s	4%	5	C. B. Richard & Co., 29 B'way, N.Y.C., Whitehall 500
Hamburg-American Line 4s	4%	4	Jerome B. Sullivan & Co., 42 B'way, N.Y.C., Broad 7130
German Gen. Elec. 4s	2%	3	Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Pl., N.Y.C., Hanover 8300
Krupp 4s	1	1%	C. B. Richard & Co., 29 B'way, N.Y.C., Whitehall 500
Krupp 5s	1	1%	Jerome B. Sullivan & Co., 42 B'way, N.Y.C., Broad 7130
Krupp 5s	1%	1%	C. B. Richard & Co., 29 B'way, N.Y.C., Whitehall 500
Krupp 5s	1%	1%	Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Pl., N.Y.C., Hanover 8300
North German Lloyd 4s	3	3%	C. B. Richard & Co., 29 B'way, N.Y.C., Whitehall 500
North German Lloyd 4s	2%	3%	Jerome B. Sullivan & Co., 42 B'way, N.Y.C., Broad 7130
North German Lloyd 4s	3%	3%	Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Pl., N.Y.C., Hanover 8300
Neckar 5s	1	1%	C. B. Richard & Co., 29 B'way, N.Y.C., Whitehall 500
MEXICO:			
Guanausto Reduc. & Mines 6s, '24	30	35	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
Jalisco Gold 6s	28	32	Jerome B. Sullivan & Co., 42 B'way, N.Y.C., Broad 7130
PUBLIC UTILITIES			
Adiron. P. & L. 1st 6s, 1960	101%	102%	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
Adiron. Elec. P. 1st 6s, 1962	95	97	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
Alabama Pow. Co. 1st 6s, 1946	94	96	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
Am. Gas & Elec. Co. 1st 6s	90	101	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
Am. Ry. & Tr. 9s, 1960	107	109	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
Am. Ry. & Tr. 9s, M. & S. 1929	100%	101%	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
Am. Ry. & Tr. stock warrant	70	90	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
Am. Pow. & Lt. serial 6s, 2016	98	99	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
Am. Pow. & Lt. 6s, 1941	107	109	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
Am. Water Wks. & Elec. 5s, '34	86	88	Ottis Billo, 37 Wall St., N.Y.C., Hanover 6297
Appalachian Pow. Co. 1st 5s, '41	91	92%	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
Appalachian Pow. Co. 7s, '36	101	103	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
Ark. Lt. & Pow. Int. 6s	90	95	A. S. H. Jones, 56 Wall St., N.Y.C., Hanover 0006
Ark. Lt. & Pow. Int. 6s	90	93	A. A. Housman & Co., 29 Broad St., N.Y.C., Rector 813
Arkansas Pow. Co. 1st 5s, '33	86	88	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
SEP			

## Branch Banking

Continued from Page 281

ties, increased protection to depositors in a system's larger capital and surplus and in general in better service to the public, through the greater flexibility of a branch-banking system and consequent better utilization of banking resources. It is also expected that smaller communities, especially those near one or more large industries, can be better cared for out of the resources of a large institution than one drawing its funds solely from one place.

Under advantages to the banks themselves and their shareholders may be mentioned greater earning power resulting from economies in operation and in the purchase of supplies, improvement and standardization of accounting and auditing methods, elimination of wastes and duplications, retention of valuable employees and executives through greater opportunities for training, advancement, &c., economy in the utilization of balances at correspondents, more diversifi-

cation and better distribution of risk over a wider area, and the creation of more paper eligible for rediscount. In fact it is urged that a properly run branch banking system would be a miniature Federal Reserve System and, except for the right to issue notes, would function about the same.

In setting up branch banking systems, an attempt is being made in California to introduce into banking certain methods and policies which have had a successful application in other lines of endeavor. While it cannot be said that branch banking, as practiced in California, is necessarily better than the existing system elsewhere or that it is equally adaptable to other sections of the country, it may be predicted that branch banking will stand or fall upon the extent and quality of service it can render to the public and upon determination of the question whether it is equally or more profitable than unit banking.

## ADVERTISEMENTS.

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## Open Security Market—Bonds

## RAILROADS

## Bid Offered

Atlanta & St. Andrew's Bay 1st 6s, 1938.....	65 75	Alfred F. Ingold & Co., 74 B'way, N.Y.C., Bow. Gr. 1454
Atlanta Terminal 6s, 1939.....	103 1/2 W. O.	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
Atlantic Coast Line deb., 1939.....	84	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C., Rector 6330
Augusta Terminal 6s, 1947.....	102 1/2 105	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
Austin & N. W. 1st 5s, 1941.....	90 1/2 W. O.	Ishuchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
B. & O., P., L.E. & W.Va. 1st 4s, 41	84 1/2 85 1/2	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
Buffalo & S. W. 6s, 1928.....	100 102	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C., Rector 6330
Bennington & Rutland 4 1/2s, 27.....	75 W. O.	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
B. & O., P., L.E. & C.R. 4s, 1959.....	72 73	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
Burlington Stock 1st 4s, 1963.....	70 1/2 77 1/2	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
Burlington, C. R. 1st 5s, 1934.....	70 1/2 100	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
Butte, Anaconda & Pacific 5s, 44.....	94 1/2 98	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
Can. Atlantic 4s, 1955.....	72 1/2 73 1/2	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
Can. Northern Ry. 4s, 1930.....	89 1/2 90 1/2	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
Can. Northern Ry. 5 1/2s, 1924.....	100 1/2 101	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
Can. Northwestern 4 1/2s, 1943.....	88 89 1/2	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
Carolina Central 1st 4s, 1949.....	70 1/2 73	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C., Rector 6330
Cent. Argentine 6s, 1927.....	94 1/2 95 1/2	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
Cent. of Ga., Chat. Div. 4s, 51.....	81	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C., Rector 6330
Cent. Ark. & E. 1st 5s, J. & J., 40.....	81 1/2	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
C. P. & E. 1st 5s, M. & S., 46.....	70 1/2 71	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
C. O. N. North Ry. 5s, A. & O., 45.....	70 1/2 71	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
Central Pacific 1946.....	70 1/2 71	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
Cent. Vermont Ry. ref. 4s, 30.....	89 91	Dunham & Co., 42 Exchange Pl., N.Y.C., Hanover 8300
Central Pacific 4s.....	50 1/2 70 1/2	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C., Rector 6330
Chattanooga Sta. 4s, J. & J., 57.....	81 1/2 83 1/2	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
Chi. & Erie 1st 5s, M. & N., 62.....	98 1/2 100 1/2	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
Chi., Ind. L. ref. 4s, 1947.....	82 1/2 85	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
Chi. Ind. & L. gen. 5s, M.E.N., 68.....	85 W. O.	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
C., M. & St. P. Europe'n 4s, J. & D., 23.....	63 1/2 69 1/2	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
Chi. M. & Puget Sd. 4s, 49.....	74 75	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
C. T. H. & S. E. Inc. 6s, Dec., '66.....	71 73	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C., Rector 6330
C. T. H. & S. E. Inc. 5s, '66.....	71 73	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
Chi., M. & St. P. gen. 4 1/2s, 89.....	88 1/2 90	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
Choctaw-Memphis 5s, J. & J., 49.....	97 W. O.	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
Clin. Leb. & T. 1st 4s, 60 & N., 42.....	86 88	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
Clin. San Fran. 1st 5s, 1924.....	98 101	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C., Rector 6330
Cleveland & Mahon 1st 5s, J. & J., 38.....	96 W. O.	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
C. G. C. & St. L., Springfield 4s, 40.....	82 90	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
C. G. C. & St. L., Cairo 4s, J. & J., 1939.....	87 90	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
C. G. C. & St. L., Clin. Wab. & Mich. 4s, J. & J., 91.....	82 84	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
Cleve. Term. & Val. 4s, M. & N., 95.....	83 85	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
Cleve. Term. & Val. 1st 4s, 95.....	83 1/2 85	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
Col. & St. Louis 1st 4s, 1942.....	70 1/2 W. O.	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
Col. & Hock. Val. 4s, A. & O., 48.....	85 W. O.	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
Col. & Toledo 4s, F. & A., 55.....	85 W. O.	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
Delaware River, R. R. & Bridge 1st 4s, F. & A., 54.....	89 W. O.	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
Det., T. & Ironton 1st 5s.....	80 95	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
Detroit & Mackinac 1st 4s, '95.....	74 77	A. S. H. Jones, 56 Wall St., N.Y.C., Hanover 0900
Detroit & Mackinac 1st 4s, '95.....	70 73	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C., Rector 6330
Dul. S. S. & A. 5s, J. & J., 37.....	81 1/2 83 1/2	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
Dul. Win. & Pac. 4s, 1939.....	72 73	Alfred F. Ingold & Co., 74 B'way, N.Y.C., Bow. Gr. 1454
Edmonton, D. & B. C. (std. Alberta) 1st 4 1/2s, A. & O., 44.....	87 89	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
Erie & Jersey 1st 6s.....	95 96	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
Fla. Cent. & Penin. con. 5s, '43.....	91 93	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
Fla. Cent. & Penin. 5s, 1930.....	93 1/2	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
Gal. Harris & San An. 1st 5s.....	99 1/2 100 1/2	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
Gal. Hou. H. 1st 5s, A. & O., 33.....	89 1/2 91	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
Georgia & Ala. con. 5s, 1945.....	70 72	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
Georgia & Ala. Term. 5s, 1948.....	88 91	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C., Rector 6330
G. H. R. A. Banking deb. 4s, 47.....	92 1/2 93 1/2	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
Grand Rapids & Int. 1st 4 1/2s, 41.....	77 80	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C., Rector 6330
Grand Rapids & Int. 4s, A. & O., 36.....	86 88	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
G. R. & I. 2d 4s, 36.....	63 1/2 64	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
Grand Trunk Pacific 3s, 1962.....	81 1/2 84 1/2	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
Grand Trunk Pac. 4s, '39 (Alberta).....	63 1/2 64 1/2	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
Grand Trunk Pac. 3s, 1962.....	81 1/2 84 1/2	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
Grand Trunk Pac. 4s, all issues.....	71 1/2 72 1/2	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
Grand Trunk Pac. Mtn. & Prair. Div. 4s, 1955.....	81 1/2 82 1/2	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
G. T. Pac. (Alberta) 4s, 42.....	80 81	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
G. T. Pac. (std. Dom. of Can.) 4s, 1962.....	80 81	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
G. T. Pac. (std. Dom. of Can.) 3s, 1962.....	63 1/2 64 1/2	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
G. T. Pac. Prair. Sec. 4s, '55, A. & O.....	71 1/2 72 1/2	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
G. T. Pac. L. Sup. 4s, A. & O. 40.....	72 1/2 73 1/2	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
Grand Trunk Western 4s, 1900.....	78 79	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
Grand Trunk Western 4s, 50 (2).....	84 1/2 85 1/2	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
Guil. & Shil. 1st 5s, 1952.....	79 81	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
Gulf Terminal Co. (Mobile) 1st 4s, J. & J., 1957.....	78 1/2 W. O.	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
Houston Belt & Term. 5s, 1937.....	93 96	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
Hous. & Tax. Cont. 1st 5s, 1937.....	96 ..	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C., Rector 6330
Ind. Cent. & St. L. 5s, N. O. 1st 5s, J. & D., 1963.....	99 100	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
Ind. & Louisville 1st 4s, 1956.....	77 81	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
Jacksonville Term. 6s, 1967.....	101 100	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
Man. & Mich. 2d 5s, J. & J., 27.....	97 1/2 99 1/2	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
K. C. F. & M. 4s & O., '36.....	83 1/2 84 1/2	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
K. & L. Term. unstd. 4 1/2s, '61.....	74 1/2 W. O.	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
K. & L. Term. 4 1/2s, 1961.....	82 W. O.	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
L. E. & W. 1st 5s, J. & J., 27.....	95 96	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
Louis. & Ark. 5s, M. & S., 27.....	94 95	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
Louisville & Jeff. Bridge 4s, '45.....	84 1/2 85 1/2	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
L. & N. S. Monon 1st 4s, J. & J., 52.....	84 1/2 85 1/2	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
Mason City & Ft. Dodge 4s, '55.....	33 36	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C., Rector 6330
Macon Term. 1st 5s, 1965.....	98 W. O.	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
Meridian Term. 4s, M. & N., '55.....	78 W. O.	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
Mil. & North. 1st 4 1/2s, J. & D., '24.....	92 1/2 W. O.	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
Mil. & North. con. 4 1/2s, 1934.....	32 1/2 W. O.	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
Minn. & St. L. con. 5s, 1934.....	80 82	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
Minn., St. P. & S. S. Marie Cent. Term. 4s, 1941.....	91 1/2 W. O.	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
Mobile & Ohio 1st 5s, 1940.....	105 106	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
Mo. & B. & I. 5s, J. & J., 45.....	94 1/2 97	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
Mohawk & Malone 1st 4s, 1961.....	86 ..	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C., Rector 6330
M. & St. 3d ext. 4s, 1938.....	86 W. O.	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
New England R. R. 5s, 1945.....	91 93	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
New England R. R. 5s, 1945.....	91 1/2 ..	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C., Rector 6330
N. O. Gt. Northern 5s, 1955.....	58 59	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
N. O. Gt. Northern 5s, 1955.....	57 58	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C., Rector 6330

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## ADVERTISEMENTS.

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## Open Security Market—Bonds

## RAILROADS—Continued

Bid	Offered	

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## ADVERTISEMENTS.

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## Open Security Market—Stocks

## STANDARD OIL SECURITIES—Continued

	Bid	Offered	
Penn. Mex. Fuel Co.	27	29	Charles E. Doyle & Co., 30 Broad St., N.Y.C., Broad 7106
Crairie Oil & Gas.	608	615	Charles E. Doyle & Co., 30 Broad St., N.Y.C., Broad 7106
Crairie Pipe Line.	296	270	Charles E. Doyle & Co., 30 Broad St., N.Y.C., Broad 7106
Solar Refining	345	355	Charles E. Doyle & Co., 30 Broad St., N.Y.C., Broad 7106
south Penn. Oil Co.	95	97	Charles E. Doyle & Co., 30 Broad St., N.Y.C., Broad 7106
southwest Penn. P. L.	217	222	Charles E. Doyle & Co., 30 Broad St., N.Y.C., Broad 7106
standard Oil of Calif. 25 par.	113%	109	Charles E. Doyle & Co., 30 Broad St., N.Y.C., Broad 7106
standard Oil of Ind. 52 par.	118%	118	Charles E. Doyle & Co., 30 Broad St., N.Y.C., Broad 7106
standard Oil of Kansas.	365	363	Charles E. Doyle & Co., 30 Broad St., N.Y.C., Broad 7106
standard Oil of Kentucky.	108%		Charles E. Doyle & Co., 30 Broad St., N.Y.C., Broad 7106
standard Oil of Nebraska.	192	200	Charles E. Doyle & Co., 30 Broad St., N.Y.C., Broad 7106
standard Oil of New York.	469	42	Charles E. Doyle & Co., 30 Broad St., N.Y.C., Broad 7106
standard Oil of Ohio.	470	475	Charles E. Doyle & Co., 30 Broad St., N.Y.C., Broad 7106
standard Oil of Ohio pf.	118	119	Charles E. Doyle & Co., 30 Broad St., N.Y.C., Broad 7106
Uwan & Finch Co.	32	35	Charles E. Doyle & Co., 30 Broad St., N.Y.C., Broad 7106
Union Tank Car Co.	115	117	Charles E. Doyle & Co., 30 Broad St., N.Y.C., Broad 7106
Union Tank Car Co. pf.	110	112	Charles E. Doyle & Co., 30 Broad St., N.Y.C., Broad 7106
Vacuum Oil Co.	478	482	Charles E. Doyle & Co., 30 Broad St., N.Y.C., Broad 7106
Washington Oil	21	25	Charles E. Doyle & Co., 30 Broad St., N.Y.C., Broad 7106
**No dividend.			

## PUBLIC UTILITIES

	Bid	Offered	
Adirondack P. & L. Co. com.	28%	110%	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
Adirondack P. & L. Co. 7% pf.	94	98	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
Am. G. & E. 10% com.	170	173	MacQuoid & Coady, 25 Broad St., N.Y.C., Broad 7654
Am. G. & E. Co. com.	45	46	MacQuoid & Coady, 25 Broad St., N.Y.C., Broad 7654
Am. Pow. & Lt. com.	144	149	MacQuoid & Coady, 25 Broad St., N.Y.C., Broad 7654
Am. Pow. & Lt. pf.	87	89	MacQuoid & Coady, 25 Broad St., N.Y.C., Broad 7654
Am. Pow. & Elec. pf.	40	49	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
Am. Lt. & Trac. 6% com.	138	141	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
Am. Lt. & Trac. 6% pf.	95	97	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
Am. Pow. & Lt. Co. 4% com.	143	147	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
Am. Lt. & Trac. com.	131	141	MacQuoid & Coady, 25 Broad St., N.Y.C., Broad 7654
Am. Lt. & Trac. pf.	93%	97%	MacQuoid & Coady, 25 Broad St., N.Y.C., Broad 7654
Am. Pow. & Lt. Co. 6% pf.	89	92	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
Am. Public Utilities com.	14	18	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
Am. Public Utilities 6% pf.	30	33	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
Appalachian Pow. Co. com.	23%	25%	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
Appalachian Pow. Co. 7% pf.	130	W. O.	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
Appalachian Pow. Co. 7% pf.	77	81	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C., Rector 813
Appalachian Pow. Co. com.	28	28	John Nickerson Jr., 61 Broadway, N.Y.C., Bowl. Gr. 6840
Ark. Lt. & Pow. com.	23	26	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
Ark. Lt. & Pow. Co.	23	25	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
Ark. Lt. & Pow. Co. 7% pf.	70	74	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
Asheville Pow. & Lt. Co. 7% pf.	90	100	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
Augusta-Aiken Ry. & Elec. com.	2	6	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
Augusta-Aiken Ry. & Elec. pf.	4	10	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
Cal. Ry. & Pow. prior pf.	23	35	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
Carolina Pow. & Lt. Co. com.	58	61	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
Carolina Pow. & Lt. Co. 7% pf.	96	100	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
Carolina Power & Lt. com.	62	62	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C., Rector 813
Central Maine Pow. Co. com.	39	42	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
Central Maine Pow. Co. 7% pf.	83	88	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
Central Maine Pow. Co. 7% pf.	93	99	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
Central States Elec. Corp. com.	8%	10	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
Central States Elec. Corp. 7% pf.	70	71	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
Cities Service Co. pf.	70%	71%	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
Cities Service, bankers' shares.	21%	22%	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
Cleve. Elec. Illum. Co. 6% pf.	95	105	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
Central States Elec. Corp. 7% pf.	70	74	H. L. Doherty & Co., 60 Wall St., N.Y.C., Hanover 10606
Cities Service Co. pf.	20%	20%	H. L. Doherty & Co., 60 Wall St., N.Y.C., Hanover 10606
Cities Service Co. pf.	71	71%	H. L. Doherty & Co., 60 Wall St., N.Y.C., Hanover 10606
Cities Service Co. com.	202	204	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
Cleve. Elec. Illum. Co. com.	120	130	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
Cleve. Elec. Illum. Co. 8% pf.	110	113	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
Colorado Pow. Co. 7% pf.	90	94	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
Colorado Pow. Co. com.	23%	25	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C., Rector 813
Colorado Pow. Co. com.	23	25	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
Commonwealth Edison Co. com.	131	133	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
Commonwealth Edison Co. 7% pf.	32	35%	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
Commonwealth Edison Co. 7% pf.	60	69	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
Commonwealth Edison Co. 7% pf.	60	69	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
Conn. Gas & Elec. 6% pf.	88	92	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
Conn. Gas & Elec. com.	35	40	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
Conn. Gas & Elec. 6% pf.	70	75	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
Cumberland Co. P. & L. com.	24	25	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
Cumberland Co. P. & L. 6% cum pf.	74	78	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
Dayton Pow. & Lt. com.	60	65	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
Dayton Pow. & Lt. Co. pf.	83	88	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
Dayton Pow. & Lt. pf.	83	89%	John Nickerson Jr., 61 Broadway, N.Y.C., Bowl. Gr. 6840
Detroit Ed'son 8% capital	115	118	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
Duluth Ed'son Elec. Co. 6% pf.	70	W. O.	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
Duluth-Superior Trac. Co. com.	17	23	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
Duluth-Superior Trac. Co. pf.	25	35	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
Duquesne Light Co. 7% pf.	107	111	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
East Texas Elec. Co. com.	88	92	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
East Texas Elec. Co. 6% pf.	82	85	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
Elec. Bond & Share Co. 6% pf.	97	99	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
Elec. Bond & Share Co. 6% pf.	80	82	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
Federal Lt. & Trac. com.	20%	20%	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
Federal Lt. & Trac. Co. pf.	72%	73	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
Ft. Worth P. & L. 7% pf. (ex div.)	96	99	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
General Gas & Elec. com.	3	4	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
General Gas & Elec. ex. 5% pf.	7%	10	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
Gen. Gas & Elec. 7% cum pf.	54	58	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
Havana Elec. Ry. & Lt. pf.	93	98	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C., Rector 8330
Illinois Trac Co. com.	33	35	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
International Shoe pf.	115	118	John Nickerson Jr., 61 Broadway, N.Y.C., Bowl. Gr. 6840
Iowa Trac Co. 6% pf.	72	76	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
Kansas Gas & Elec. Co. 6% pf.	93	98	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
Kansas Gas & Elec. pf.	93	96	John Nickerson Jr., 61 Broadway, N.Y.C., Bowl. Gr. 6840
Kentucky Security Corp. com.	27	30	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
Kentucky Secur. Corp. 6% pf.	68	73	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
Lehigh Power Co.	19	19%	MacQuoid & Coady, 25 Broad St., N.Y.C., Broad 7654
Lehigh Pow. Secur. Co. capital	18%	19%	John Nickerson Jr., 61 Broadway, N.Y.C., Bowl. Gr. 6840
Metropolitan Edison pf.	92%	92%	John Nickerson Jr., 61 Broadway, N.Y.C., Bowl. Gr. 6840
Michigan Elec. Ry. & Lt. 6% pf.	92	97	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
Miss. River Pow. Co. com.	31	32%	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C., Rector 8330
Miss. River Pow. Co. 6% pf.	84	85	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
National Lt. & H. P. com.	5	10	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
National Lt. & H. P. 5% pf.	25	35	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
Nebraska Pow. Co. 7% pf.	93	96	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
Niagara Falls Pow. Co. 7% pf.	109	111	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
New Orleans Public Service.	21	24	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C., Rector 8330
North. Ont. Lt. & Pow. Co. com.	55	63	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
North. Ont. Lt. & P. Co. 6% cum pf.	99	102	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
North. States Pow. Co. 8% com.	93%	95%	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
North. States Pow. Co. 7% pf.	90%	92%	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
Pac. Gas & Elec. 1st pf.	90%	92%	John Nickerson Jr., 61 Broadway, N.Y.C., Bowl. Gr. 6840
Pac. Gas & Elec. 1st pf.	90%	92%	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
Pac. Pow. & Lt. 7% cum pf.	102	104	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
Puget Sound Pow. & Lt. com.	54%	56%	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
Puget Sound Pow. & Lt. com.	102	104	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
Repub. Ry. & Light com.	1%	1%	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
Repub. Ry. & Lt. 6% pf.	43	44	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
Saratont Electric.	12	14	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C., Rector 8330
Republic Ry. & Light com.	12	14	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
Republic Ry. & Lt. 6% pf.	43	44	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
South. Cal. Edison Co. 8% com.	104%	106%	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
South. Cal. Edison Co. 8% pf.	122	W. O.	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
South. Cal. Edison Co. com.	106%	108%	John Nickerson Jr., 61 Broadway, N.Y.C., Bowl. Gr. 6840
Southwestern Pow. & Lt. pf.	91	93%	John Nickerson Jr., 61 Broadway, N.Y.C., Bowl. Gr. 6840
Standard Gas & Elec. Co. 8% pf.	48	49	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
Tenn. Elec. Power Co. com.	14	14%	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
Tenn. Elec. Power Co. new.	14%	13%	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C., Rector 8330
Tenn. Elec. Power Co. 6% 2d pf.	35	37	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C., Rector 813
Toledo Ed'son Co. 6% pf.	93%	95%	A. A. Housman & Co., 20

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